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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to study in depth the 
influence of Imam al-Juwayni on Imam al-Ghazali's 
discussion of theology and whether or not the latter's 
ideas are properly derived from the former. The first 
chapter deals with an analysis of the life of both the 
Imams against the background of the religious milieu of 
their time. The second chapter discuss the views of the 
two Imams on dI1m al-Kaiäm. The third chapter attempts 
to compare and contrast Imam al-Juwayni's and Imam al- 
Ghazali's approach to the doctrine of the origin of the 
world and the existence of God. In the fourth chapter 
we assess the views of the two Imams on the problem of 
the attributes of God. The fifth chapter deals with the 
question of human actions and free will. The final 
chapter present their. views on prophethood and 
messengership. 
While many Islamic scholars have a vague 
notion that Imäm al-Ghazäli's ideas on theology depend 
heavily upon Imäm al-Juwaynl, this thesis attempts to 
prove that Imäm al-Ghazäli's theological position and 
views have been greatly influenced by his teacher, Imäm 
al-Juwayni. This work sets out to show this in detail. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on the theological 
positions of Imam al-Juwayni and his student, Imam al- 
Ghazali, and hopes to define a relationship between 
these two important scholars and to demonstrate their 
importance in Islamic scholarship. 
Imm al-Juwayni is one of the outstanding 
theologians, jurists, and mystics of the fifth century 
of the Hijrah. He was knowledgeable in figh 
(jurisprudence), `Ilm a1-f; aläm (theology), tasawwuf 
(mysticism), logic, and poetry. Many Islamic scholars 
of great renown studied under him. 
One of his greatest students was Imam al- 
Ghazali who is known as tiujjat al-Isläm (the proof of 
Islam). He was one of the religious reformers in the 
Islamic community in the fifth century of the Hijrah. 
He first met Imam al-Juwayn3 in N3sabür in 473/1080 and 
studied under him until 478/1085. Within this period 
Imam al-Ghazali learned widely from this man in various 
fields including theology, mysticism, and logic. 
The works of Imäm al-GhazTali have been spread 
widely throughout the world and translated into many 
1 
languages such as English, Urdu, and Malay. He is very 
famous in the Islamic world for his knowledge and 
ideas, especially his views on theology. His work is 
considered one of the standard references of Islamic 
teaching. 
Not many people know about his teacher, Imäm 
al-Juwayni, who influenced him in his ideas on 
theology. However, to Islamic. scholars it has long been 
known that in his work on theology Imäm al-Ghazäli 
depended very heavily upon this man. Despite this 
general scholarly knowledge no systematic study of this 
influenced has been researched. This provides the 
rationale for this study. Most of the theological 
opinions of Imäm al-Ghazäli had already been touched 
upon by his teacher. That is why we believe that it is 
very important to research this relationship, to 
discover and show the theological influence of Imäm al- 
Juwayni on Imäm al-Ghazäli. 
The aim of this thesis is, therefore, to 
explore and expound the influence of Imam al-Juwayni on 
the theology of Imäm al-Ghazäli, and present an 
analysis of material to suggest the extent to which the 
latter's ideas are derived from the former. The central 
question is the extent to which Imäm al-Ghazäli was 
influenced by the teaching of Imäm al-Juwayni. To 
address this question we shall seek to discover 
influences and similarities between them in their 
2 
methods and in their opinions on identical or similar 
problems. 
There are indeed several aspects from which 
the thought of these two men may be studied, the 
philosophical, the juristic, and the theological 
aspect. Their contribution to theology is an extremely 
important page in the history of Islamic thought, more 
particularly in the history of the Ash`ariyah school. 
They played an important role in this school for the 
development of the Ashcarite doctrine by combining 
philosophical and doctrinal problems and using rational 
argumentation to make their points. 
Imam al-Ghazäli sometimes uses different 
methods from Imäm al-Juwayni in discussing his views on 
theological problems. Some of these differences are 
slight, some great, but on the whole the trend which he 
followed was similar to that of his teacher and the 
conclusions were the same. With this in mind, we may 
try to find out which of them was the more successful 
in dealing with such problems as the concept of God, 
His Attributes, and the like, and in clarifying and 
simplifying theological arguments, so that the 
community could comprehend and accept them. 
3 
Modern scholarship on the subject 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no 
recent systematic study of the theological influence of 
Imäm al-Juwayni on Imäm al-Ghazäli in the manner and on 
the scale being presented in this thesis. The few 
discussions to be found are somewhat summary in fashion 
and can serve as background for the study of some 
aspects of the thought of Imäm al-Juwayni and Imäm al- 
Ghazäli. 
In 1903, D. B. Macdonald, wrote a few 
sentences about Imam al-Ghazzli's views on theology in 
his book, Development of Muslim Theology Jurisprudence 
and Constitutional Theory. 1 In this work Macdonald 
likens Imäm al-Ghazäl3 to the modern theologian, 
Ritschl, who rejected metaphysics and opposed the 
influence of any philosophical system on his theology. 
A. J. Wensinck also wrote briefly about Imäm 
al-Ghazäli's views on kaläm in his book, The Muslim 
Creed. 2 In this book he asserts that among Imäm al- 
1D. B. Macdonald, Development of Muslim Theology 
Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory, London, 1932, 
p. 238. 
2A. J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, Cambridge, 1932, p. 
95. 
4 
Ghazäli's works on kaläm is a1-Igtisäd f3 al-I` tigäd 
which consists of four aspects of kaläm. Firstly Imam 
al-Ghazäli discuss the essence (dhät) of God, His 
existence and its eternity; secondly he deals with the 
Attributes of God; thirdly he deals with the acts of 
God; and finally he deals with prophethood. 
A 
ý 
In. 1947, A. S. Tritton, devoted a few pages to 
Imäm al-Juwayni's views on theology in his book, Muslim 
Theology. 3 In this work Tritton noted that the Imäm al- 
Juwayn3 rejected the validity of cIlm al-Kaläm at the 
end of his life. However, according to Tritton, al- 
Subk3 rejects this account. L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati 
also wrote briefly about the theological views of Imäm 
al-Juwayni and Imäm al-Ghazäli in their book, 
Introduction a La Theologie Musulmane. 4 
In 1960, Fawqiyyah Husayn Mahmüd carried out 
a study of Imäm al-Juwayni's views on the creation of 
the world. Her unpublished Ph. D thesis al-Juwayni and 
his doctrine of the origination of the world throws 
some light on Imäm al-Juwayni's theological views. 
5 
3A. S. Tritton, Muslim Theology, Bristol, 1947, p. 185. 
4L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati, Introduction a La 
Theologie Musulmane, Paris, 1948. 
5Fawqiyah Husayn MahmUd, al-Juwayni and his doctrine of 
the origination of the world, unpublished Ph. D thesis, 
University of Edinburgh, 1960. 
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However, her thesis is limited to a discussion of the 
origination of the world. 
Mahmüd commences her thesis with a discussion 
of the life and personality of Imäm al-Juwayni in which 
she explains the early life of Imäm al-Juwayni and his 
education. In the second part of her thesis, she 
discusses the origination of the world. In this she 
explains Imäm al-Juwayni's doctrine of knowledge. Under 
the title of the sources of knowledge, Mahmüd discusses 
its degrees, subjects, the method of each subject, and 
the aim of Imäm al-Juwayni in seeking knowledge in all 
its forms. It seems that Mahmüd tries to shows how Imäm 
al-Juwayni studied the world, and how Imäm al-Juwayni 
considered its problems. Mahmüd then goes on to discuss 
how Imäm al-Juwayni distinguishes between studying the 
world according to theology and studying it to know its 
different phenomena. Her thesis then goes on to discuss 
the sources of knowledge according to Imäm al-Juwayni, 
which are reason (a1-`Aq1), the senses (a1-fawäss) and 
the self (al-Nafs). 
In the conclusion of part two of her thesis 
Mahmnd draws comparisons between Imam al-Juwayni and 
two of his predecessors, al-Bagillani and al-Baghdadi. 
The aim of her comparison is to show how far Imam al- 
Juwayn3 was successful in presenting his predecessors' 
view in a better and neater way on the subject of the 
origination of the world. Finally in the part three of 
6 
her thesis, she presents an edited version of an 
unpublished work of Imam al-Juwayni, Lumac al-Adillah 
fi Qawädid cAgä'id Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamäcah, which 
till then was still in manuscript form. 
A certain amount of information about the 
similarity of Imäm al-Juwayni's view on theology with 
those of Imäm al-Ghazdli can also be found in the work 
of W. M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology. 6 He 
mentions that the theological work produce by Imäm al- 
Ghazäli, al-Igtisäd fi al-Ictigäd, was similar to the 
work of Imäm al-Juwayni, al-Irshäd ilä Qawätic al- 
Adillah f3 Usül al-Ic tigäd. 
In 1967, J. W. Sweetman, in his book, Islam 
and Christian Theology, noted some of Imam al-Ghazäl3's 
views on theology.? Sweetman compares Imam al-Ghazäl3's 
understanding as presented in Ihyä' with Baghdad3's al- 
Farq bayn al-Firaq and asserts that Imam al-Ghazäli 
does not serously depart from the fundamental beliefs 
contained in Baghdad3's al-Farq. He also noted that 
though Baghdad! is in many respects wider than Imam al- 
Ghazal3 in his views, the main principles are the same 
in both. He also noted that Baghdäd3 does not include 
6W. M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Edinburgh, 
1962, p. 118. 
7J. W. Sweetman, Islam and Christian Theology, London, 
1967, Part 2, vol. 2, p. 27. 
7 
in his discussion the question of God settling on the 
throne, whereas Imäm al-Ghazäli did that in his 
discussion. 
In 1976, H. A. Wolfson wrote a valuable book 
on the kaläm, entitled The Philosophy of the Kaläm. 8 In 
this book he devotes a few very important pages to the 
III 
similarity of Imam al-Juwayni's and Imäm al-Ghazäli's 
views on the- theory of acquisition. According to him 
the argument used by Imäm al-Ghazäli concerning the 
theory of acquisition is the same argument as used by 
Imäm al-Ghazäli's teacher, Imäm al-Juwayni, in his 
refutation of compulsionism. 
In 1986, a book entitled Abi al-Ma`au3 al- 
Juwayni wa Atharuhu fi dIlm al-Kaläm, by Muhammad b. 
CAll CUthmän mentions some of Imäm al-Juwaynis's view 
on the Attributes of God. 9 In this book he also touches 
upon Imäm al-Juwayni's view on the scale (al-mizän), 
repentance (al-tawba), and the Imämate. 
A recent book, The Classification of 
Knowledge in Islam by Osman Bakar, mentions that Imäm 
al-Ghazäli's view on kaläm was influenced by Imäm al- 
BH. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Kaiäm, Harvard, 1976. 
9Muhammad b. CAll `Uthmän, AbU al-MaCä13 al-Juwaynä wa 
Atharuhu fi `Ilm al-Kaläm, Beirut, 1986. 
8 
Juwayni. 10 He asserts that Imäm al-Ghazäli studied 
kaläm with Imäm al-Juwaynl. The latter played a 
significant role in the philosophization of Ashcarite 
kaläm. This philosophization influenced Imäm al- 
Ghazäli's own vision and treatment of kalem as a 
discipline. 
;- 
Sources 
This research is based mainly on primary 
sources which are in printed form. For Imam al- 
Juwayni's view on theological discussion we consulted 
three of his works: 
a) al-Shämil fä Usü1 al-Din, written between 
456/1063 and 459/1066. This book is useful because it 
contains most of Imäm al-Juwayni's theological 
opinions. It deals thoroughly with his views on the 
origination of the world; the substance (Jawhar); the 
accident (carad ); the existence of God and His 
Attributes; human actions; the prophethood of Muhammad 
and the Imamate. 
b) A1-Irshed ilä Qawäti` a1-Adillah fl Usü1 
al-Ictigäd, written after 459/1066. This book covers 
100sman Bakar, The Classification of Knowledge in 
Islam, Kuala Lumpur, 1992, p. 157. 
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almost the same areas as discussed in al-Shämil. 
However, the discussion in al-Irshäd is more brief. In 
fact we could consider this book as a summary of al- 
Shämil. 
c) A1-cAgidah a1-Niz5miyyah, written in about 
471/. 1078. This book was composed late in Imam al- 
Juw, Syn3's life and introduces the topic of kaläm. This 
work presents his true opinion about kaläm. He declares 
that kalem is a good way to prove the existence of God, 
but is not a means to the knowledge of God Himself. 
This opinion of Imam al-Juwayn3 stresses the great 
importance of kaläm, because he considers it as a 
science leading to the knowledge of the existence of 
God. 
As for Imam al-Ghazäll, this thesis relies on 
three of his published works: 
a) al-Igtisäd fä al-Ictigäd, written in about 
487/1094. Almost all of Imäm al-Ghazäli's views on 
theological discussion can be found in this book. This 
work deals with roughly the same topics as the al- 
Irshäd of Imäm al-Juwayni. Both these works make full 
use of the syllogism in their discussion. 
b) Ihyä' C U. Iwn al-Din, written in about 
492/1098. This book is the greatest work of Imam al- 
Ghazäli in its length, the importance of its contents, 
10 
and its influence. The work is in four volumes and is 
divided into four quarters, dealing with: cult 
practices (cibädät), social customs (cädät), vices, or 
faults of character leading to perdition (muhlikät), 
and virtues or qualities leading to salvation 
(munjiyä t). Each quarter has ten chapters. However, 
this thesis only utilises volume one, chapter Qawacid 
a1-cAga id, and volume four, chapter al-Tawhid wa al- 
Tawakkul, which deal with the subject of this research. 
c) A1-Munqidh min al-Da1ä1, written in about 
502/1108. This book is not precisely an autobiography, 
nor an accurate chronological record of events. It is, 
however, arranged schematically according to the 
development of his religious opinions. The title of al- 
Munqidh min al-Daläl (Deliverance from Error), has 
presumably a social as well as an individual reference, 
and carried the implication that the community has 
somehow gone astray. Imam al-Ghazäll's aim in this book 
is to show the reader the utmost degrees and inmost 
nature of the Islamic sciences and the perplexing 
depths of religious systems. 
However, the range of works of both Imäms 
were also consulted in order to glean more detailed 
information. The above list was, however, the main 
source for the discussion. 
11 
CHAPTER ONE 
The world of Imäm al-Juwayn3 and Imäm 
al-Ghazäli 
To understand the contribution of Imam al- 
Juwayn3 and Imam al-Ghazäl3 to theological thought we 
need briefly to study their lives and historical 
context. 
1.1.1 Political Background 
Imäm al-Juwayn3 and Imäm al-Ghaz7al3 both 
lived in the fifth century of the Hijrah, an era of 
great political upheaval. To trace this we need to go 
back to the Abbasid caliphs. In the year 334/945 the 
power of the Abbasid caliph began to weaken and his 
rule became overshadowed by the Buyids who had become 
the power in the Baghdad area. l The caliph of that 
particular time became only a caliph in name and lost 
any real power. 2 
The Buyids took this opportunity to spread 
the Shiite doctrines throughout the land. The Fatimid 
caliph aided the Buyids by sending their delegates to 
1Kennedy, Prophet, p. 198. 
2Morgan, Persia, p. 23. 
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the leaders of the scattered communities in order to 
spread the Shiite belief and to create confusion among 
the people and cause wider disagreements among them. 
This situation remained for a hundred years until the 
Saljügs came to power in Baghdad in the year 447/1055.3 
They were led by the founder of their house, Rukn al- 
Dawlah Abü Tälib, well known as Toghril Beg, who died 
in year 455/1063.4 
When Toghril Beg died his nephew, Alp Arslan, 
succeeded him and ruled the Saljuq's empire in 
455/1063.5 He had his own 'prime minister' known as 
Nizäm al-Mulk who had a deep knowledge of Islam and was 
a very generous, liberal and forgiving man. Most of his 
council members were fugahä' and other Islamic 
leaders. 6 He used his political wisdom to settle 
disputes among the sects and he achieved this by giving 
advice based on Sunnite principles. 
1.1.1.1 Sectarian Altercation. 
In the fifth century there were many 
instances of infighting caused by differences in 
3Kennedy, Prophet, p. 349. 
4Morgan, Persia, p. 27. 
51bid., p. 29. 
61bn Kathir, Bidäyah, vol. 12, p. 217. 
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Islamic interpretation between madhhabs (sects) and we 
will only mention those conflicts which occurred at the 
time of Imäm al-Juwayni and were current at the end of 
Imäm al-Ghazäli's life. 
In Baghdad, the religious dissensions (titan) 
occurred in 443/1051 between the Shiites and the 
Sunnites. The cause of this conflict was a sentence 
written in golden characters by some of the inhabitants 
of al-Karkh on towers flanking the fishermen's gate, 
"Muhammad and CAll are the best of mankind; whoever 
agrees is a believer and whoever denies this is an 
unbeliever. " The Sunnites become incensed at this and 
refused to accept the association of `Ali and the 
prophet Muhammad or the sense of an equal importance 
between them as suggested by the inscription on the 
tower. 7 
Moreover, the Hanbalites also interfered and 
prevented the Sunnite followers from drinking water 
from the Tigris river and gave them instead water which 
was mixed with contaminated. This water caused the 
death of one of the Hashimites. His body was taken to 
the city by his family who went around the streets with 
the death song. The Sunnite followers became angry at 
this death and took revenge by wrecking the graves of 
7Ibn al-Athir, K-arail, vol. 8, p. 59. 
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the Buyid kings and ministers, plundering and robbing 
them. 8 
At the end of 444/1052 the conflict between 
Sunnite and Shidite flared again. The Shicites burned 
Sunnite houses and wrote the words "Muhammad and `Ali 
are the best of mankind" on Sunnite mosques and called 
upon people to do likewise as a good deed. 9 
In the year 447/1055 another dispute occured 
in Baghdad between the fugahä' of the Shäficites and 
Hanbalites; the Hanbalites refused to utter the 
Basmalah (the name of God) openly and refused to recite 
the qundt in the dawn prayer. l0 Because of this the 
Shäficites fugahä' became angry and refused to attend 
the Friday prayer led by the Hanbalite imam. This 
caused more division between them. 11 
In Nisäbür, Civil disorders spreed between 
443/1051 and 447/1055. The dissension which caused the 
disorders is known in Islamic history as fitnah al- 
8Ibid. 
9Ibn Kathir, Bideyah, vol. 12, p. 6. 
10Ibn al-Athir, Emil, vol. 8, p. 72. 
11Ibn Kathir, Bidäyah, vol. 10, p. 71. 
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Kunduri. 12 The reason for this strife was that al- 
Kunduri, who is described as a Hanaf1 and who was the 
minister (wazlr) of Toghril Beg, envied the influence 
of the mayor of Nisäbür, Abü Sahl b. al-Muwaffaq who 
was himself a pious Ashcarite scholar. Because of this 
piety the latter became famous among Sunnite followers. 
Al-Kunduri feared that Abü Sahl may compete for his 
position of prime minister. Therefore, he insinuated to 
the sultan that there ought to be a campaign against 
heresy in faith. In this way al-Kunduri hoped to 
camouflage his intention to condemn the Ashcarite and 
he hinted to the sultan that this group was guilty of 
heretical statements. He thus created false accounts 
that al-Ashcari had uttered opinions contrary to the 
religion and Sunnah of the prophet Muhammad. The sultan 
consequently became angry with what was reported and 
ordered that the Ashtarite should be prohibited from 
preaching in mosques, as well as being cursed from 
pulpits. This situation led to the emigration of some 
Ashcarites from the town, and among these emigrants was 
Imäm al-Juwayni. 
Towards the end of the life of Imäm al- 
Juwayni, which is the period we consider as the 
beginning of the scholarship of Imäm al-Ghazäli, these 
12A1-Kunduri is the first minister (wazir) of the 
Saljüq sultan, Toghril Beg. His full name is Muhammad 
b. Mansur b. Muhammad Abn Nasr, died in 457/1064. 
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disputes proliferated. In the year 469/1076 another 
conflict between the Shäfidites and Hanbalites took 
place when Abü Nasr b. al-Qushayri arrived in Baghdad 
on his way to perform the hajj in Mecca. He addressed 
the Nizämiyyah school, and in this talk he preached to 
pcople to be closer to their teachers. So, he gained 
many followers and some of them were fanatical 
supporters. The quarrel between him and the Hanbalites 
who attended the talk began because all his talk was 
based on the beliefs of the Ashcarite sect. The quarrel 
between them became so serious that he was killed by a 
group of 4anbalites. 13 
In the year 502/1108 peace between Shiites 
and Sunnites was established after a quarrel that had 
lasted many years. This was due to the efforts made by 
the Sultan. All Muslims at that time were happy at this 
news, especially the Sunnites and Shiites because the 
internecine war had lasted for so many years and so 
many lives had been lost. 
At the end of the fifth century the Bdtinite 
movement led by their leader Hasan b. Sabäh al- 
Ismädill, who died in 518/1124,14 caused many problems. 
The issue became more serious when the Bdtinites overan 
the castle known as the Spanish fort which had been 
13Ibn al-Athir, K-a-mil, vol. 8, p. 124. 
14Ibid., p. 317. 
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built by Malik Shah. When this news reached Nizam al- 
Mulk, he sent his armies against the Bätinites and 
surrounded them. They reacted by sending their army to 
kill Nizäm al-Mulk and he was killed in the year 
485/1092.15 
In the year 494/1100 the Bätinite movement 
became more dangerous in Khuräsän. Sultan Berk-Yaruq 
wanted to destroy them; so he prepared his armies and 
went out to arrest and kill them. The sultan's men 
killed some of the Bätinite followers and captured 
many. 16 
In the year 497/1103 the amir of Bazghash 
gathered the armies of Khuräsän to kill the Bätinite 
followers and many of them were killed and he released 
those who were still alive with several conditions: 
that is, they must build a fort for the sultan, and 
when finished, they must leave the country. So, in 
498/1104 they were moved to the town Bayhaq where many 
of them died. 17 
However, the Bätinite still held the fort in 
Isbahän and in 500/1106 Sultan Muhammad Jisha attacked 
15A1-Suyüt3, Tärikh al-Khulafä', Beirut, n. d. p. 427; 
Morgan, Persia, p. 32. 
16Ibn Athir, Kämil, vol. 8, p. 200. 
17Ibid., p. 228. 
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that fort and surrounded it until they agreed to return 
the fort to the sultan. That they did on the condition 
that he relinquished to them the Khalinjan fort. 
However, when the Bätinite followers were in this 
critical situation, the sultan ordered his armies to 
attack and kill them. 18 The disturbances caused by the 
Bätinite movement continued until the death of Imäm al- 
Ghazäli. 
There is no doubt that these social conflicts 
affected the life of Imäm al-Juwayni and Imäm al- 
Ghazäli as mentioned by Islamic historians. 19 These 
difficulties caused Imäm al-Juwayni and the leaders of 
the Sunnite to move to Baghdad and Hijäz. 
Ibn Khallikän mentions that Imäm al-Juwayni 
travelled to Baghdad and met many culamä' in that 
city. 20 He used all his time to seek knowledge from 
these culamä' by sitting with them to discuss religious 
matters and sought means to protect the faith. All this 
can be seen through his writing, especially on 111m al- 
Kaläm. He worked very hard to defend the Sunnite view 
and clearly mentioned that he followed the Salaf (early 
181bid., p. 242. 
19Al-Subkl, Tabagät, vol. 5, p. 170; 
-Ibn al-dImäd, Shadharät, vol. 3, p. 253; 
-Ibn al-Jawzl, Muntazam, vol. 9, p. 170. 
20Ibn Khallikän, Wafayät, vol. 4, p. 170. 
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Muslim) way and firmly followed what has been revealed 
in the Qur3dn and the Sunnah of the prophet Muhammad. 
He also wrote a book on the problem of Imämah which was 
popularly known as al-Ghiyäth. 
In this book he acknowledges Nizäm al-Mulk 
who was working very hard to protect the Sunnite 
followers from heretical innovators. This can be seen 
from his introduction to the book in which he says: 
"The writer included the wide services of the 
Nizämiyyah in another book. 1121 This means that he wrote 
another book given the name of al-Nizämiyyah wa al- 
arkän al-Islämiyyah, also known as al-cAgädah al- 
Nizämiyyah. This was in praise of Nizäm al-Mulk and to 
show his love and respect to this man who gave strong 
support and help to the Sunnite sect. 
As for Imäm al-Ghazäll, we can see his role 
in defending Islam from its enemies, spreading dacwa 
(missionary activity) and calling people to return to 
the teaching of the Qur'än and the Sunnah of the 
prophet Muhammad. He also took the pious Salaf (early 
Muslim) as his model to follow in every day life. We 
can see that in one of his famous book, Fadä'ih al- 
Bätiniyyah, he castigates the Bätinite movement and 
says: "I have mentioned the wrongness of this group 
firstly, in the book al-Mustazhari; secondly, in the 
21A1-Juwayni, Ghiyäth, p. 12. 
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book Hujjat a1-Bay5n; thirdly, in the book Mufagsil a1- 
Khiläf, which has twelve chapters; fourthly in the book 
al-Darj al-Marqüm; and fifthly, in the book a1-Qist5s 
al-Mustagim which means exposition of the balance of 
knowledge and the declaration that there is no 
infallible imäm. "22 
Imam al-Ghazäli proclaimed his fatwa clearly 
about Bätinites: "This movement is murtadd (apostate) 
and kufr (infidel) because their beliefs deviated from 
Islam and they should be killed and not be allowed in 
this world because they only live for making 
trouble. "23 He has also explained his analysis of this 
movement in his book al-Munqidh min al-Dal5l. 24 
1.1.2 Social Background 
The society of that particular time and place 
consisted of different races such as Arabs, Persians, 
Turks and Kurds. As we discussed earlier, the rulers in 
the middle of the fifth century Hijrah were the Buyids 
(Ban! Buwayh) of Persian origin, and later on they were 
replaced with Saljügs of Turkish descent, who dominated 
Baghdad and most of the Islamic world. 
22A1-Ghazäli, Munqidh, p. 137. 
23A1-Ghazäli, Fadä'ih, p. 11. 
24A1-Ghazäli, Munqidh, pp. 95-147. 
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Life in general in the society of that time 
was chaotic and unstable, and this was due to the 
weakness of the rulers, especially the caliph. This 
caused the spread of fitnah (civil strife) and war in 
that society. Society was divided into several classes. 
The Sultan, ministers, Amirs and leaders were in the 
elite with lives full of prosperity, and were also free 
to do anything they liked while the other classes were 
expected to obey the rules. The caliph used to spend 
the country's wealth on his own needs and desires. Ibn 
Kathir gives an example of such excess when the caliph 
al-Mugtadi married the sultan Malik Shah's daughter in 
480/1087. He prepared one hundred and thirty camels 
covered with silk cloths which were full of gold and 
silver and also prepared seventy four mules covered 
with silk, and their necklaces were made from gold and 
silver. 25 
The caliph spent thousands of dinars on his 
own needs without paying attention to the people who 
needed help to survive in their lives. Many people died 
in Baghdad at that time from lack of food and from 
disease. It is recorded they were very weak and had no 
strength even to bury their dead. 26 
251bn Kathir, Bidäyah, vol. 12, p. 141. 
26Ibid., p. 168. 
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Most of the scholars at that time were more 
interested in zuhd (asceticism), and some of them had 
totally relinquished an interest in the world, such as 
the scholar Abü Nasr al-Siraj al-TUsi (d. 378/988), his 
student Abü `Abd al-Rahman al-Salami (d. 412/1021), and 
Imam al-Qushayri. They all claimed that only the true 
tasawwuf could implement the Sharicah. 27 The wazir 
Nizam al-Mulk (d. 485/1092) was a pious and ascetic man. 
When he heard the call to prayer he would stop doing 
anything until he performed the prayer. Most of his 
offices were filled by the fugahä' and scholars. 
The Saljnq rulers were better than the 
Buyids. They gave back to the caliph some of his power 
and they worked very hard to fight and capture the 
leaders of the Bdtinite movement. They also spread 
culture and knowledge throughout the country and they 
showed more concern for the situation of their 
citizens. 
1.1.3 Cultural Background 
The growth of education in the time of Imam 
al-Juwayni and Imäm al-Ghazäli was very great. Islamic 
scholars at that time worked very hard to seek 
, 
27Shawg3 Dayf, `Asr al-Duwal wa al-Imärät, Cairo, 1980, 
p. 518. 
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knowledge and spread it to the public. Therefore, 
Islamic and other studies such as tafsir, (exegesis) 
hadith (tradition) fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) 
philosophy and logic, developed in that city. 
When Nizäm al-Mulk was appointed as wazir by 
Alp Arslan in 455/1063 he started to build many schools 
such as the Madrasah of Baghdad, and the Madrasah of 
Nisäbür. 28 The objective behind this was to spread the 
Sunnite sect through these schools. He spent a lot of 
money to maintain those schools and especially on those 
who wanted to seek knowledge. It is reported he spent 
about 600,000 dinars a year for this purpose. 29 
When this news reached Malik Shah, he said 
that the money which was spent by Nizäm al-Mulk on the 
schools could have been used to build his army. Nizäm 
al-Mulk then explained to Malik Shah: "I was building 
for you a group of armies called "night armies". When 
your ordinary armies sleep at night, your night armies 
will take over from them to face God with their tears 
and their tongues to make ducä' (prayer) for you and 
your armies so you and your armies may live with their 
prayer and wisdom. "30 
28A1-Subk3, Tabaqät, vol. 4, p. 303. 
29Zaki Mubärak, al-Akhläq linda al-Ghazäli, Cairo, 1391 
A. H., p. 26. 
30Ibid. 
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The system of schools which was built by 
Nizäm al-Mulk was followed by the people after him. Abü 
al-Gharä'im, known as Täj al-Mulk, built a school in 
Baghdad called al-Näjiyah in 480/1087.31 Abi Sacd 
Sharaf al-Mulk al-Khawärizm3 al-Hanaf3 (d. 494/1100) 
also built a big school in Baghdad. 32 
Many great scholars in various fields 
flourished at that time, especially in Islamic studies, 
such as al-Q&41 Abü Bakr al-Tayyib al-Bdgilldni 
(d. 403/1012); 33 al-Qddi CAbd al-Jabbdr b. Ahmad Abü 
Hasan al-Muctazili (d. 415/1024); 34 Abü al-Mazffar al- 
Isfardyini (d. 471/1078); 35 Hasan b. cAbdullah Ibn Sind 
(d. 428/1036); 36 the great süfi Abü Qdsim al-Qushayri 
(d. 469/1076); the teacher of the Shäficils, al-Shaykh 
Abü Ishdq al-Shayrdzi (d. 476/1083). 37 
31Ibn Taghr! Bird!, Nujüm, vol. 5, p. 25. 
32Ibid. 
331bn cAsäkir, Tabyin, p. 217. 
34A1-Subkl, Tabagät, vol. 3, p. 221. 
351bn `Asäkir, Tabyin, p. 276. 
361bn Kathlr, Bidäyah, vol. 12, p. 40. 
37Ibid., vol. 12, p. 133. 
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1.2.1 The life of Imam al-Juwayni 
The full name of Imäm al-Juwayni is CAbd al- 
Malik b. CAbdullah b. Yüsuf b. Muhammad b. Hayyüyah al- 
Juwayni. 38He also has the patronymic (kunyah) name Abü 
al-Macäll. 39 
As to his generic name (nisbah) all 
biographers40call him "al-Juwayni" except al-Subk3, who 
calls him "al-N3säbür3" after the town of N3s5bür. 41 
His name "al-Juwayni" is inherited from his father who 
38A1-Subki, Tabaqat, vol. 5, p. 165. 
-Ibn Khallikän, Wafayat, vol. 4, p. 170. 
-Ibn al-'Imäd, Shadharat, vol. 3, p. 357. 
-Ibn al-Jawzi, Muntazam, vol. 9, p. 18. 
-Ibn Kathir, Bidayah, vol. 12, p. 128. 
-Ibn cAsäkir, Tabyin, p. 278. 
-A1-Jundär3, Ahmad b. `Abdullah, Tarajim a1-Rija1, 
Cairo, 1322 A. H. p. 19. 
39lbid. 
40Ibn Khallikän, Wafayät, vol. 4, p. 170. 
-Ibn al-dImäd, Shadharät, vol. 3, p. 357. 
-Ibn al-Jawz3, Muntazam, vol. 9, p. 18. 
-Ibn Kathir, Bidäyah, vol. 12, p. 128. 
-Ibn CAsäkir, Tabyin, p. 278. 
41A1-Subk3, Tabagät, vol. 5, p. 166. 
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was also called "al-Juwayni" after the place called 
"Juwayn. "42 
He was also known by the honorific name 
(laqab) Imäm al-Haramayn, because he lived at Mecca and 
Madinah for four years. There he served the Islamic 
faith by debating, giving decisions in Islamic Law and 
trying to spread religious knowledge far and wide. 43 
1.2.1.1 Date of Birth 
His biographers differ about the date of his 
birth. Al-Subki, 44 Ibn Khallikän, 45 and Ibn Kathir, 46 
all write that he was born on the 18th of Muharram 
419/1028. On the other hand Ibn Taghri Birdi, 47 and Ibn 
al-Jawzi, 48 note that he was born in 417/1026. 
42juwayn is located between Bistäm and Nlsäbür, bounded 
by Bayhaq in the west and by Jdjiram in the north. (See 
Mucjam al-Buldän, vol. 2, p. 223) 
43Ibid. 
441bid., p. 17. 
451bn Khallikän, Wafayät, vol. 4, p. 170. 
461bn Kathir, Bidäyah, vol. 12, p. 128. 
471bn Taghr! Bird!, Nujüm, vol. 5, p. 121. 
48Ibn al-Jawzl, Muntazam, vol. 9, p. 18. 
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1.2.1.2 Place of Birth 
Imäm al-Juwayni was born in the province of 
Khuräsän. Brockelmann in Geschichte Der Arabischen 
Litteratur mentions that he was born in Bustingdn. 49 
Hgwever, none of the sources quoted by Brockelmann 
mention Imam al-Juwayni's birthplace but all agree that 
Bustingän was the place where he died. 
1.2.1.3 Early Education 
Imäm al-Juwayni studied jurisprudence (figh) 
under his father, 50and earned his admiration. He also 
exerted himself in the study of legal rites (al- 
madhähib), especially the Shäficite one, their 
differences, and theology. He learnt hadith (tradition) 
from several Culamä' (Islamic scholars) such as Abü 
Hasan, Abü Sacd al-Nadawi, and Mansur b. Dämis, a well- 
known muhaddith (traditionalist). 51 
49Bustingän is one of the pleasant little villages near 
Nisäbür. It is separated from Nisäbür about 3 or 3 and 
half miles. 
50He is Abü Muhammad CAbdullah b. Yüsuf b. CAbdullah 
b. Yüsuf b. Muhammad al-Juwayni (d. 439/1047). He was a 
great authority on hadith, figh, and theology. See Ibn 
Khallikän, Wafayät, vol. 4, p. 84; Ibn CAsäkir, Tabyin, 
p. 180. 
51A1-Subk1, Tabagät, vol. 3, p. 258. 
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Imam al-Juwayni had a very good command of 
the Arabic language, as al-Fdrisi said. 52 He studied 
the Qur'än extensively and was noted for his eloquence. 
Most of those who met him were astonished at his 
ability to debate and his vast knowledge, so that, when 
his father died, he was recognized by them, in spite of 
his youth, as one of the very wise imäms. He was also 
known as a discriminating and honest critic. 
His father was very proud of his son's wide 
knowledge. Imam al-Juwayni read all the books which 
were written by his father and sometimes in his 
annotations he added where he thought necessary and 
also criticised him. His father was glad of that. Imäm 
al-Juwayn3 was clearly a genius and a child prodigy who 
enjoyed research. He was to reject anything which was 
contrary to reason (cagi) even if the error was from 
his own father. After his father's death, he used to 
repeat this sentence when he discovered one of his 
father's errors, "This is an error committed by the 
shaykh, God save his soul. "53 
Imäm al-Juwayni has noted in his own 
testimony that in his quest for truth he read 
extensively in the Islamic sciences and still 
52Ibid., p. 254. 
53Ibid., vol. 5, p. 169. 
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unsatisfied turned aside from the authoritatively 
transmitted knowledge to works condemned by the ah1 al- 
Is15m. Eventually, however, his quest took him back to 
the faith of the early Muslims and it was in that faith 
that he hoped to die. 54 
Some biographers interpret the above 
admission as if Imäm al-Juwayni had at one time 
rejected the Islamic sciences. But as al-Subkl held 
correctly, we believe that all he did was to subject 
religious problems to a wider critical, and 
intellectual examination. 
Imäm al-Juwayni was fond of reading and it is 
said that he had read a hundred books before he began 
to study theology under al-Isfaräyini. 55 If we now bear 
in mind that Imäm al-Juwayni's father was fond of 
knowledge, that he tried to examine things critically, 
that he always encouraged his son to learn and that he 
was glad when his son criticised him, it is clear that 
it was he who set the pattern for his son's life. 
When his father died, the son took his place 
in the school and began to teach. While teaching, he 
continued to widen his knowledge. He went to study 
under Abü al-Qäsim al-Isfardyini (d. 452/1060), who was 
541bid., vol. 3, p. 260. 
551bid. 
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considered a great man and a leading imäm -in 
jurisprudence and theology. He was an Ash`arite and 
used to hold debates, taught Islamic sciences and 
pronounced decisions on Islamic law. He followed the 
ascetic practices of the early Muslims. 56 
Imam al-Juwayni also attended the teaching of 
al-Kabbäzi (d. 447/1055), 57 who was the shaykh of the 
recitors of the Qur'an. CAbd al-Ghaffar al-Farisi 
mentioned that Imäm al-Juwayni had learnt the art of 
reciting the Qur'an and other sciences from al-Kabbäzi 
whom he attended. 58 
1.2.1.4 Travel to Baghdad and the Rijäz 
As discussed earlier, in the political, 
social, and cultural background, Imam al-Juwayn3 
encountered religious intrigues in Nisäbür in his time. 
This was the reason which made him leave Nisäbür. Al- 
Subk3 quotes from CAbd al-Ghaffär al-Färisi: 
He went out to travel and left the 
country. He went out with the mashäyikh 
(scholars) to their gathering, and then 
went to Baghdad to meet some of the 
greatest culamä' and learned from them 
until he gained greater knowledge and 
his name became well known. Later he 
visited Mecca to performed the häjj. He 
561bn cAsäkir, Taby3n, p. 265. 
57Ibid., p. 279. 
58A1-Subki, Tabagät, vol. 5, p. 170. 
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stayed at Mecca for about four years, 
debating, giving decisions in Islamic 
Law, and trying to spread knowledge 
everywhere. 59 
Ibn al-dImäd also relates a similar account 
in his book, Shadharät al-Dhahab. 60 
From the above it is clear that the reason 
which made Imam al-Juwayni leave Nlsabnr was religious 
intrigue. We can see that during his stay at Baghdad he 
learnt from the greatest Culama3 the methods to use in 
religious matters and his name became famous in that 
town. Later he went to the Hijaz and stayed in Mecca 
for four years, debating and proclaiming fatäwa, and 
spreading knowledge to the public. Because of his stay 
in Mecca he was later to be called Imam al-Haramayn, as 
we mentioned earlier. 
During this period at Mecca, besides 
defending the Sunnite doctrine, Imam al-Juwayni spent 
his time in pious devotion, between al-Safa and al- 
Marwa, until he had purified his soul. Indeed al-Subki 
in describing his piety and sensitivity appears to 
imply that he was a süf1. He says: "When in the course 
of his assemblies he launched into a account of 
conditions or süfi states (ahwäl) and waded into the 
science of sufism, he used to reduce those present to 
59lbid., p. 171. 
60Ibn al-'Imäd, Shadharät, vol. 3, p. 350. 
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tears by his own weeping and to make their eyes bleed 
by his cries, his recitations and his allusions, for he 
was ablaze within himself. "61 This suggests a 
heightened sense of mysticism at this moment in his 
life. 
Some of Imäm al-Juwayni's own words show that 
he looked for a way other than cllm al-Kaläm, which is 
based on reasoning, to reach an understanding of the 
reality of God. He says that reason may be at a loss to 
apprehend reality, although it is sure of the existence 
of an eternal God. 62 This means that Imäm al-Juwayni 
confirms that `llm al-Kaläm does not necessarily lead 
to the knowledge of the reality of God. This reality 
can also be known by the heart. It is the heart that 
leads to knowledge of that reality and this is sufism. 
It has to be said that biographers do not 
give many details about Imäm al-Juwayni's life as a 
süfi, any more than they do about the philosophical 
element in his knowledge. This come from the 
understanding that Imäm al-Juwayni was supposed to be 
mainly a theologian, for he was the head of al- 
Nizämiyyah school at Nisäbür, which was built like the 
61A1-Subki, Tabagät, vol. 5, 
62Ibid., p. 16. 
p. 179. 
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other Nizämiyyah schools to keep the adherents of the 
Sunnite sect loyal and in good spirit. 63 
Imam al-Juwayni himself seems to have been 
careful to keep two aspects of his life out of the 
public eye. None of his works known to us is on sufism, 
or discuss philosophical problems systematically. 64 
Sufism was not, at that time, the way recognised by all 
Muslims as a means to the knowledge of God. It seems 
even that it was not highly esteemed by most of them. 
Imäm al-Qushayri mentioned in his Risälah that there 
were at that time some bad süfis who were harmful to 
süfism. 65 
This means that Imäm al-Qushayri was trying 
to defend süfism and to prove that it was not what 
these disreputable süfis made it out to be. Philosophy 
was also attacked by many Muslim sects. 66 This explains 
why Imäm al-Juwayni and his biographers were trying not 
to give many details about these two aspects of his 
life. 
631bid., pp. 26-28. 
64Ibid., p. 54. 
65A1-Qushayri, Abü al-Qäsim cAbd al-Karim, al-Risälah 
f1 `Ilm al-Tasawwuf, Cairo, 1346 A. H. p. 34. 
66Ibid., p. 31. 
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1.2.1.5 Life at Nizämiyyah school 
After he had studied with some of the great 
scholars of Hijäz, he returned to Nisäbür. This was 
when Alp Arslan took over power from his uncle Toghril 
Beg who died in 455/1063 and Nizäm al-Mulk became his 
prise minister. Imam al-Juwayni was appointed as a 
teacher at al-Ni; ämiyyah school in Nisäbür where he 
continued teaching till the end of his life. 67 Al-Subki 
mentions that he served in this school for nearly 
thirty years without any pressure or force being 
exerted on him to remain there. 
He became famous, and many people came to 
learn from him and he taught about three hundred pupils 
every day. When he became the head of the Sunnite 
community he was responsible for affairs. He was also 
appointed preacher in the mosque. 68 At this stage his 
writings began to appear and his knowledge became 
mature. That he had a good command of philosophy as 
well as of Islamic sciences is very clear in his 
answers to the naturalists (tabaciyyün) and other 
philosophers in al-Shämil, which is one of his most 
671bn al-`Imäd, Shadharät, vol. 3, p. 358. 
68A1-Subkl, Tabagät, vol. 5, p. 186. 
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important books. This tallies with what al-Subki says 
about the philosophical element in his thinking. 69 
He mentions that Imäm al-Juwayni debated the 
problem of the creation of the Qur'än with a 
piilosopher and refuted all their arguments so 
convincingly that partisans and opponents alike agreed 
that he had carried the day. Imäm al-Juwayni's 
assertion that he had at one time turned to sciences 
other than the traditional ones may be taken to mean 
that he took to the study of philosophy. Ultimately, 
however, he came to disapprove of philosophy, 70 as did 
most of his contemporaries. 
That is why, when Imäm al-Juwayni discusses 
the opinions of the philosophers whom he calls 
"heretics" (al-mulhidah), he does not expose them in an 
organised manner. He gives separate answers to separate 
problems because he does not want to engage in 
sophistry and related arguments. 
When the Hanbalites said that Imam al-Juwayni 
was an unbeliever because he believed in some of the 
philosophers' opinions about the knowledge of God, 
namely that God knows universals and not particulars, 71 
69Ibid., vol. 3, p. 253. 
7OIbid., p. 260. 
71A1-Juwayni, Irshsd, p. 104. 
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they were alluding in an unfair and abusive way to the 
fact that Imäm al-Juwayni had studied philosophy. Al- 
Shahrastäni also mentions that Imäm al-Juwayni shared 
the philosophers' views about the created power of man 
(a1-qudrah al-had2thah). 72 This statement proves that 
al-Shahrastäni also believed that Imäm al-Juwayni had 
embraced philosophy. 
Al-Subki and other biographers make only 
slight allusion to this element, without giving any 
details about how, where and when he learnt philosophy. 
This was through veneration for the Imäm, philosophy 
being a science abhorred by most of the Muslim 
thinkers. 
Imäm al-Juwayn3 left N3säbür for Isbahän for 
a short time about the year 465/1072.73 It is noted of 
him that at the close of his life he wrote on the 
Shäficite legal rites a book entitled Nihäyat al-Matlab 
fi Diräyat al-Madhhab, a huge book of about twenty-two 
volumes. 74 
It has been mentioned that when Abü al-Hasan 
`All b. Fadl b. 'All al-Majäshici the linguist came to 
N3säbür in 469/1076. Imäm al-Juwayni was humble enough 
72A1-Shahrastäni, Nihäyat, p. 78. 
73A1-Subki, Tabaget, vol. 3, p. 255. 
74Ibid., p. 98. 
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to study grammar (nahw) under him. At that period Imäm 
al-Shayräzi came also to Nisäbür in connection with 
some administrative affairs. Imäm al-Juwayni was also 
happy to receive this great imäm. Imäm al-Juwayni then 
fell seriously ill. He recovered but a relapse 
followed. He asked to be transferred to Bustingän 
because of its moderate climate and shortly afterwards 
died in this village. 75 
1.2.1.6 His Teachers 
Imäm la-Juwayn3 studied first under his 
father, the great scholar on tafsir, Nadi th, and fiqh. 
When his father died, he went to al-Bayhagi's school 
and learnt usnl under Abü al-Qäsim al-Isfaräyini. 76 
He learnt hadäth under Abü Bakr Ahmad b. 
Muhammad b. Härith al-Isbahäni al-Yamani, Abi Said 
CAbd al-Rahmän b. Hamddni al-Nisäbüri, Abü Hasan 
Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Mazki, Abü `Abdullah Muhammad b. 
Ibrähim Yahyd al-Mazki and al-Häfiz Abü Na`im al- 
Isbahäni. 77 He also studied in Baghdad under Abü 
Muhammad al-Jawhari. 78 
75lbid. 
76Ibn `Asäkir, Tabyin, p. 279. 
77A1-Subk3, Tabaq5t, vol. 5, p. 193. 
78Ibn al-Jawzi, Muntazam, vol. 9, p. 18. 
38 
He learnt the recitation of the Qur'än (al- 
Qira'ät) under Abü CAbdullah al-Kabbäz3. He also 
studied the books of the previous scholars such as 
those of Imäm Abü Hasan al-Ash`är3 and al-Q54! Abi Bakr 
al-Bägillän3. He said: "I would never utter a single 
word about `I1m al-Kaläm until I memorised twelve 
thousand pages of the words of al-Qäd3 Abü Bakr. "79 
1.2.1.7. Date of Death 
All biographers agree on the date of Imäm al- 
Juwayni's death. They note that he died in Bustingän on 
Wednesday evening on the 25th of Rabic al-Awwal 
478/1085, and at that time he was 59 years old. 80 This 
leads us to conclude that the date of his birth was 
probably the 18th of Muharram 419/1029. 
1.2.1.8. The Works of Imzm al-Juwayni 
Imäm al-Juwayni was a prolific writer. There 
are about twenty nine books in various fields of 
Islamic studies which have been attributed to him. The 
following are the list of his works: On Usü1 al-Fiqh 
the books are: al-Burhän f1 Usü1 al-Fiqh, al-Talkhis fi 
a1-Usül, al-Irshäd fi Usül al-Fikh, Mukhtasar al-Irshäd 
79A1-Subkl, Tabagät, vol. 5, p. 193. 
BOIbid., p. 181. 
li a1-B5gill5ni, Mughith a1-Kha1g f3 Ikhtiar a1-Ahagq, 
Kitäb al-Mujtahidin, Madarik a1-cUqü1, a1-Waragät fi 
Usü1 al-Fikh. On Fiqh his works are: Risälah fi a1- 
Tagl. id wa al-I j tihäd, Munäzarah fi a1-Ij tihäd f3 al- 
Qiblah, Nihäyat a1-Matlab f3 Diräyat al-Madhab, 
Munäzarah fi Zawäj al-Bikr, al-Silsilah f3 Macrifat al- 
Qawlayn wa al-Wajhayn, Risälah fi a1-Figh. On Usü1 al- 
Din the books are: a1-Irshäd i15 Qawatic al-Adillah f3 
Usü1 a1-I` tiqäd, al-cAg. idah a1-Nizämiyyah, Lumac al- 
Adillah fi Qawacid `Aga'id Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamacah, 
al-Shämil fä Usü1 al-Din, Risälah f3 Ustz1 al-Din, 
Ghiyäth a1-Umam f3 Iltiyath a1-Zu1am, Mas5'i1 a1-Imäm 
cAbd al-Hagg al-Siqilli wa Ajwibatuhu 11 a1-Imam Abi 
al-Ma'äl. i, al-Kämil f3 Ikhtisär a1-Sh5mil, Mukhtasar 
a1-Irshäd 11 a1-Bägi115n3. On Khiläf wa al-Jadal the 
books are: al-Durrah al-Mudiyyah fi mä Waqaca min 
Khiläf bayn al-Shafi`iyyah wa al-Hanafiyyah, al-Asalib, 
Ghuniat al-Mustarshidän fä al-Khiläf, a1-Käfiyah fi al- 
Jadal. His works on other subjects are: Qasidat 
Wasiyyah li Waladihi, Diwän Khutab, Kitab al-Nafs, 
Risälah fi Ithbät al-Istiwä' wa a1-Fawgiyyah. 
1.2.2 The life of Imam al-Ghazäli 
The full name of Imäm al-Ghazäli is Muhammad 
b. Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Tüsi also known as 
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hujjat al-Islam (The proof of Islam). 81 He was an 
outstanding theologian, jurist, original thinker, 
mystic and religious reformer. 
1.2.2.1 Date and Place of Birth 
Imäm al-Ghazäli was born at Tüs in Khurasan, 
near the modern Meshhed in Iran, in 450/1058. 
1.2.2.2 Family Background. 
The father of Imam al-Ghazäli, though only a 
wool spinner and a poor man, was a very pious person. 
An exemple of his strict honesty and belief in hard 
work was that he would not eat any food except that 
produced by his own effort. He liked to visit the 
Culamä' (scholars) and sat with them to seek religious 
knowledge and also offer his services to them. When he 
heard the words of those culamä' he would cry and pray 
to God to give him a son as pious as the Culamä'. 
According to the account presented by WM 
Watt, 82 the father of Imäm al-Ghazäli though not very 
highly educated man was marked by the strong humble 
piety so characteristic of Muslims of that time. We 
need to remember that this faith was without doubt 
81Ibn `Asäkir, Tabyin, p. 261. 
82Watt, Muslim, p. 20. 
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founded upon a wide knowledge of the Qur'än and hadith, 
a knowledge gained by following the sermons and 
lectures given in the mosques. 
Imäm al-Ghazäli's brother Abü al-Futüh Ahmad 
(d. 520/1126) was a distinguished scholar, mystic and 
preacher in Baghdad. His ruling passion was making 
public exhortations, and for this he neglected the law 
of which he was a doctor, but he gave lectures on this 
science in the Nizämiyyah College, when acting as 
substitute for his brother. The written work by Imäm 
al-Ghazäli entitled Ihyä' `ulüm al-din was abridged by 
his brother into one volume with the title of Lubäb al- 
Ihyä'. His brother is also author of another treatise, 
al-dhakh. irä f. i `ilm al-basira. 83 
1.2.2.3 Early Education 
Imam al-Ghazäll, together with his brother 
and several sisters, was left an orphan at an early 
age. His father died when he and his brother were still 
young and before his death he committed his sons to the 
care of a Süfi friend, to whom he stated that, because 
he had greatly regretted his own lack of education, 
such money as he was able to leave them was to be spent 
entirely on their education. 
83Ibn Khallikän, Wafayät, vol. 4, p. 216. 
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This Süfi friend undertook the education of 
the two boys until the small legacy was exhausted. 
Then, since he was himself a poor man, he advised them 
to go to college where, as students, they would have 
rations assigned to them. And this they did. 
While still a boy, Imdm al-Ghazäli began his 
studies with the desire for wealth and reputation, as 
he himself has acknowledged: " We sought learning for 
the sake of something other than God, but He would not 
allow it to be for anything but Himself. "84 
Imäm al-Ghazäli began his education in Tüs. 
His biographers mention that he studied filth 
(jurisprudence) under Ahmad Ibn Muhammad al- 
Radhakäni, 85 and thereafter travelled to Jurjän and 
became a pupil of Abü al-Qäsim Ismd'11 Ibn Mascadä al- 
Ismäcili (d. 487/1094). 
From this teacher he took copious notes, but 
at first neglected to memorize what he had written. 
This was characteristic of him, and the results are 
evident throughout his work. His quotations are 
exceedingly careless, and this is one of the great 
charges brought against him by his critics that he 
84A1-Subk3, Tabagät, vol. 4, p. 102. 
85Ibid. 
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falsified traditions. The fact was that he quoted from 
memory and very freely. 
On Imäm al-Ghazäli's way back to Tüs from 
Jurjän he was to receive a lesson. He tells the story 
himself. The party was attacked by highway robbers, who 
carried off all that the travellers had with them. Imäm 
al-Ghazäli went after them, though warned by the chief 
of the brigands that he imperiled his life by doing so. 
He persisted, however, and begged only for the return 
of his precious note-books, which could be of no value 
to them. 
The robber chief asked him: " What are your 
note-books? " He explained that they contained notes of 
lectures he had recently heard and represented his 
knowledge of them. The robber laughed and said: " How 
can you lay claim to this knowledge when we have taken 
it from you? Being separated from your knowledge, you 
remain without it. " Then he ordered one his men to 
restore the note-books to him. 
Imäm al-Ghazäll felt that the words of the 
robber were to be taken as divine guidance to him, and 
when he reached Tus, he took himself to study for three 
years, during which time he committed to memory all the 
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contents of his note-books, so that if he were robbed 
again, he could not be deprived of his learning. 86 
He later went to Nisäbür where he studied 
under the most distinguished theologian of the age, 
Imam al-Juwayni. 87Some of the biographers mention that 
Imäm al-Juwayni gave full respect and vigilant care to 
al-Ghazäli. 88 
He work very hard to acquire knowledge from 
his teacher. His studies were of the broadest kind, 
embracing Islamic law, theology, dialectics, 
philosophy, logic and the doctrines and practices of 
the Süfis. Imam al-Juwayni who was proud of Imam al- 
Ghazäli's intellectual powers and ambition, describes 
him as al-bahr al-mughdiqB9 (a sea to drown in). Imam 
al-Ghazali remained at Nlsabür until Imäm al-Juwayni's 
death in 478/1085.90 
86Ibid., p. 103. 
871bn `Asäkir, Tabyin, p. 292. 
-Ibn Khallikän, Wafayät, vol. 4, p. 64. 
-Ibn Kathir, Bidäyah, vol. 12, p. 173. 
88lbid., p. 291. 
-A1-Subki, Tabaqät, vol. 6, p. 197. 
89lbid. 
90lbid. 
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Imäm al-Juwayni allowed complete freedom of 
thought and expression to his pupils. They were 
encouraged to engage in debates and discussions of all 
kinds. Imäm al-Ghazäll, in his debates with fellow 
students, showed great suppleness of mind and a gift 
for polemics. Consequently he easily took a commanding 
place among the other students. 
It was during Imäm al-Ghazäli's student days 
at the Nizämiyyah college of Nisäbür that he began to 
tutor his fellow students and taught them. Despite the 
comparative youth of his early twenties, he won a 
reputation for his writings which showed that he had 
made himself the master of every subject to which he 
had applied himself 
It is related that when Imam al-Ghazäl3 had 
written his book al-Mankhül, he showed it to his master 
Imäm al-Juwayni who observed: " You have buried me 
while I am still alive. Why did you not have patience 
to wait until I was dead? For your book has thrust my 
writings out of sight. "91 
It was during this period that Imäm al- 
Ghazal! also became impatient with dogmatic teaching 
and abandoned the policy of dependence upon authority 
(taglid) . He rose up to free his mind from irksome 
9lIbid. 
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captivity, in order to seek that which aroused the 
attention of the rational soul itself, and thereby 
facilitated for the soul the attainment of its 
happiness and joy. 
Imäm al-Ghazäli tells that from his boyhood, 
he had been possessed by the desire to comprehend the 
real meaning of things for himself and had come to the 
conclusion that one of the greatest hindrances in the 
search for truth was the uncritical acceptance of 
beliefs on the authority of parents and teachers, and a 
rigid adherence to the heritage of the past. This does 
not mean that inherited beliefs are inherently wrong or 
misguided, it is the blind acceptance that needed 
questioning. 
He remembered the hadith saying ascribed to 
the Prophet that every child is born with a naturally 
religious disposition (`alä a1-fitra), but then his 
parents make him into a Jew or a Christian or a Magian. 
Imäm al-Ghazäli was anxious to know the nature of this 
innate disposition before it was affected by unreasoned 
convictions imposed by others. 
So he set out to secure a knowledge which 
left no room for doubt and involved no possibility of 
error or conjecture. Finding that none of the knowledge 
which he had acquired (except that which was based on 
first-hand experience) satisfied these conditions, he 
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became a seeker after absolute truth and was content 
with no lower standard. He expresses this in a couplet 
which has become famous: 
Take what you see and let hearsay alone, 
When the sun has arisen, what need have 
you of Saturn? 92 
Driven by doubt, Imäm al-Ghazäli began to 
investigate theological differences even when he was a 
student and not yet twenty. This can be seen in his 
book "al-munqidh min al-daläl" in which he says: 
From my early youth, since I attained 
the age of puberty before I was 
twenty, until the present time when I 
am over fifty, I have ever recklessly 
launched out in to the midst of these 
ocean depths, I have ever bravely 
embarked on this open sea, throwing 
aside all craven caution; I have 
poked into every dark recess, I have 
made an assault on every problem, I 
have plunged into every abyss, I have 
scrutinized the creed of every sect, 
I have tried to lay bare the inmost 
doctrines of every community. All 
this have I done that I might 
distinguish between true and false, 
between sound tradition and heretical 
innovation. Whenever I meet one of 
the Bätiniyyah, I like to study his 
creed; whenever I meet one of the 
Zähi ri yyah, I want to know the 
essentials of his belief. 93 
Thus Imäm al-Ghazäl3 relates his scholastic 
experience during his stay with his teacher Imam al- 
92A1-Ghazäli, Afzän, p. 409. 
93Watt, Faith, p. 20. 
Juwayni. This was before he was twenty years old. We 
believe that this is strong evidence to show the 
influence of Imäm al-Juwayni on his student Imäm al- 
Ghazäli. He had opened the mind of his student to 
search for the truth among the altercation of the sects 
in his time. 
Imäm al-Ghazäli justified his scepticism by 
saying: " He who does not doubt, does not investigate, 
and he who does not investigate does not perceive, and 
he who does not perceive remains in blindness and 
error. "94 All kinds of knowledge, he felt, should be 
investigated by the scholar, for all might be a help to 
him and the true scholar should be hostile to none. 
This is illustrated by his words: "For men are hostile 
to that of which they are ignorant. "95 He says also 
that it is the business of the true investigator to 
embark, "on the deep waters of what is obscure (al- 
ishkäl), from which the common folk should be kept 
away, just as boys are kept away from the bank of the 
Tigris, lest they should be drowned. But those who are 
strong may embark upon such studies just as the skilled 
swimmer is free to dive into waters. "96 This explains 
to us why he was driven to study and explore deeply in 
the knowledge he embarked on. 
94A1-Ghazäli, Mizän, p. 409. 
95A1-Ghazäl3, Munqidh, p. 40. 
96Ibid., p. 27. 
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During his stay at Nisäbür, Imäm al-Ghazäli 
is also reported to have been a disciple of several 
other teachers, mostly obscure, the best known being 
Abü CAli al-Farmadhi. 97 From this teacher he learned 
more about the theory and practice of *nfism. He even 
practised rigorous ascetic and Süfistic exercises under 
his guidance but not to the desired effect. As he 
himself narrates, he could not attain to that stage 
where the mystics begin to receive pure inspiration 
from above. So he did not feel quite at ease or settled 
in his mind. 
On the one hand, he felt philosophically 
dissatisfied with the speculative systems of the 
scholastic theologians and could not accept anything on 
authority; on the other hand, the Süfistic practices 
also failed to make any definite impression on him for 
he had not received any sure results. There is no 
doubt, however, that the increasing attraction of the 
Süfistic teaching, with its insistence upon a direct 
personal experience of God, added to Imäm al-Ghazäli's 
critical dissatisfaction with dogmatic theology. 
When his teacher Imam al-Juwayni died he 
moved into the camp of Nizäm al-Mulk where many of the 
culamä' were gathering and here he was received with 
97Watt, al-GhazAlä, E. I. 2,2, p. 1038. 
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honour and respect by them. Then in the year 484/1091 
he went to Baghdad to teach at the Nizämiyyah 
college-98 This college had been restricted to 
Shdficite scholars. And according to Ibn al-Jawzi, 
Nizäm al-Mulk imposed as a condition that the teacher, 
preacher, librarian, grammarian, and the reciter of the 
Qurldn must all be Shäficite. 99 
When Imam al-Ghazali arrived to take up his 
appointment as professor to the chair of jurisprudence, 
the jurists came to him and said: " It has been the 
custom for everyone who teaches in this building to 
invite the jurists to be present and listen, and we 
wish you to invite us to your lectures on 
jurisprudence. " He replied to this: "Most 
willingly. 11100 
From that time onwards some of the leading 
scholars attended his lectures on Shäfi'- ite 
jurisprudence, together with three hundred students of 
his own and one hundred of the sons of the princely 
families. 101He received a warm welcome in Baghdad. It 
has been said that all the Baghdadis were astonished by 
the excellence of his lectures, his fluent delivery, 
98Ibn al-cImäd, Shadharät, vol. 9, p. 196. 
991bn al-Jawz3, Muntazam, vol. 9, pp. 65-66. 
100A1-Subk3, Tabagät, vol. 4, p. 113. 
101Watt, Faith, p. 30. 
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the extent of learning, the subtlety of his allusions, 
and the lucidity of his explanations, and they 
conceived a great regard for him and treated him as 
"the apple of their eye". 102 Moreover, he came to be 
looked upon as the greatest jurist ever to enter 
Baghdad. 103 
1.2.2.4 The Scepticism of Imäm al-Ghazäli 
Apparently, Imam al-Ghazäli attained all the 
glory that a scholar could by way of worldly success. 
He came to wield influence comparable to that of the 
highest officials of the state. 104 However, inwardly he 
began to undergo an intellectual and spiritual crisis. 
He doubted the evidence of the senses; he 
could see plainly that they often deceive. No eye could 
perceive the movement of a shadow, but still the shadow 
moves; a gold piece would cover any star, but still the 
star is a world larger than the earth. 
Moreover, he doubted even the primary ideas 
of the mind. Is ten more than three? Can a thing both 
102Margaret Smith, A1-Ghazäli the Mystic, London, 1944, 
p. 21. 
103A1-Subki, Tabag5t, vol. 4, p. 29. 
104Ibid., p. 107. 
52 
be and not be? Perhaps, he could not tell. If his 
senses deceived him, why not his mind? May there not be 
something behind the mind, transcending it, which would 
show the falsity of its convictions even as the mind 
shows the falsity of the information given by the 
senses? May not the dreams of the Sufis be true, and 
their revelations in ecstasy be the only real guides? 
When we awake in death, may it not be into a true but 
different existence? All these doubts occurred to Imam 
al-Ghazäli; and this preoccupied his mind for two 
months. During this time he was a sceptic in fact 
though not in theory or in outward expression. 105 
At length God cured Imäm al-Ghazäll of the 
breakdown. He writes: 
"My being was restored to health and an 
even balance; the necessary truths of 
the intellect became once more accepted, 
as I regained confidence in their 
certain and trustworthy character. This 
did not come about by systematic 
demonstration or marshalled argument, 
but by a light which God most high cast 
into my breast. That light is the key to 
the greater part of knowledge ..... The 
point of these accounts is that the task 
is perfectly fulfilled when the quest is 
prosecuted up to the stage of seeking 
what is not sought (but stops short of 
that). For first principles are not 
sought, since they are present and to 
hand, and if what is present is sought 
for, it becomes hidden and lost. When 
however, a man seeks what is not sought 
(and that only), he is not to be accused 
of falling short in the seeking of what 
is to be sought. "106 
105Watt, Faith, pp. 23-25. 
106Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
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Though Imam al-Ghazali said in his 
autobiography, al-Mungidh min al-Daläl, that this 
period of scepticism occurred before he started 
studying theology, Batinite teachings, philosophy and 
mysticism, l0? "Some scholars claim that it seems 
certain that the fit of scepticism as he describes it, 
must have been preceded by some study of 
philosophy. "108 
This philosophical background is clearly 
evidenced by the instances when Imäm al-Ghazäli 
discusses epistomological questions about the nature of 
knowledge and the nature of certainty. We can see that 
some of his debates seem close to those utilized by 
Miskawayh (d. 422/1030) though these were for a 
different purpose altogether. Miskawayh refers to the 
use of reason for the judgment of sense, as in the 
instance of the sun, which by rational proofs is known 
to be a hundred and sixty times greater than the earth. 
Imäm al-Ghazäli may or may not have been acquainted 
with this particular passage, but what seems certain is 
that one of the issues being discussed by Imäm al- 
Ghazäli was a current topic for philosophers working in 
the Islamic world just prior to his own time. 
1071bid., pp. 26-27. 
lOBWatt, Muslim, p. 51. 
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While we can scrutinise these specific 
instences of commonality between Imäm al-Ghazäli and 
the philosophers, his critique of knowledge is 
important as it is in general philosophy. He seems very 
interested in a sphere above reason, and in this he is 
clearly echoing the Platonic tradition, so strong in 
philosophical writing in Arabic. Like this Platonic 
influence, Imäm al-Ghazäli was seeking a level beyond 
the ordinary reason, a realm above simple logic. 
Moreover, the very fact that Imam al-Ghazäli 
"came to regard the various seekers (seeking after 
truth) as comprising four groups, "109 indicates that he 
did some study of these groups previously. 
1.2.2.5 Seeking After the Truth 
Imäm al-Ghazäli, being saved after the two 
months' crisis, regained the power to reason. 
Consequently, he began investigating what these four 
groups had achieved, "commencing with the science of 
theology and then taking the way of philosophy, the 
authoritative instruction of the Bätiniyyah, and the 
way of mysticism, in that order. "110 
109Watt, Faith, p. 26. 
110Ibid. 
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In theology, Imäm al-Ghazäli found no 
intellectual certainty, for the theologians depended 
entirely on the acceptance of their dogmatic 
assumptions on authority. He denounced their over 
emphasis on the doctrinal, for it led to a faulty 
representation of religion' by reducing it to a mere 
mould of orthodoxy and catechism of dogmas. The 
disputes of the scholastics among themselves he 
considered as mere dialectical logomachies which had no 
real relation with religious life. 111 
Realizing that the remedy for his ailment was 
not to be found in theology, Imam al-Ghazäli turned to 
philosophy which he pursued as diligently and as 
comprehensively as he could. He had seen already that 
the weakness of the theologians lay in their not having 
made a sufficient study of primary ideas and the laws 
of thought. 
He spent three years on this. He was at 
Baghdad at the time, teaching jurisprudence and writing 
fatäwä. Working without a teacher, he gave two years to 
the study of the writings of the different schools of 
philosophy, and almost another to meditating and 
working over his results. He felt that he was the first 
Muslim doctor to do this with the requisite 
thoroughness. 
lllIbid. 
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Imam al-Ghazäli divides the followers of 
philosophy in his time into three groups: materialists 
(Dahriyyün), naturalists (tabidiyyün) and Theists 
(ilähiyyün). 112 
Rejecting a creator, the materialists 
maintain that the world exists from all eternity, that 
the animal simply comes from the egg and the egg from 
the animal. The wonder of creation compels the 
materialists to admit a creator, but the creator is 
seen as a machine which has a certain balance of 
temperament in itself which keeps it running; thought 
is a mechanical part of human nature and ends with 
death. They thus reject a future life, though admitting 
a God with some attributes. 
He deals at much greater length with the 
teachings of those whom he called Theists. Aristotle, 
he regards as the final master of the Greek school; 
their doctrines are best represented for Arabic readers 
in the books of Ibn Sing and al-Fgrgbl since the works 
of their predecessors on this subject are a mass of 
confusion. Part of these doctrines must be reckoned as 
unbelief, part as heresy, and part as theologically 
indifferent. 
112Ibid., p. 30. 
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Imäm al-Ghazäli then divides the 
philosophical sciences into six: mathematics, logic, 
physics, metaphysics, political economy, and ethics. 113 
He discusses these in detail, showing what must be 
rejected, what is indifferent, what dangers arise from 
each to him who studies or to him who rejects without 
study. Throughout, he is cautious to mark nothing as 
unbelief that is not really so, to admit always those 
truths of mathematics, logic and physics that cannot 
intellectually be rejected. He only warns against an 
attitude of intellectualism and a belief that 
mathematicians, with their acuteness and success in 
their own field, are to be followed in other fields, or 
that all subjects are susceptible of the exactness and 
certainty of syllogism in logic. 
The great errors of the Theists are almost 
entirely in their metaphysical views. Three of their 
propositions mark them as unbelievers. Firstly, they 
reject the resurrection of the body and physical 
punishment hereafter, asserting that the punishments of 
the next world will be spiritual only. That there will 
be spiritual punishments Imäm al-Ghazäli admits, but he 
holds that there will be physical punishment as well. 
Secondly, they hold that God knows universals only, not 
113Ibid., p. 32. 
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particulars. Thirdly, they hold that the world exists 
from all eternity and to all eternity. When they reject 
the attributes of God and hold that He knows by His 
essence and not by something added to His essence, they 
are only heretics and not unbelievers. 
In physics Imam al-Ghazäli accepts the 
constitution of the world as developed and explained by 
Philosophers; however all is to be regarded as entirely 
submissive to God, incapable of autonomous-movement, a 
tool of which the Creator makes use. 
Finally, Imam al-Ghazäli considers that the 
philosopher's system of ethics is derived from the 
teaching of the Süfis. At all times there have been 
such saints, retired from the world. God has never left 
Himself without a witness and from their ecstasies and 
revelations knowledge of the human heart, for good and 
evil, is derived. 114 
Though Imam al-Ghazäli devoted two of his 
books (Magäsid al-faläsifa and Tahäfut al-faläsifa) to 
summarizing and criticizing the views of the 
philosophers, he did almost the same in some of his 
non-philosophical books such as al-Munqidh min al- 
114Ibid., p. 38. 
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daläl, 115 Faysal at-tafriga, 116 a1-Igtisäd fi a1- 
ictiq5dll7 and Ithye' culczm al-din. 118 
In the third and last year spent in 
reflecting upon philosophy, it seems that Imam al- 
Ghazali engaged in examining the doctrines of the 
Ta`limiyyah. 119 In fact, Imam al-Ghazali placed his 
study of the Ta`limiyyah after the third year of his 
stay in Baghdad, but this must not be accepted as an 
accurate chronological record of events. The reason for 
this is that Imam al-Ghazali spent only four years in 
Baghdad; if three years out of these four were devoted 
totally to studying and reflecting upon philosophy, and 
for six months out of the last year Imam al-Ghazali 
"was continuously tossed about between the attraction 
of worldly desires and the impulses towards eternal 
life, "120 it is unlikely that he would have been able 
in the remaining time (only six months) to: 
115A1-Ghazäli, Munqidh, pp. 9,18-27,51,55. 
116A1-Ghazäli, Faysal, pp. 21-22. 
117A1-Ghazäli, Igtisäd, pp. 2,3,14-15. 
118A1-Ghazäli, Ihyä', vol. 1, p. 20. 
119The party of tadlim or 'authoritative instruction' 
(also known as Ismdllliyyah and Bätiniyyah) held that 
truth is to be attained not by reason but by accepting 
the pronouncements of the infallible Imäm. See Watt. 
Faith, p. 13. 
120Watt, Faith, p. 57. 
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a) Write his two famous philosophical books, Magäsid 
al-faläsifa and Tahäfut al-faläsifa. 
b) Acquaint himself with the Süfis' beliefs by reading 
their books, so that he comprehended their fundamental 
teachings on the intellectual side, and progressed as 
far as is possible by study and oral instruction. 121 
c) Continue his daily functions such as teaching to the 
three hundred of the most distinguished students of the 
time, and one hundred of the sons of the princely 
families. 122 
d) Search for their (i. e. Tadlimites) books and collect 
their doctrines. 123 He made a collection of their 
utterances, arranged them in logical order and 
formulated them correctly. He went as far as "doing 
their work for them. 11124 
e) Write a1-Mustazhiri refuting the Ta`limites' 
doctrine. 
So, it seems certain that the date of the 
study of the Tadlimite doctrines must have been from 
early in 487/1094. Whatever the date might be "it is 
enough to say that Imam al-Ghazzli found the Tadllmites 
and their teachings eminently unsatisfactory; they had 
121Ibid. 
122Smith, op., cit. p. 22. 
123Watt, Faith, p. 44. 
124Ibid. 
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a lesson which they went over parrot-fashion, but 
beyond it they were in dense ignorance. "125 
After Imäm al-Ghazäli completed his study of 
the Tadlimites, he turned to the books of the Sufis. If 
one follows strictly Imäm al-Ghazäli's autobiography 
one will find no suggestion that he had a previous 
acquaintance with them and their practices. But 
probably this means nothing more than it does when he 
speaks in a similar way of studying theology and 
philosophy, namely, that he now took up the study of 
mysticism in earnest and with a new and definite 
purpose. His native country was steeped in Sufism. His 
great teacher, Imäm al-Juwayni, had been a devout Sufi. 
According to the tradition, the friend to whom his 
father had entrusted his brother and himself had been a 
Sufi. 
However, Imäm al-Ghazäl3 recognized that the 
mystic way includes both intellectual belief and 
practical activity. Since the intellectual belief was 
easier for him than the practical activity, he began to 
acquaint himself with süfis beliefs by reading books 
such as Qüt al-Qulüb by Abü Tälib al-Makki (d. 386/996), 
the works of al-Härith al-Muhäsibi (d. 243/857), the 
various anecdotes about al-Junayd (d. 298/910), al- 
125Macdonald, al-Ghazäli, JACS, xx (1899), p. 87. 
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Shibli (d. 334/945), and AbU Yazid al-Bistäm3 
(d. 261/875) and other discourses of leading süfi men. 
After learning all the fundamental teachings 
of the mystic way on the intellectual side by the way 
of study and oral instruction, it became plain to Imam 
al-Ghazäli that what is most distinctive of mysticism 
is something which cannot be apprehended by study, but 
only by immediate experience, by ecstasy and by a moral 
change. 126 
Since the attainment of this immediate 
experience was the only problem facing Imäm al-Ghazäli 
in his task of reaching the truth, he found himself 
continuously tossed about between the attractions of 
worldly desires and the impulses towards eternal 
life. 127 Imäm al-Ghazäli felt that at last God had made 
it easy for him to abandon position and wealth and 
family ties and friends in order to fulfil his purpose 
of apprehending the truth. This came through a complete 
nervous breakdown, by which he collapsed physically and 
mentally and lost his power of speech. 128 
In year 488/1095 he was struck down by a 
mysterious disease which made it physically impossible 
126Watt, Faith, pp. 
127Ibid, p. 57. 
128Ibid. 
54-55. 
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for him to lecture. After some months he left Baghdad 
on the pretext of making the pilgrimage, but in reality 
he was abandoning his professorship and his whole 
career as a jurist and theologian. This he explains in 
al-Munqidh: 
In due course I entered Damascus, and 
there I remained for nearly two years 
with no other occupation than the 
cultivation of retirement and 
solitude together with religious and 
ascetic exercises, as I busied myself 
purifying my soul, improving my 
character and cleansing my heart for 
the constant recollection of God most 
high, as I had learnt from my study 
of mysticism. I used to go into 
retreat for a period in the mosque of 
Damascus, going up to the minaret of 
the mosque for the whole day and 
shutting myself in so as to be alone. 
At length I made my way from Damascus 
to the Holy House (that is 
Jerusalem). There I used to enter 
into the precinct of the rock every 
day and shut myself in. Next there 
arose in me a prompting to fulfill 
the duty of the pilgrimage, gain the 
blessings of Mecca and Medina, and 
perform the visitation of the 
Messenger of God most high (peace be 
upon him), after first performing the 
visitation of al-khalil, the friend 
of God (God blessing). I therefore 
made the journey to the Hijaz. 129 
There has been speculation, from that time 
until the present day, as to the motives which induced 
Imäm al-Ghazäli to abandon his professorship. Imäm al- 
Ghazäli himself gave as his reason his realization that 
his appointment as a professor was not conducive to the 
129Ibid., p. 59. 
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spiritual life, that he found himself working not 
solely in the service of God but also for his own 
worldly ambitions of wealth and fame, and that 
consequently he feared his spiritual downfall and 
damnation. 130 
However, some recent scholars have attributed 
his decision to leave his post in Baghdad to much more 
mundane considerations. Macdonald suggests that certain 
trends in the political events at the time might have 
contributed to his decision. In 485/1092 the wazir 
Nizam al-Mulk was assassinated and shortly afterwards, 
in the same year as Malik Shah was murdered, a civil 
war broke out between different factions of the ruling 
family of the Saljügs. In 488/1095, Barkiyäruq executed 
his uncle Tutush, who had been supported by the caliph 
and hence presumably by Imam al-Ghazäli, and it was not 
long before Barkiyaruq's own death in 499/1105 that 
Imäm al-Ghazäli returned to teach in Nisabnr. 131 
WM Watt, however, doubts that these 
considerations played a large part in Imäm al-Ghazäli's 
decision and writes: "There may be a grain of truth in 
the suggestion, however, in so far as the vicissitudes 
of the years after 485/1092 and the need for 
maintaining a delicate balance on the political tight- 
1301bn al-Qayim, Miftäh, vol. 2, p. 197. 
131Macdonald, a1-Ghazäl3, E. I. 1, ii, p. 146. 
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rope may have helped to convince Imam al-Ghazdli that 
nothing of what he was interested in could be achieved 
through politics and his semi-political position in 
Baghdad. "132 Watt argues further that the difficulties 
with Barkiyäruq were probably not intended to do more 
than call attention to this factor. 
At this stage we accept Imam al-Ghazali's 
conversion to the mystic life as genuine. The chief 
arguments are the coincidence of dates and Imam al- 
Ghazali's implication in the recognition by the caliph 
of Barkiyaruq's rival Tutush for a time in 487/1094. It 
was in February 488/1095 that it became clear, with the 
death of Tutush, that Barkiyaruq was victor in the 
struggle with him (which had lasted since the death of 
Malik Shah in November 485/1092). Imam al-Ghazäll's 
illness began in July 488/1095, and he left Baghdad in 
November. Again, Barkiyaruq's death was in late 
December 498/1104, and it was some eighteen months 
later that Imam al-Ghazali returned to teach at 
Nisabür. Because of this correspondence of dates, some 
causal connection cannot be ruled out. On the whole, 
however, it seems unlikely. In the uncertain politics 
of the time, people frequently appeared to change 
sides. Barkiyaruq was generally on good terms with 
Fakhr al-Mulk, a son of Nizam al-Mulk who had inherited 
something of his talents and his policies and who was 
132Watt, Muslim, pp. 140-141. 
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later responsible for Imam al-Ghazäli's return to 
teaching at Nisäbür. With this powerful support it is 
not likely that some small fault of Imam al-Ghazali 
would have required his departure from his post at 
Baghdad and he himself asserts that he was courted by 
t1e rulers. So it is credible that Imäm al-Ghazali 
himself decided to leave. 
Another scholar, F Jabre, suggests that Imäm 
al-Ghazäli was mainly afraid of the Bätinites who had 
murdered Nizäm al-Mulk in 485/1092 and whom he had 
attacked in his writings. This suggestion is also 
doubted by Watt who thinks that Imäm al-Ghazäli was not 
in very great danger from the Bätinites since 
assassination was not adopted by them as a regular 
activity until after 489/1095 and in any case the 
obvious candidate for assassination would have been the 
caliph and not a distinguished scholar. 133 
Watt relies, in the main, upon the reason 
given by Imam al-Ghazali himself to explain his sudden 
departure from Baghdad, his dissatisfaction with the 
condition in which he had to work and with the quality 
of the life that was possible for the leading professor 
in Baghdad. Watt finds circumstantial evidence to 
support his view in suggesting that this 
dissatisfaction is the key to understanding Imam al- 
1331bid. 
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Ghazäli's life and points to its predominance in the 
Ihyä' `ulüm al-din. 134 
Imäm al-Ghazäli retired once more to his 
house in TUs and established a college for students of 
jurisprudence, close by madrasah lil fugahä' (school 
for legist), 135 and also a convent (khängah) for 
training young disciples in the theory and practice of 
the Sufi life. 136 
During Imäm al-Ghazäli's time in Tüs, he 
divided his time in the way best fitted to serve the 
needs of those around him. He devoted himself to 
reading the Qur'än, to studying the Traditions afresh, 
to carrying out God's will, to teaching and to prayer, 
so that he should not waste a single moment of his own 
time or that of those with him. 137 
1.2.2.6 Date of Death 
Imäm al-Ghazäl3 died on Monday, 14th of 
Jumädä II 1111/505 at the age of fifty three. 138 His 
body was buried outside Tabarän in a grave near to that 
1341bid. 
135A1-Subki, Tabagät, vol. 4, p. 105,109. 
136Ibid. 
137Ibid. 
138Ibid. 
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of the Persian poet, Firdawsi. 139 
1.2.2.7 The Works of Imäm al-Ghazäll 
Imam al-Ghazali has a vast number of works 
which he wrote on various aspects of Islamic studies. 
It is claimed that he composed over 500 works. However, 
Watt casts doubt upon the authenticity of some of the 
works which are ascribed to Imam al-Ghazäli. He 
suggests that: "Of each work as a whole we must ask: 
Are we certain that this is a genuine work of al- 
Ghazäli.? "140 The following is a list of some of Imam 
al-Ghazali's works: His works on jurisprudence are: al- 
Mankhül fi Usül al-Fiqh, a1-Basit fi al-Furl c, Ghayät 
al-Ghawr f. i Masä'i1 ad-Dawr, al-Wasit, a1-Mustasfä min 
'Ilm al-Usü1, al-Wajiz, Ghawr ad-Dawr fi al-Mas'ala al- 
Surayjiya. His works on Sufism are: Ihyä' 'UlUm al-Din, 
al-Risäla al-Ladunniyya, Bidäyat al-Hidäya, Mishkät al- 
Anwär, al-Maggad al-Asnä Sharh Asmä' Allah al-Flusns, 
al-Arba'in fi UsUl al-Din. His works on Philosophy are: 
Tahäfut al-Faläsifa, Magäsid al-Faläsifa, Mihakk al- 
Nazar, Mi `yär al-d Iim fi Fann . al-Mantiq. His works on 
Theology are: al-Igtisäd fi al-Ictigäd, Faysal al- 
139Ibid. 
-Ibn Khallikän, Wafayät, vol. 1, p. 587. 
140Watt, "Works Attributed to al-Ghazäli" JRAS (1952), 
P. 25. 
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Tafriqa bayn al-Isläm wa al-Zandaqa, cAg2dat Ahi al- 
Sunnah fi Kalimat al-Shahäda, al-Risälah a1-Qudsiyya, 
I1jäm al-`Awäm can 'Ilm a1-Kaläm. His works on Polemics 
are: Fadä'ih al-Betiniyya wa Fadä'i1 al-Mustazhiriyya, 
al-Qistäs al-Mustaglm. And finally his writing on his 
personal life is: a1-Munqidh min al-Qai51. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The views of Imam al-Juwayni and Imam al-Ghazdli 
on `IIm a1-KaIäm 
Before we discuss the views of Imäm al- 
Juwayni and Imäm al-Ghazäl3, we shall briefly give the 
salaf's (early Muslims') definition of `I1m al-Ka1äm 
and their views on the subject. 
2.1 The definitions of `llm al-Kaläm. 
dIim al-Kaläm has many definitions, but we 
shall discuss only the definition given by some of the 
doctors of kaiäm (mutakallimün) and Islamic 
philosophers. 
One of the doctors of kaläm, al-Iji 
(d. 756/1355), in his book al-Mawägif regards CI1m al- 
Kaläm as the science which is concerned with 
establishing religious beliefs firmly by adducing 
proofs and banishing doubts. He explains the meaning of 
belief as faith alone without action, while religion is 
the following of the prophet Muhammad. l 
lAl-Ij3, Mawägif, p. 7. 
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A1-Färäbi (d. 339/950), one of the 
philosophers, regards cI1m al-Kaläm in his book Ihsä' 
al-`ulüm as a science which enables a man to procure 
the victory of the doctrines and actions laid down by 
the legislator of the religion, and to refute all 
opinions contradicting them. 2 
Ibn Khaldün (d. 808/1406), gives a similar 
definition of cZlm al-Kaläm in his Muqaddimah as the 
discipline which brings to the service of religious 
beliefs the use of rational proofs from the salaf and 
sunnite views to oppose the doubters and deniers of 
faith. 3 
Al-Tahänawi (1158/1745), the author of 
Kashshaf istiiähät a]-funün, defines dIim al-Kaiäm as 
the science which is concerned with establishing 
religious beliefs firmly. 4 
A1-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjäni (d. 816/1413) 
defines dIim al-Kaiäm as the science which discusses 
the dhät (essence) of God and his sifät (qualities) and 
2A1-Färäbi, Ihsä' al-`ulüm, Cairo, n. d., p. 107. 
31bn Khaldün, Mugaddimah, p. 458. 
4A1-Tahänaw3, Kashshäf istilähät al-funün, Calcutta, 
1962, vol. 4, p. 154. 
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permissible human behaviour based on Islamic principles 
according to Islamic law. 5 
Therefore, although cilm al-Kaläm has various 
interpretations, we can see that the intended meaning 
i, s always the same: to explain religious beliefs and to 
protect them from the doubters. 
The meaning of Islamic beliefs, all decisions 
about faith and Islamic principles or the dhät 
(essence) of God, His sifät (qualities), His afcäl 
(actions) or His relation to human beings are based on 
the Qur'an and the sunnah of the prophet Muhammad. In 
fact, `Ilm a1-Kai5m is derived from religion or the 
Qur'an, not from reason. Although reason develops 
arguments and proofs, nag] (traditional proof) is 
required for support. Nagl and reason are needed 
together. Both are the principles of the Muslims' 
belief in how to achieve the goal of truth. 6 
These were the ways of cilm al-Kaläm in its 
early period but later different approaches were 
adopted. Some of the Islamic madhähib (sects) used `11m 
a1-Kal5m to their own ends in order to attack Muslims 
who opposed them and to accuse them without any proof 
5A1-Jurjäni., Ta`r. ifät, p. 238. 
6cAbd. al-Fattäh Mahmüd, Isälah al-Tafkir al-Islämi, 
Cairo, 1975, p. 16. 
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of being unbelievers. As a result of this, the real 
objective of dI1m a1-Kai m was often misdirected. For 
some used dIim al-Kaiam for their sectarian interests, 
and not for the general religion. 
2.2 The view of the salaf on `Xlm al-Kaläm 
When we examine the attitude of the salaf to 
`Ilm al-Kaläm, we find that they avoided it because it 
was not the practice of the prophet Muhammad and his 
companions. 
The prophet Muhammad warned his companions 
not to debate any problem which was related to God and 
he gave them his guidance. For example, as narrated by 
Abu Hurayrah, he said: 
Spread what I have told you. Indeed the 
people before you met destruction 
because they questioned and disagreed 
with their prophet. If I command you to 
do something, do it; if I forbid you 
from doing something, leave it. 7 
This hadith shows that the prophet does not 
want his companions to discuss what had been brought by 
71bn Mäjah, vol. 1, p. 3. 
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him and ordered them to follow strictly without asking 
any question. In another hadith narrated by Abu 
Hurayrah, the prophet said: 
The people will keep asking you about 
knowledge until you say that this is 
God. Abu Hurayrah said: Some of the 
Bedouin came to me and asked: ' 0 Abu 
Hurayrah, God created us, who then 
created God? ' Abu Hurayrah (to dismiss 
them) took a little stone with his hand 
and threw it at them saying: "Get up; 
what has been said by the prophet is the 
truth. "8 
The companions of the prophet did not argue 
amongst themselves about the creation of God and if 
they faced any problems which related to God, they 
refered them to the prophet. One day CAli b. Abi Tälib 
was asked where God was. He replied: "He does not need 
a place"; and then they asked what God was like. He 
replied: "He does not have shape. " He then asked for a 
candle and put it in a wooden tube and said to them: 
"In what direction is the flame burning? " When they 
8Sahih Muslim, vol. 2, p. 153. 
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replied: "It does not have a specific direction, " he 
said: "It is same with God. "9 
That was the attitude of the prophet and his 
companions concerning God. This attitude was followed 
by the salaf. We can see that although they disputed 
some of these matters, they united to prevent issues 
from becoming exaggerated by using techniques of 
diplomacy and appeasement. They describe debates about 
these problems as heresies and issues which lead people 
astray. 
We can find this in Imäm Mälik's views. When 
questioned about the' meaning of the verse, " God 
sitting on the throne", 10 he answered: "That God is 
sitting on the throne is known; how it is done is 
unknown. It must be believed, and questions about it 
are heresies. I think you are already astray". Then he 
ordered the man to leave. 11 
9A1-Isfaräyini, al-Tabsir fl al-Din wa Tamyiz al-Firgah 
al-Na-jiyah can al-Firgah a1-Helikin, ed. Muhammad Zähid 
al-Kawthari, Cairo, 1940. p. 144. 
10The Qur'än, 20 : 5. The quotations from the Qur'än 
are cited according to the translation of Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'än, Leicester, -1975. 
11Abü Zahrah, Tärikh al-Madhähib al-Islämiyyah, Cairo, 
n. d., vol. 2, p. 227. 
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When Ahmad bin Hanbal was asked about fate 
and divine decree he said: "I gathered seventy men from 
the Täbi`in (followers), the leaders of the Muslims and 
the greatest fugahä' (legists). They all believed in 
the decree of God, accepted His commands, were patient 
under His wisdom, followed His orders, kept from all 
that is prohibited, believed in the divine decree 
whether good or hurtful, avoided disputation and 
argumentation about religion. "12This demonstrates that 
this scholar was opposed to the study of CIIm al-Kalam. 
In his book "4yä' culüm a]-Din" Imäm al- 
Gazäli explained the stand of some scholars, such as 
Shäfici, Mdlik and Ahmad bin Hanbal, on dIim al-Kaläm. 
All of them forbade CIlm al-Kaläm and disputes about 
religion. 
Ibn cAbd al-Adlä said: " I heard al-Shäfidi 
say: 'To meet God with all kinds of sin except 
idolatry, is better then meeting Him with something 
which is from dIlm al-Kalam. I had heard from Hafs (one 
of the Muctazilite speakers) some words which made me 
unable to repeat them'. He said again: 'The 
mutakallimün said something which I did not believe or 
expect. ' Therefore, to do everything (except idolatry) 
forbidden by God is better than to turn to `Ilm al- 
Kaläm. " 
121bid., p. 245. 
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It was reported by al-Karäbisi that when Imam 
al-Shäfi`i was asked about dIlm al-Kaläm, he became 
angry and said: " Ask that question from Hafs and his 
followers who will be punished by God. If anyone were 
to know that the dIlm al-Kaläm is full of corruption, 
they would shun it as they would run from a lion. " 
Furthermore, he said: "If you hear someone say that 
something is indefinite or definite, beware, for he 
must be one of ahl al-Kaläm who has no religion. " 
Al-Za`faräni reported that Im5m al-Shäfi`i 
said: "My judgment of the ahl a1-Ka1äm is to strike 
them with palm stalks and take them around the tribe 
and say: 'This is the reward of those who practise cI1m 
a1-Kaläm and leave the Qur'än and the Sunnah. " Imäm 
Ahmad b. Hanbal said that the ah1 al-Kalam will not be 
successful ever and nothing can we find in their hearts 
except corruption. He also proclaimed that the kaläm's 
scholars are Zanädiga (atheists). 
Imam Malik said: "The witnesses of ah-7 a1- 
bid`ah (heretics) and ah1 a1-ahw2i' (people with 
arbitrary desires) cannot be accepted. " One of his 
followers explained that what he means by ahl a1-ahwä' 
was ahl a1-Kal5m. Imam Hasan al-Basra said: "Do not 
discuss with ahl al-ahwä'; do not attend their teaching 
and to show our rejection do not listen to them. " The 
Muhaddithün agreed with these views and claimed that 
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the companions of the prophet did not practise cIlm al- 
Kaläm in their life, even though they were better 
acquainted with the truth than others. This was due to 
the hadith in which the prophet said: "Destroy the 
meticulous, destroy the meticulous, destroy the 
meticulous. "13 This shows their disapproval of these 
who go too deeply into argumentation. 
They also argue that if the `I1m al-Kaiam 
were part of religion, the prophet would have asked 
his companions to practise it and taught them its 
methods as he taught them the knowledge of farä'id (the 
law of succession and distribution). However he forbade 
them to have an argumentation about the divine decree, 
as he said: "Keep away from the divine decree. "14 
These were some of the views of the salaf 
concerning dIlm al-Kaiam. We believe that the reason 
they rejected this science is because it was not 
practised by the prophet and his companions in their 
time. We can understand that they saw `Ilm al-Kaläm as 
sowing doubt. 
13Sahih Muslim, vol. 16, p. 220. 
14A1-Ghazäll, Ihyä', vol. 1, pp. 94-95. 
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2.3 The views of Imäm al-Juwayni on dIlm al-Kaläm. 
We have already discussed the life of Imäm 
al-Juwayni in the earlier chapter and his interest in 
Islamic knowledge, an interest cultivated from an early 
age. He wrote on many different aspects of Islamic 
knowledge, one of which was cIlm a1-Kal5m. He wrote 
many books in this field such as al-Shämil fi usül al- 
din, a1-Irshäd, al -Luma c fi al -Adi l lah, and al - `Agidah 
al-Nizsmiyyah. 
Some of the biographers mentioned that Imam 
al-Juwayni turned away from CIlm al-Kaläm in the last 
days of his life. Ibn al-Jawzi narrates that Imäm al- 
Juwayni said: "You should follow the belief of al- 
`Ajä'. iz (the Sunnite Süfis). "15 This was his final 
turning away from `I1m al-Kaläm for a life of 
meditation. 
Al-Subki narrated in his book Tabagät al- 
Shäfi`iyyah al-Kubrä that Imam al-Juwayni said: "Do not 
involve yourself with dIlm al-kaläm. If I had known 
that through `I1m a1-Kaiäm I would end up in this 
state, I would not have become involved with it. "16 He 
suggested it was compulsory for an imäm to have 
knowledge of usül al-din to guide those Muslims who 
151bn al-Jawzi, Muntazam, vol. 9, p. 19. 
16A1-Subkl, Tabagät, vol. 5, p. 180. 
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have problems with dI1m al-Kaläm by following the 
salaf, as he claimed that the duties of Imäms are to 
unite their followers and guide them to the way of the 
salaf, to avoid probing the unsolved problem, not to 
study the difficult too deeply and not to examine the 
d, lemma too closely. They should just follow what had 
been taught to them without question. Although they 
are learned and possess authority, they tended to avoid 
discussion of any problem which could lead people 
astray from the religion. 
The salaf cared about the problems of 
Muslims and tried their best to protect them from being 
led astray and from deviation from faith. Some people, 
however, will be led astray, as the prophet said: " My 
ummah will divided into seventy three groups, only one 
of which will be saved". 17 
Imam al-Juwayni explains which group will be 
saved by saying: "Those who are in the same way with me 
and my friends. We do not allow discussion of dI1m a1- 
Kal5m and we do not evoke it in our considerations. We 
raise difficulties for those who are trying to revive 
this discussion. "18 
17Ibn Mäjah, vol. 2, p. 1322. 
18A1-Juwayn3, Ghiyäth, pp. 190-191. 
81 
Thus, the views of Imäm al-Juwayni concerning 
`Ilm al-Kaläm are clear to us. He claims that dIlm al- 
Kaläm can lead people astray and to deviate from the 
religion. He also claims that only the way of the salaf 
which he followed was the safe way, as he proclaimes: 
". Know that I have withdrawn all my articles which were 
against the salaf and I request the scholar of Nlsäbür 
to do so. "19 
By examining the words of Imäm al-Juwayni in 
his own books we find that he called for isolation from 
`Iim al-Kaiäm, but the question is, how can he agree 
with this as he himself used 'Ilm al-Kalam and wrote 
many books about it? 
We note that the period in which Imäm al- 
Juwayni lived was full of sectarian confusion. This 
caused the spread of anxiety and disputation among the 
people. He felt that his responsibility as a Muslim was 
to settle the disputes among them. This was one reason 
he started work from his early youth in his father's 
school and later. This effort was followed by the other 
scholars and the Shäfidite leaders. After he returned 
to NIsäbür when the Saljügs took power he lived at the 
Nizämiyyah college and all the Sunnite affairs began to 
improve at that particular time. 20 
19A1-Subki, Tabagät, vol. 5, p. 189. 
20Ibn `Asäkir, Tabyin, p. 279. 
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As for himself, he chose the Sufi way as 
mentioned by al-Subki. He would cry when he heard a 
telling line of poetry (bayt) or meditated on his life 
and when he began to talk about ahwäl (states) he would 
include the Sufis' knowledge for his audience and would 
often cry, followed by the participants. 21 Al-Subki 
mentioned again that when he wore new clothes he 
warned his heart by saying: We are human beings, we 
have to be well-turned out, we are not mountain or 
iron. "22 
All these are Sufi practices, which show that 
Imam al-Juwayni was involved in Tasawwuf. Tasawwuf or 
the mystical way at that particular time was not yet 
regarded by most Muslims as a means to the knowledge of 
God. This does not mean that Imam al-Juwayn3 had 
totally rejected dIim al-Ka15m, but that he regarded it 
as a tool. It could cure some ills of the soul and not 
others. To him `Ilm al-KaJäm had its own value as long 
as it related to proving the existence of God and 
freeing Him from the attributes of His creations. He 
prefers Tasawwuf because this can lead him closer to 
the knowledge of. the reality of God. He used cIjm a1- 
21A1-Subki, Tabagät, vol. 5, p. 177. 
22lbid. 
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Kalam as a tool to achive the goal of truth and 
practised Tasawwuf in his life. 23 
2.4 The views of Imam al-Ghazali on CIlm al-Kaläm 
The views of Imam al-Ghazäli on dIlm al-Kaläm 
are clear to us when we look through many of his books. 
We have taken his views on dIlm a1-Kal5m from some of 
his famous books such as al-mungidh min al-dal5l, 
gawä'id al-tagä'id fi kitsb Ihy5l' culüm al-din, faysal 
al-tafriga bayn al-Isläm wa al-zanädigah and al-igtisäd 
fi al-ictigäd. 
Imam al-Ghazäli proposes that the study and 
use of dIlm al-Kaläm were essentially pragmatic in that 
it became a means of defending the orthdox creed 
expecially against the heretical deviations being 
propounded by some. The argument runs thus. Through His 
messenger in the utterances of the Qur'än and through 
the traditions, God has sent a creed which is the true 
faith and whose base provides for human welfare both in 
religious and secular matters. However, Satan also sent 
forth teachings and practices contrary to the true 
faith, and these are often in the form of the teachings 
of the heretics. 
23Fawqiyyah Husayn, al-Juwayni Imäm al-Haramayn, Cairo, 
n. d. p. 223. 
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People often tend to accept these suggestions 
and in this way pervert the true creed for its 
adherents. Into this context God created the class of 
theologians so that they may be able to support the 
traditional faith. By means of systematic argument, by 
disclosing to scrutiny the confused and confusing 
doctrines deployed by the heretics who are at variance 
with traditional or orthodox beliefs, these theologians 
could reinforce the handed-down faith and refute 
heretical teachings. This argument explains the origins 
of theology and theologians, and therefore the use of 
dI1m a1-Ka1äm by Imam al-Ghazäli. 24 
The theologians were successful because in 
due course they performed the task assigned them by 
God. By refuting deviations and heretical innovations, 
they were able to safeguard the traditional belief and 
defend that faith which is the creed acquired from the 
prophetic source. 25 
Following the above argument it is clear that 
Imam al-Ghazall supported the mutakallimün and he 
explained the importance of cIlm al-Kaläm. But to him 
though dIlm al-Kaläm could attain its own objective, in 
the final analysis it was inadequate for him. He also 
said: "Theological argumentation was not adequate to my 
24Watt,: Faith, p. 27. 
, 
25lbid. ', p. 28. 
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case and was unable to cure the malady of which I 
complained. "26 
He explained this inadequacy of `Ilm al- 
Kaläm. The mutakallimün are trapped into a system based 
only on logic; they ground their arguments on premises 
taken from their opponents which they seem compelled to 
admit by taglid (blind acceptance or belief), or by a 
communal consensus or by a bare acceptance of the 
Qur'an and Tradition. Their primary energy seems 
devoted to make explicit the contradictions of those 
they opposed and criticizing them in respect of the 
logical consequences of what they admitted. For Zmäm 
al-Ghazäll this would have no effect in answering those 
who admitted nothing at all except explicit logic to 
establish truth. 27 
Furthermore, dIim al-Kaiäm does not reach the 
perfect understanding required by Imam al-Ghazäll, 
because to him dIim al-F: aiäm is an achievement which 
could help the reason to understand the practical 
knowledge deeply and clearly. However, he mentions that 
the belief must be built up in children from an early 
age. In this way they can firmly believe in the 
religion and protect it from doubts. It is not the way 
to confirm and strengthen their belief that they should 
26lbid. 
27Ibid. 
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know the knowledge of jadal (disputation) or dIlm al- 
Kaläm, but this faith can be achieved by reading the 
Qur'an with the commentary, understanding the Tradition 
and also by performing the worship. All these will help 
to confirm and strengthen their belief with support 
from the Qur'an and traditional evidence. 
We can see that Imam al-Ghazäll was 
satisfied with the traditional proofs and claimed that 
this was a safe method for children and ordinary 
people. He also warned them not to engage in any 
discussion and arguments on faith, because these can 
create more confusion than truth. 
He explains the disadvantages of dIlm al- 
Kaläm: it can confuse and place firm belief into doubt 
by referring to the inconcrete evidence which can cause 
the true believers to disagree among themselves; it 
could also help the heretics strengthen their belief by 
referring to their fanatical understanding of religion 
which was gained from discussion. 28 Concerning the 
advantage of dIlm al-Kaläm he explains that it can 
discover the truths and know them and it also protects 
the true faith from the doubts which were created by 
the heresies. 29 
28A1-Ghazäli, Ihyä', vol. 1, p. 96. 
29Ibid. 
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dIlm a1-Kaiam to Imäm al-Ghazdli is not 
enough to bring someone to the stage of perfect belief 
because the clarification which was discovered by `Ilm 
al-Ka1em was already clear and can be known without any 
need to be deeply involved in it. This was the reason 
why he says: "dIlm al-Kalam can attain its own aim, but 
for me this is inadequate. "30 
He attacks the theologians who accused the 
ordinary people of being unbelievers because of their 
ignorance of the general knowledge of shar. i`ah. He 
says: "The people who go too far are the theologians 
who accuse the ordinary Muslims of being unbelievers 
when they claim that those who do not follow their 
steps in understanding kaläm and the sharicah are 
unbelievers. "31 
He gives an example: cXlm al-Kaläm is like a 
medicine which can cure some of the soul's disease. 
There are different types of medicine which can be used 
to cure disease, some of them suitable to some people 
and some not. It is same with cllm a1-Kai m. He then 
divids the people into four groups: 
The first group are those who believe in God and 
His messenger with the firm belief and practise 
religious duties regularly without questioning them. 
30A1-Ghazäli, Munqidh, p. 96. 
31A1-Ghazäli, Faysal, p. 150. 
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They follow the companions' way, believe what was 
brought by the prophet and avoid discussion among 
themselves. 
The second group are those who deviate from 
t4he true belief such as the unbelievers, heretics and 
misleaders. Some of them have a weak understanding, a 
dogmatic blind belief and have grown up with these 
deviant beliefs. This group does not accept any proof 
from the Qur'än and had th . 
I 
The third group are those who believe blindly 
though God has given them intelligence. They use their 
intelligence to create doubt in their own belief. 
Diplomacy is needed in order to bring them back to the 
true faith and save them from doubt and confusion in 
their minds. To convince them, they need strong 
evidence such as verses from the Qur'än, hadith, or 
the teaching of the famous men among them. 
The fourth group are those led astray who 
have intelligence and are willing to accept the true 
belief if the right way is used to convince them. This 
group needs diplomacy to influence them to the true 
belief. 32 
32A1-Ghazäli, Igtisäd, p. 10. 
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Imam al-Ghazdl3 also explains that the people 
are of different types. Some of them can accept `Ilm 
a1-Kal5m and benefit from it, while others cannot; 
sometimes it can harm them. To him the basis of true 
belief is the Qurldn and had3 th and purity of heart, as 
he says: "Whoever worships God with real piety, 
renounces pleasure in worldly things and always 
remembers God, will be honoured by the light of 
knowledge. Such knowledge cannot be known by ordinary 
people. That is the real knowledge which cannot be 
achieved except by overcoming the difficulty of 
believing and accepting God's light in the heart. "33 
He says again: "Whoever thinks that the 
achievement of faith depends on dIim a1-hal5m and 
proof, is a heretic because faith is the light of God 
which is given to the heart of His servant in various 
ways. Sometimes it is given internally which cannot be 
seen, sometimes through dreams, and sometimes through 
witnessing a pious man by accompanying him and studying 
under him". 34 As God says: 
"Those whom God (in His plan) willeth 
to guide, He openeth their breast to 
Islam. "35 
33A1-Ghazäli, Faysal, p. 152. 
34Ibid., p. 151. 
35The Qur'än, 6: 125. 
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In another verse God Says: 
"Is one whose heart God has opened to 
Islam, so that he has received 
Enlightenment from God. "36 
Once when the prophet was asked the meaning 
of 'the opened heart', he replied: "Enlightenment which 
will anvelope the believers' hearts. " He was asked 
again what was its sign, to which he replied: 
"Withdrawal from the mansion of deception and a return 
to the mansion of eternity. "37 
From this it is clear to us that Imam al- 
Ghazäli was following the Sufi way like his master Imäm 
al-Juwayni to achieve the truth. As he says: " I learnt 
with certainty that it is above all the mystics who 
walk on the road of God; their life is the best life, 
their method the soundest method, their character the 
purest character; indeed, were the intellect of the 
intellectuals and the learning of the learned and the 
scholarship of the scholars, who are versed in the 
profundities of revealed truth, brought together in the 
attempt to improve the life and character of the 
mystics, they would find no way of doing so; for to the 
mystics all movement and all rest, whether external or 
internal, brings illumination from the light of the 
36The Qur'an, 39 : 22. 
37A1-Ghazäl3, Faysal, p. 153. 
91 
lamp of prophetic revelation; and behind the light of 
prophetic revelation there is no other light on the 
face of the earth from which illumination may be 
received. 1138 
Imäm al-Ghazäli holds that the eyewitness is 
always the best evidence. He later compared the belief 
of the ordinary people and the ahl al-kaläm, he found 
that the beliefs of the ordinary people were better 
than those of the ahl al-kaläm. He says: " Compare the 
belief of the pious ordinary people and the belief of 
the ahl a1-kaläm. You will find the belief of the pious 
ordinary people has firmness like the high mountain 
which can not be destroyed and shaken while the belief 
of the ah1 a1-kaläm is not consistent. It is like a 
string on the air which can be blown to the right and 
left following the wind's direction. "39 
He prefers the blind belie: to the belief 
gained through debate because the pure belief should be 
protected from uncertain and sceptical discussion. At 
the same time he preferred evidence to blind belief 
because in Islam belief is supported by evidence, as 
God Says: 
"Can there be another god besides God? 
say, bring forth your argument, if 
38A1-Ghazäli, Mungidh, p. 145. 
39A1-Ghazäli, Ihyä', vol. 1, p. 94. 
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you are telling the truth. "40 
He also says: "If the people want the 
enlightenment of God in their hearts, to be well 
behaved, to gain success, always to be pious, to 
p. rotect their souls, control desire and receive 
guidance from God in discovering the truth of the 
faith, they have to strive to please Him, as He says: 
"And those who strive in our(cause), we 
will certainly guide them to our paths. 
For verily God is with those who do right. "41 
According to Imam al-Ghazäli, the way to 
erase any doubts, to discover the truth and to know the 
secret of faith is through the soul's striving, 
restraining desire, paying total attention to God and 
keeping the mind clear from sinful discussion. This is 
the mercy of God, who grants subsistence to those of 
good repute according to the degree of their belief, 
acceptance and cleanness of heart. 421mEim al-Ghazäli 
encourages the people. to strive towards achieving 
purification of the soul and complete happiness. 43 
40The Qur'än, 26 : 64. 
41The Qur'än, 29 : 69. 
42A1-Ghaz5li, Ihyä', vol. 1, p. 99. 
43Muhammad al-Bahl, al-Ghazäli falsafatuhu al- 
akhlägiyyah wa a1-süfiyyah, Cairo, 1981, p. 25. 
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From the previous discussion we can point out 
some of the important facts as follows: 
- Imam al-Juwayni and Imam al-Ghazall both used `I1m 
aI-ka15m in their works and wrote many books on it. 
- Imam al-Ghazali has taken his master's view, 
mentioning that `I1m al-KaJäm is not suitable for all 
people. Imam al-Juwayni says: " It is the duty of an 
imam (leader) to unite the people and guide them into 
the way of the Salaf. If this can be done, that is the 
safer way for them. "44 Imam al-Ghazali also says: " 
There must be a person in every century who has deep 
knowledge of `Ilm al-Kaläm to protect the people from 
the heresies, but it is not right to teach this 
knowledge openly to the public like teaching other 
subjects such as tafsir and filth. "45 
- Imam al-Juwayni turned away from dIIm a1-Kalam to the 
Sufi way before the end of his life. This influenced 
his student Imam al-Ghazali when he also turned away 
from cI1m a1-Kaiam when he found it did not satisfy him 
to the Sufi way as he says: Iim al -Kaiäm can attain 
its own aim, but for him this was inadequate. "46 We 
44A1-Ghazäli, Ghiyäth, p. 25. 
45A1-Ghazäli, Ihyä', vol. 2, p. 99. 
46A1-Ghazäli, Munqidh, p. 96. 
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found that he sometimes attacks dIim a1-Kaiäm and at 
other times he defends it. 
- As-we have discussed earlier, in the time of the two 
Imams, the growing intellectual discussions were spread 
widely. The conflict between sects such as the 
Sunnite, Muctazilite and others created intellectual 
discussions at that particular time. The Ash`arite 
followers such as Imäm al-Juwayn3 and Imäm al-Ghazäll 
have left to the people argued proof to protect their 
belief and religion by using the traditional proofs 
from the Qur'an, hadith and the statements of the' 
salaf. They also used rational proof, philosophical 
method and logic to face the enemy who used the same 
methods to fight the Muslims. 
- `Ilm al-Iialäm at that time was used as a weapon or 
method by the scholars and the preachers to achieve 
their objective. They used it in the proper way and 
finally gained victory over the religion's enemies. 
Regarding the two Imams' turning away from `I1m al- 
Kaläm, it does not mean that this knowledge collapsed 
but it gives confirmation that this knowledge was used 
only as a weapon and method in the intellectual 
discussions. To satisfy their souls, they needed the 
pure religious belief, clear and firm faith, without 
need of any logical proof or philosophical explanation. 
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- It was clear from the previous discussions that Imäm 
al-Ghazäli claimed that the only way to achieve the 
true belief was the Sufi way: by the soul's striving 
and the abandoning of disputes and discussion to gain 
God's enlightenment. 
- The inclination of Imam al-Ghazäli to Tasawwuf was 
due to his life in his father's house and because he 
became a pupil of Imam al-Juwayni. As mentioned earlier 
he was with Imam al-Juwayni until the end of his 
teacher's life in 487/1094 Imam al-Juwayni had turned 
away from `Iim al-KaTäm, as he says: " Now I have turned 
back to the true words, you should follow the belief of 
the elders. If I am not awakened by the truth, I will 
be in trouble. "47 He also explains that this possible 
difficulty was "the result of my involvement with dflm 
a1-KaT5m, so beware of it. "48. There was no doubt that 
Imam al-Ghazäli himself had witnessed and heard this 
statement from Imam al-Juwayni and this influenced his 
soul and life. 
- Abü al-Wafä' al-Taftäzäni mentions that the elders 
mentioned by Imdm al-Juwayni were Sunnite Süfis and it 
471bn al-Jawzi, Muntazam, vol. 9, p. 19. 
48Ibid. 
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is their view which was strongly defended by Imäm al- 
Ghazä1i. 49 
2.5 The views of Imäm al-Juwayni and Imäm al-Ghazäli on 
the problem of rational and tradition proof (cagl and 
nagl) 
The question of rational and tradition proofs 
is one of the dominant problems in Islamic intellectual 
history. Theologians have discussed the relation 
between rational and tradition proofs and the strenght 
of one over the other and which is more reliable and 
how far the rational proofs can be considered. The 
Qur'än itself told people to think about the world and 
to use reason to study its verses in order to gain 
belief. As God Says in the following verses: 
" Men who celebrate the praises of God, 
standing, sitting, and lying down on 
their sides, and contemplate the 
(wonders of) creation in the heavens 
and the earth, (with the thought): 
"our Lord! not for naught hast thou 
created (all) this! glory to thee! give 
us salvation from the penalty of the 
fire. "50 
- "The likeness of the life of the 
present is as the rain which We Send 
49Abü al-Wafä al-Taftäzän3, Madkhal ilä a1-Tasawwuf al- 
Islämi, Cairo, 1979, p. 152. 
5OThe Qur'än, 3: 191. 
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down from the skies: by its mingling 
arises the produce of the earth which 
provides food for man and animals: (it 
grows) till the earth is clad with its 
golden ornaments and is decked out (in 
beauty): the people to whom it belongs 
think they have all powers of disposal 
over it: There reaches it our command by 
night or by day, and We make it like a 
harvest clean-mown, as if it had not 
" flourished only the day before! thus do 
We explain the signs in detail for those 
who reflect. "51 
- "And it is He Who spread out the 
earth, and set thereon mountains 
standing firm, and (flowing) rivers: and 
fruit of every kind He made in pairs, 
two and two: He draweth the night as a 
veil o'er the day. Behold, verily in 
these things there are signs for those 
who consider. "52 
- "Behold! in the creation of the 
heavens and the earth; in the 
alternation of the night and the day; in 
the sailing of the ships through the 
ocean for the profit of mankind in the 
rain which God sends down from the 
skies, and the life which He gives 
therewith to an earth that is dead; in 
the beasts of all kinds that He scatters 
through the earth; in the change of the 
winds, and the clouds which they trail 
like their slaves between the sky and 
the earth; (here) indeed are signs for a 
people that are wise. "53 
When we discuss the views of the theologians 
on the problem of rational and tradition proofs, we 
find that there were three different views as 
illustrated below : 
5lThe Qur'än, 10 : 24. 
52The Qur'än, 13 : 3. 
53The Qur'än, 2: 164. 
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First: That of the 2ähiriyyah54 and those 
who were like them. They rely on the 
Sharicah on its own, and do not 
use reason 
Second: The Mu`tazilah55 who claimed that 
reason is superior to the Sharc. 
Third: The Ashcariyyah and the Ahl al-Sunnah 
(tradionalists). 56 Their views take 
the middle path. Sometimes they argued 
that the Sharc was superior to reason 
and sometimes they said reason was 
the way to understand the Sharc. Thus 
they confirmed that both reason and 
the Sharc were connected to each 
other. 
54A school of Law, which would derive the Law only from 
the literal text (Zähir) of the Qur'än and Sunnah. It 
is also known as Dä-15dä after its founder Dä'üd b. 
Khalaf. See "al-Zähiriya", E. I. 1, iv, p. 1192. 
55This group was founded by Wäsil b. `Atä' (d. 131/748) 
in the first half of the 2nd/8th century. This group 
are called the followers of divine justice and unity. 
They are also known as the Qadarlyah and `Adllyah. See 
"Muttazila", E. 1.1, vii, p. 783. 
56This group are those who refrain from deviating from 
dogma and practice. See "Sunna", E. I. 1, iv, p. 555. 
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As Imäm al-Juwayni and Imäm al-Ghazäll were 
the followers of al-Ashcari, we shall examine their 
views on the problems of the rational and tradition 
proofs and examine the influence of the rational on 
tradition proof. 
The views of Imäm al-Juwayni on the use of 
reason were different from those of the Muctazilites 
and the philosophers because he does not build his 
notion of knowledge on reason alone, nor does he deny 
rational evidence. For him it was one way of attaining 
the truth of the Sharicah. But if reason is not 
illuminated by the light of the Sham, it will not be 
guided to righteousness because reason alone is weak 
and restricted. 
He does not deny that reason can discover 
proof. He held that if the content of the Sharc was 
found contrary to reason it should be rejected totally 
because Share should not be contrary to reason. 57 He 
also disagreed with those who claimed that reason must 
be examined with religious knowledge; he held that the 
soul needed awakening; and this awakening does not come 
internally but it comes from force. Sharc awakens the 
negligent soul and rouses it from confusion to make it 
think about God's powers. The ability of reason is 
57A1-Juwayn3, Irshäd, p. 36. 
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limited, so it is necessary to discuss religious 
matters in order to gain an original religious 
knowledge. 58 He held that at times reason could not 
provide an understanding except by recourse to Sharl. 
This meant that reason is obedient to Sharc. 59 
Concerning faith, he had the view that the 
right method was reliance on the rational and tradition 
proofs by pairing them together. Therefore, he divided 
the proofs into rational and tradition (sam`i). 60 He 
was of the opinion that the rational proof carried its 
own truth because to him reason was a natural science: 
it was there at birth and one could not study to obtain 
it. That was called natural knowledge which cannot be 
obtain by someone, but comes naturally. Human beings 
put faith in the strong evidence which is based on 
reason in order to convince their hearts and to make 
their souls peaceful. Imam al-Juwayni holds that the 
servants of God do not have the ability to doubt the 
science of reason. Because this knowledge is almost 
axiomatic, belief in it is clear. 61 
58Ibid., p. 9. 
-Fawqiyyah Husayn, op., cit, p. 155. 
59lbid. p. 143. 
601bid., p. B. 
61A1-3uwayn3, Burhän, vol. 1, p. 136. 
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As for the tradition (samdi) proof, it 
relies on the information or command of God, the Qur'än 
and Sunnah, which are full of information and commands 
of God which are compulsory. All the contents of the 
Qur'än and Sunnah of the prophet Muhammad are true 
information which it is compulsory to believe for a 
Muslim. 
Imam al-Juwayn3 had confidence in reason and 
proof and this he has mentioned in the introduction to 
his book a1-Irsh5d. He felt compelled to write the book 
to add rational argumentation and positive evidence 
because rejectors would not believe anything other 
than rational proof. They recognized only it and obeyed 
its rules. As he said: " We have to follow the way which 
contains positive evidence and intellectual argument 
which are higher than others and recognize that other 
earlier writing may not contain these qualities. "62 He 
did not mean to devalue the writers before him. 
However, he used this method of necessity as an 
argument to oppose the rejectors and thus disprove 
their views by using the same method. 
Imam al-Juwayni divided the acquisition of 
knowledge into three categories: 
62A1-Juwayn3, Irshäd, p. 23. 
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The first category: What is conceived by reason 
alone such as the reality of things, the impossibility 
of the impossible, the possibility of the possible and 
the necessity of what is necessary. 63 
The second category: What is conceived by 
tradition is the occurrence of possible things, and 
their disappearance. The possibilities which are 
created by God, if declared by a truthful person, can 
be believed. 64 
The third category: What is conceived by reason 
and tradition simultaneously. This comes from the 
traditional and does not appeal to the reason, and the 
reason has to ascertain its validity. 65 
Therefore, reason to Imam al-Juwayni had its 
value with regard to the usül al-din. It endows this 
science with a degree of certainty which appeases the 
soul. Reason alone is sometimes unable to urge people 
to think about God's attributes and His grace in this 
world, it must be guided and supported by the Share. 
From the above it is clear that Imam al- 
Juwayni held that: 
63A1-Juwayni, Burhän, vol. 1, p. 136. 
64Ibid., p. 137. 
65Ibid. 
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- Reason was the necessary science which leads 
to natural knowledge and which brings certainty and 
leaves no one in doubt. 
- He used rational evidences in his writing to 
refute the rejector. 
No matter how certain reason is, it still 
fails to reach some forms of knowledge and still needs 
guidance. Because of this he divided the acquisition of 
knowledge into three categories. 
- He held that reason and the Share should go 
together to prevent people doubting their beliefs, and 
enable people not to become blind followers but be 
convinced in their own minds. 
As for his influence on his student (Imäm al- 
Ghazal! ), we shall first present the views of Imäm al- 
Ghazal! on the rational and tradition proofs. 
Imäm al-Ghazäli has explained his views 
concerning rational and tradition proofs in his book 
a1-Igtisad f3 al-Ictigäd. He wages a very severe 
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campaign against the Hashwiyyah66 for their acceptance 
of a naive belief in the matter of the doctrines of 
faith, and for their adherence to the literal meaning 
of the religious texts (al-nusüs al-shard iyyah) . He 
also directs an attack against the philosophers and the 
extremists amongst the Muctazilites for their having 
exaggerated the power and authority of the mind and its 
freedom, so that thereby they put reason in opposition 
to scriptural proofs (gawätic a1-sharicah). Imam al- 
Ghazal! says: 
The tendency of these is toward being remiss 
(tafrit) while the tendency of the others is 
towards extravagance (ifrät); and both of 
them are far from wisdom and caution. But the 
essential purpose in the dogma of faith is 
adherence to moderation and the following of 
the rightful path; since both the extremes 
are abhorrent. And how can enlightenment 
prevail amongst those who are content with 
following the Traditions while denying the 
methods of speculation and ignoring the fact 
that the truth of the prophet is proved by 
reason? 67 
Imam al-Ghazäli further states that the 
tradition proofs may be conclusive and positive in 
their transmission (sanad) and text (main) and show 
that what is proved by them must be believed. Where 
66A contamptuous term derived from hashw ("farce" and 
hence "prolix and useless discourse") and with the 
general meaning of "scholar" of little worth, 
particularly traditionists. See "Hashwiyya", E. I. 2, 
iii, p. 269. 
67A1-Ghazäli, Igtisäd, p. 48. 
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doubt and suspicion about the text or transmission of 
these occur, then what is proved by them must not be 
believed. 
He clarifies the above in another text in 
which he held that reason would not be guided except by 
the Sharc, and the Shar` would not be clear except by 
reason. Reason is like a foundation and Shar is like a 
structure. The structure will not appear if it does not 
have the foundation and vice versa. He held that the 
reason is like sight and Shar is like a beam of light, 
the. sight will be fruitless if there is no light beam. 
He held again that reason is like light and Share is 
like oil which feeds the light; if there is no oil the 
light will not flame. 68 
He explained the unification between reason 
and tradition when he said: " Sharc is reason from 
outside and reason is Sharc from inside, they unite". 
He gave an example of when Sharc is reason from outside 
as the instance when God uses the word "wisdom" in 
referring to the unbeliever in the Qur'än: 
Deaf, dumb, and blind they are 
devoid of wisdom. 69 
68A1-Ghazäli, Malärij, p. 57. 
69The Qur'än, 2: 171. 
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As an example of Share from inside, God says: 
God's handiwork according to the 
pattern on which He has made mankind 
no change(let there be) in the work 
(wrought) by God: that is the standard 
religion. 70 
Reason was named religion in this verse 
because of it unification. God says again: 
Light upon light. 71 
The light in this verse means the light of 
reason and Shar`. 72 
Imäm al-Ghazdli also explained the role of 
reason in religious knowledge. He held that the 
perfection of the heart is dependent on its freedom 
from disease because reason's knowledge does not give 
enough safety to the heart when it is needed. Reason is 
not enough to prevent disease in the body. It needs to 
know how to prevent it by learning from the doctors, 
but, when hearing from them, prevention cannot be 
understood except by use of reason. Therefore reason 
70The Qurcän, 30 : 30. 
7lThe Qur'an, 24 : 35. 
72A1-Ghazäl3, Ma`ärij, p. 57. 
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and hearing cannot be separated, they are intertwined. 
He who follows blindly without using intelligence is 
illiterate and he who uses reason without guidance from 
the Qur'än and Sunnah is led astray. Combining them 
together is the best way because reason's knowledge is 
l. ke food and the Shar "s knowledge is like medicine. 
The sick man whose illnes is caused by food can be 
cured with medicine; it is the same with the soul's 
diseases which can be cured by practising the Sharicah, 
that is, worship as duty dictates, and following the 
acts of the prophets to improve the soul. He who does 
not cure his sick soul by practising the Sharicah and 
refers only to reason alone, his soul's diseases will 
not be cured. Whoever claimed that reason's knowledge 
is contrary to Sharicah knowledge, and that these 
cannot be united together, must be a blind man who 
cannot see the truth with his own eyes. 73 
Imäm Ghazäll holds the opinion that both of 
these are not contrary. On this he said: " It does not 
seem that the Sharicah is contrary to reason; they have 
a strong interrelationship; they cannot be 
separated. "74 
73A1-Ghazäli, Ihyä', vol. 3, p. 15. 
74A1-Ghaz7ali, Macärij, p. 58. 
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Imam al-Ghazäll has been greatly influenced 
by his teacher (Imam al-Juwayni). The above statement, 
for example, is already mentioned by Imam al-Juwayni: 
If the content of the Sharc which reached us were 
contrary to reason it should be rejected totally 
because the Sharc is not contrary to reason. 75 
Imam al-Ghazali uses the same explanation as 
his master when he explains that the acquisition of 
knowledge is divided into three categories. These are: 
First: Propositions which can be known by 
reason without need of the evidence 
of the Sharc. 
Second: Propositions which can be known by the 
evidence of the Share without recorse 
to reason. 
Third : Propositions which can be known by 
both these means. 76 
Examples of the first category are 
propositions such as the creation of the world, the 
existence of the creator and His knowledge, power and 
will. Examples of the second category of theological 
propositions are the acceptance of beliefs which cannot 
75A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 36. 
76A1-Ghazäl3, Ihyä', vol. 1, p. 27. 
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be prooved such as the Resurrection, the Day of 
Judgment, the reward and punishment accorded in the 
Hereafter and similar propositions; the verification of 
the truth of these propositions cannot be known except 
through revelation from God. Examples of the third 
category are all propositions which fall within the 
sphere of reasoning but come second to the word of God 
in so far as matters of proof are concerned. These 
include questions of ru`ya (a vision of God) and the 
acceptence that God alone is the creator of all 
movement, accidents and other similar things. So, when 
taking tradition proof, it should be observed, if the 
mind states the possibility -of believing in what is 
proved by the tradition proofs, it must be believed. 
Where doubt and suspicion about the matn (text) or 
sanad (transmission) of these tradition proofs occur, 
then what is proved by them must not be believed. 77 
Imäm al-Ghazäli has views similar to his 
master's: that the rational evidence helps to 
strengthen the religious foundations. He held that the 
rational evidence should be believed, even though it 
may be open to interpretation. Often the belief which 
is built in the heart is taken from such evidence which 
may be interpreted in other ways such as the 
interpretation of some that human beings have the 
ability to create. The companions of the prophet 
77A1-Ghazäli, Igtisäd, p. 132. 
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Muhammad rejected this by referring to the following 
verse of God: 
That is God, your Lord! There is no 
god but He, the Creator of all things: 
Then worship ye Him. 78 
This verse is general and not absolutely 
clear in meaning, but it is also has specific meanings 
which can be known through research by using reason. 79 
This was the same view of Imam al-Juwayni when he said 
that rational discussion on the revealed knowledge 
should be undertaken to avoid doubt in the believers' 
minds. 80 
For Imam al-Ghazali the concept 
intellectual knowledge insists on certainty. It is an 
idea of knowledge which reveals some object or 
religious position in a manner which cannot harbour 
doubt, questioning or the possibility of error or 
illusion. Intellectual knowledge or certain religious 
knowledge apprehended by the human intellect cannot 
entertain any supposition of error and it needs to be 
infallible. This last aspect is important because it 
ensures a security of faith which can withstand any 
attempt to prove it is false; religious knowledge which 
78The Qur'än, 6: 102. 
79A1-Ghazäli, Iqtisäd, p. 133. 
80A1-Juwayn3, cAgä dah, p. 77. 
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the intellect encounters and grasps as true defies 
attempts at doubt and denial, though such an attempt be 
made by someone who can conjure stone to gold or 
transform a rod into a snake. 81 
" To achieve certain knowledge Imam al-Ghazäli 
doubts the knowledge which is gained by imitation, by 
senses and by primary knowledge. He does not accept any 
belief except that which God gave him as a light to 
his heart. Because God's light is the key to much 
knowledge, without it a person cannot save himself from 
doubt. This light is the key to certainty. If reason 
is not prepared to accept this light, doubt will 
remain. Therefore, reason is able to achieve the truth 
like the power of the sight on the eyes. 82 
The power of reason to Imam al-Ghazäli is 
like the power of sight. If the eyes were not prepared 
to see, the light of the sun would not be seen. There 
are two conditions to achieve this sight: the eyes and 
the light. In a similar way, knowledge is brought into 
the soul: by the preparation of the strong mind and the 
emanation of God's light on to it. We can divide the 
truth into two forms: first : that which needs outside 
assistance to know it, such as the truth of Divinity. 
Second: that which does not need such as necessary 
81A1-Ghazäli,. Munqidh, p. 90. 
82A1-Ghazäli; Ihyä', vol. 3. p. 10. 
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knowledge; If reason needs assistance from outside to 
know the truth of necessary knowledge this assistance 
does not benefit but supports and confirms it. 83 
Thus, some of the views of Imam al-Ghazali 
concerning reason are similar to the views of Imam al- 
Ashcari who claimed that reason has the ability to 
understand the Sharicah and interpret it when 
necessary. But Imam al-Ghazalä is to be distinguished 
from other theologians because he set up a measure to 
test the deeper spiritual level by using the Süfi way 
and making doubt a tool to reveal the truth. To him 
people have different stages in realizing the truth. 
For Imäm al-Ghazäli the choice of the way of 
the mystic encompasses both practical activity and 
intellectual belief. The intellectual aspect consists 
of ridding the self of obstacles, by stripping the self 
of its baser features and evil inclinations. In this 
manner the heart could achieve complete freedom from 
all that is not God and become in a state of constant 
recollection of Him. 84 
A human being has three stages: 
83Karäm 'Azqül, a1-cAq1 fä a1-Is15m, Beirut, 1946, p. 
11. 
84A1-Ghaz5l3, Mungidh, p. 139. 
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The first stage is a1-haw5ss (senses) 
The second stage is al-cagl (reason) 
The third stage is a1-galb (heart) 
or dhawq (literally tasting), 
Imäm al-Ghazäli wrote: "Man's information 
about the world comes by means of perception; and every 
perception of the perceptible is created so that 
thereby man may have some acquaintance with a world (or 
sphere) of the existent. "85 By 'world (or sphere)'we 
simply mean 'classes of existents' . Imäm al-Ghazäli 
then explains the creation of human faculties. At first 
came the sense of touch and by this tactile means 
people perceive certain classes of existents, such as 
heat and cold, things smooth or rough. Next reason or 
intellect was created in people and by this they 
apprehend things necessary or possible, which was not 
possible in the previous stage. Beyond the intellect 
there is yet another stage. Here, in a realm beyond 
sensery perception or intellectual reasoning, a 
symbolic eye is opened by which people may perceive the 
unseen or forsee things still to come and understand 
issues or things which are not able to be apprehended 
85Ibid., p. 148. 
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by mere intellect, in the same way as objects of 
discernment are beyond sensory understanding. 86 
We come to understand that Imam al-Ghazali 
was the first among the Ashcarites to introduce the 
Süfi method for the realization of knowledge. This was 
the result of the influence of his teacher, Imam al- 
Juwayn3, on him. Imam al-Juwayni achieved the 
realization of knowledge by observation after 
observation and at the same time kept his mind alert 
and wary of negligence so that he could expound the 
truth. 87 
Imam al-Ghaz5l3 divided observation into two 
forms: 
First: the observation of philosophy. 
Second: the observation of the Sufi. 
In the observation of philosophy he discussed 
the reality of God and began to research the reality of 
the human soul. Initially he confirmed their existence 
with rational proof and thereafter with knowledge 
derived from God. 88 
86Ibid., p. 149. 
87A1-Juwayni, Burhän, vol. 1, p. 155. 
88A1-Ghazäl3, Mungidh, p. 160. 
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In the Süfi observation on the discussion of 
reality he began by the purification of the soul, 
raising the moral self and purification of the heart by 
constant recollection of God. If one acts continuously 
in this way, he will reach high spiritual 
achievement. 89 
If we summarize the influence of Imam al- 
Juwayn3 on Imam al-Ghazäli on the problem of the 
rational and tradition proofs we will find: 
- Imäm al-Ghazäli has adopted his teacher's views 
that reason is the natural knowledge which brings 
certainty and that intellectual discussion on the 
revealed knowledge (a1-samdiyyät) must proceed to avoid 
any doubt in believing it. 
- That certain knowledge is confirmed and is not 
destroyed by doubt. This can be illustrated in the life 
of Imäm al-Ghazäli when he first started to doubt. 
During his studentship under Imäm al-Juwayni he began 
to investigate as he said: " Now that despair has come 
over me, there is no point in studying any problems 
except on the basis of what is self-evident, namely, 
necessary truth and the affirmations of the senses. I 
must first bring these to be judged in order that I may 
89Ibid., p. 164. 
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be certain on this matter. "90 Then he come to 
investigate, different groups, beginning with the 
theologians and following with philosophers and after 
that the Bätinites and last the Sufi way. 91 
Following this period he turned for the next 
ten years to the süfi way of life. In this period of 
solitude and meditation he came to apprehend an immense 
number of things, many of them not fathomable by 
reason. He seems to have entered into the heart of the 
mysteries of the world and he said: "I learnt with 
certainty that it is the mystics who walk on the road 
of God. "92 
The view of Imäm al-Juwayni that certain 
knowledge is the real knowledge which can convince 
someone into firm belief had influenced Imäm al- 
Ghazäli's soul and encouraged him to research on this 
fact. 
90Ibid., p. 91. 
91Ibid., p. 95. 
921bid., p. 145. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Imäm al-Juwayni's Doctrinal use of the Question 
of the Origin of the World and its Influence on 
Imäm al-Ghazäll 
3.1 Introduction 
The question of the origin of the world is 
one of the biggest debates in Islamic philosophy, 
creating significant discussion between theologians and 
philosophers. Central to this debate is the relation of 
the world and God, and for both Imäms the nature of the 
world directs one to an understanding of God. Though 
much of this chapter deals with the nature and origins 
of the world as presented by the Imäms, the central 
idea is the nature of God and what He has created. 
The Qur'än reveals many verses which show the 
origin of the universe, such as the following story of 
Abraham telling his people to worship one God: 
When the night covered him over, he 
saw a star, he said: "This is my 
Lord. " But when it set, he said: "I 
love not those that set. " When he 
saw the moon rising in splendour, 
he said: "This is my Lord. " But when 
the moon set, he said: "Unless my 
Lord Guide me, I shall surely be 
among those who go astray. " When he 
saw the sun rising in splendor, he 
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said: " This is my Lord; This is the 
greatest(of all). " But when the sun 
set, he said: "O my people! I am 
indeed free from your(guilt) of 
giving partners to God. For me, I 
have set my face, firmly and truly, 
towards Him who created the heavens 
and the earth. And never shall I 
give partners to God. "l 
Commentators hold that these verses show that 
Abraham tried to convince his people that there was 
only one God and thus bring them to perfect 
certainty. 2 He wanted to explain to them that they were 
mistaken in their faith and guided them to use 
observation and evidence for their faith. He then used 
the origin of the universe as evidence for proving the 
existence of God. The changes of the star, sun and moon 
from state to state prove that there must be an 
administrator who administrates them from state to 
state and governs them in every condition. 
The question of the creation of the universe 
is important for Imäm al-Juwayni as he used this to 
prove the existence of God in this world. This method 
was later adopted by his student Imäm al-Ghazäl3 also 
to prove the existence of God. Before examining their 
views on this subject, we shall define the two terms 
al-cälam and al-hudüth, which are significant for this 
discussion. 
'The Qur'än, 6: 76-79. 
2Ibn Kathir, Tafsir a1-Qur'än al-Karim, Cairo, 1552, 
vol. 2, p. 150. 
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3.2 Definition of the words a1-c5lam and al-hudüth 
3.2.1 Al-cälam 
" Al_cälam means all creatures except God, or 
all existents in time and place. 3 
According to the salaf a1-c5lam means 
"everything that exists, except God. "4 The khalaf 
(later Muslims) define al-c5lam as "the universe of 
substances and accidents". 5 
A1-Qurtubi quoted from Qatädah to explain the 
word al-`älamin from the Qur'änic verse al-hamdu 
lillähi rabb al_calamän. 6 The word a1-c5lamin is the 
plural of a1-`ä1äm, that is, all that exists except 
God. 7 
According to al-Farrä' and Abü cUbaydah the 
interpretation of a1-c51am is those sentient beings 
capable of thought and reason. They are four: al-Ins 
3A1-Jurjäni, Tacr3fät, p. 83. 
4A1-Juwayn3, Lumac, p. 73. 
5lbid. 
6The Qur'zn, 
7A1-Qurtüb3, a1-J5mic 1i Abkam a1-Qur'an, Beirut, 1985, 
Vol. 9, p. 138. 
120 
(mankind), al-Jinn (invisible beings), al-Ma1ä'1kah 
(angels), and a1-Shaytän (the devil). Animals cannot be 
called a1-cä1am because they cannot think. 8 
3.2.2 AI-hudnth 
The genral meaning of the verb hadatha is 'it 
happened' or 'it was found'. 9 It can also mean it came 
into existence, began to be, had a beginning, began or 
originated, existed newly for the first time, not 
having been before. ' The verbal noun is hudüth. Hadath 
is a term applied by Sibawayh to the verbal noun. '° Al- 
hädith is the event, the accident, that which is likely 
to happen. The opposite of the verb hadatha is gaduma. 
The opposite of al-hudüth is al-qudmah or al-gidäm, and 
of al-hädith is al-gädim. 
According to the philosophers, the 
specialized meaning of hudüth is the determination of 
the existents from pure potentiality to actuality. They 
believe that the world is eternal. The existents do not 
spring from nothing; matter and time precede them. They 
believe that there is an eternal matter which exists 
with God. It has no form, and bears within itself the 
8lbid, vol. 1, p. 137. 
91bn Manzür, Lisän al-cArab, Cairo, 1300 A. H, vol. 2, 
p. 436. 
lOIbid. p. 437. 
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potentiality of being. This potential suggests there 
are causes which lie in the world itself. 11 
These causes determine the existence of 
something at the moment it is created, for otherwise it 
would have remained in the state of pure potentiality 
in which it was before. But if there was something 
determining its existence, this determinant must have 
been determined by another determinant and so on. There 
is a series of causes. But there cannot be an infinite 
series of causes. There is a prime agent, a prime 
mover, which is God. According to Aristotle, the 
efficient cause lies in the souls of the stars. God is 
not an ultimate agent. God is the ultimate aim of 
desire which'inspires"the Heavens to action. 12 
According to the theologians existence sprang 
from nothingness. The Mctakallimün divided the existent 
into a1-Jawhar (substance) and al-cArad (accident), 
which are according to them created by God from 
nothing, and do not spring from a pre-existent matter. 
They then state four basic principles: The first one is 
the existence of the accident (thübüt a1-cArad) (by 
11Ibn Hazm, al-Fisal f3 Milal wa al-Nihal, Cairo, 1317 
A. H., vol. 1, p.: 9,23,24,35; 
-J. W. Sweetman, Islam and Christian Theology, London, 
vol. 2, pp. 132-145. 
12lbid. 
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accidents is implied changable characteristics or 
transient features such as feelings, moods and states 
of mind. The debate about their precise meaning and the 
variety of accidents comes later in this chapter); the 
second is the originated character of accidents (hudüth 
al-cArad); the third is the impossibility of substances 
being without accidents (istihälat tacarri al-Jawähir 
can al-Acräd); and the fourth, which is the 
impossibility of events without a beginning (istihälat 
hawädith Iä awwala lahä) or a chain of events without a 
first link. 13 
To them, the act of originating is one of 
God's acts. This is, in general, their method of 
proving that the world is originated. But there are 
some differences between two of the most important 
sects of Mutakallimün, the Muctazilites and the 
Ashtarites, in what concerns the existent, the non- 
existent, substance, and accident. These differences 
are mentioned, not by the Muctazilites, but by their 
opponents, the Ashcarites. 14 
The existent, according to the Ashcarites, is 
the thing (a1-shay), the thing existing in the eternal 
world, which is the creation of God, the result of His 
will. The Ashcarites hold that this is different from 
, 13A1-Bägillän3, Tamhid, p. 44. 
142bid. p. 40. 
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the Muctazilites' point of view. According to the 
khalaf, the thing is not what exists, but what is known 
(al-madlüm). This leads to the view that the existent 
and non-existent are both things, because what is known 
may be existent or non-existent. If the thing is a 
thing both in non-existence and existence, there would 
not be anything for God to do, His power will have no 
effect because existence is already one characteristic 
of the non-existent thing. In this way the thing has 
existence without the interference of God's will. 15 And 
this is contrary to the Sunnites' principles. 
The Ashcarites mention also that the 
substance, according to the Muctazilites, is a 
combination of accidents (a1-acräd mujtamicah). 
Therefore, if the accidents perish, the substance 
perishes too. The Ashcarites find that the Muctazilites 
have confused two species (Dins); the substance must be 
of a quite different species from the accident. This is 
one of the most important bases of the doctrine of the 
origin of the world. 
But Ibn al-Amir, who was a Sunnite, 
understands the Muctazilites' point of view about 
substance in a different way. He says, as a commentary 
upon the Ashcarites' explanation of the Muctazilites' 
opinion on substance, that if the Mu`tazilites say that 
15A1-Juwayni, Shämil, pp. 24-25. 
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substance perishes when the accidents perish, they do 
not mean that substances are not different from 
accidents; they simply mean that it is impossible to 
separate substances from accidents. Thus, their opinion 
is not contrary to that of the Ashcarites. 16 
This leads to the view that the Muctazilites' 
rivals may have misunderstood them, and what is said 
about the Muctazilites in their opponents' books may 
give a wrong idea about their doctrines. So it can be 
asserted that the MuCtazilites' doctrines are still 
unknown to us. 
The Ashcarites have another way of proving 
the origin of the universe. It is given by al-Ashcari. 
He said: 
"The proof of that is that the 
completely mature man was 
originally semen, then a clot, then 
a small lump, then flesh and bone 
and blood. Now we know very well 
that he did not translate himself 
from state to state. For we see 
that at the peak of his physical 
and mental maturity he is unable to 
produce hearing and sight for 
himself, or to create a bodily 
member for himself. That proves 
that he is even more incapable of 
doing that when he is weak an 
imperfect. " 17 
16Ibid., p. 12. 
17A1-Ashcari, a1-Lumac f3 a1-Radd calä ahl a1-Zaigh wa 
a1-Bidac, pp. 6-7, trn. by R. J Mccarthy, Beyrouth, 
1953. 
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A1-Ashcari then gives an example which proves 
the existence of God. He says: 
it From seeing him a baby, then a 
youth, then a man in the prime of 
life, then an old man, we know very 
well that he does not translate 
himself from youth to old age and 
decrepitude. For even though a man 
strain to rid himself of old age 
and decrepitude, and to restore 
himself to this youthful condition, 
he cannot do it. So what we have 
said proves that he has a 
translator who translates him from 
state to state and governs his 
every condition; for his 
translation from state to state 
without a translator and governor 
is impossible. "18 
3.3 The origin of the world according to Imam al- 
Juwayn3. 
Imam al-Juwayni holds two doctrinal views on 
the origin of the universe. After this short 
introduction both these views will be discussed in 
detail 
The first view can be found in his books al- 
Irshäd and al-Shsmil in which he divided the world into 
two; the substances (al-Jawähir) and the accidents (al- 
Acräd). He later explained four propositions to affirm 
the origin of the world. 
First: That there are accidents. 
18Ibid. 
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Second: That accidents are originated. 
Third: That accidents cannot exist without 
a substance. 
Fouth: That nothing existent (muhdath) 
has no beginning. 
In the second doctrinal view, which can be 
found in his book al-cAgidah a1-Nizämiyyah, he does not 
categorise the origin of the universe into substances 
and accidents. 
3.3.1 The first doctrine 
We shall begin with his first doctrine of the 
origin of the universe and its influence on Imäm al- 
Ghazäli. Imäm al-Juwayni took the theologians' 
definition of substance as follows: 
First: Substance is that which accepts 
the accident. 19 He refutes this, because it defines 
substance by one of its characteristics. 20 
Second: Substance is everything that 
occupies space, or has location. 21 He does not refute 
this. He just replies to those who thought that 
19A1-Juwayni, Shämil, p. 142. 
20Ibid. 
21lbid. 
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occupying a place (al-tahayyuz) is unintelligible. 
According to him, it is intelligible. 
Third: That substance is every Jirm22 is 
accepted by him as being the best definition. 23 It does 
not differ from the second definition, but it is 
clearer. In Irshäd, he just states that the substance 
is what has a location (mutahayyiz). 
He then mentions the qualities of substance. 
He divides these qualities into essential or individual 
qualities (al-sifät al-nafsiyyah) and abstract or 
relational qualities (a1-sifät al-macnawiyyah). What he 
means by essential qualities are those without which 
substance cannot be conceived. He defines them as being 
necessary to the substance for its existence. They have 
no cause (Cillah) to be in the substance. They 
constitute itself. 24 The essential qualities are the 
occupation of space and the acceptance of accidents. 
The relational qualities differ from the 
essential. They do not constitute the self of the 
221n general, Jirm means body. But Imäm al-Juwayni does 
not really mean "body". The term Jirm used by him in 
this definition is equivalent to "every thing that 
occupies space, or has location". 
f 23Ibid. 
24A1-Juwayn3, Xrshäd, p. 51. 
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substance. They are in it by cause (ci11ah), which is a 
ma c nä. 
Imäm al-Juwayni discusses other qualities of 
substance which are not the essential qualities. They 
are what he calls relational, as follows: 
(a) Substance is different from accident. 
(b) That all substances are of 
the same genus or are similar. 
(c) Substances cannot penetrate one another. 
Let us discuss the first quality, that 
"substance is different from accident". According to 
Imäm al-Juwayni this quality is conceived by the mind, 
after the division of the existent into substance and 
accident. For him, only the substance occupies a place, 
and never the accident. That is why he refutes one of 
the Muctazilite definitions, which is that "substance 
is a collection of accidents" because, if substance is 
the result of a group of accidents, and nothing else, 
this means that every accident occupies a place, which 
is contrary to his principles. 
To show how substance is different from the 
accident, he says that, if life comes to the substance, 
the substance becomes alive and feels pain, joy, and 
other feelings. These accidents were not in the 
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substance. 25 Thus they do not occupy a place, and are 
different from the substance. 
The second quality is that substances are of 
the same genus (al-Jawähir mutajänisah) or are similar. 
According to Imäm al-Juwayni tajenus means similarity. 
He explains what he means by similarity. He says that 
it is possible for two similars to be different from 
one another in one quality and for two dissimilars to 
have a common quality, provided it is not an "essential 
quality" in both cases. 26 
In this way similarity lies in resemblance in 
essential qualities. 27 In the case of substances the 
similarity, as has been previously said, lies in two 
essential qualities, location in space (tahayyuz) and 
the acceptnce of accidents (qubül al-acräd). Some 
theologians who do not accept the similarity as an 
essential quality of substances notice that the 
Ashcarites and most of the Muctazilites who assert that 
all substances are similar have to introduce accidents 
in the structure of things to explain the differences 
between things. In other words, they say that they have 
to assert the acceptance of accidents as an essential 
quality of substance, and to affirm the impossibility 
25A1-Juwayni, Shämil, p. 143. 
26A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 56. 
27lbid. 
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of the separating of substance from accident. Accident 
makes the differences noticed in existents, for only 
accident and not substances are visible. 
The third quality is that substances cannot 
penetrate one another, 28although they can be beside one 
another. If substances were interpenetrable, they would 
enter into a small space. In this way, the world would 
emerge from a small space without God's interference. 
But according to Imam al-Juwayni every accident, every 
event in the world, every change is due to God's will. 
Futher, the interpenetrability of substances 
might lead to the interpenetrability of accidents, with 
the result that one accident might be found in more 
than one substance. This is contrary to the qualities 
of accidents. 29 
Imäm al-Juwayni asks: " If the substances are 
penetrable, which one will penetrate, and which one 
will be penetrated, substances being spaces? How will 
they be one into another? How will the accidents, which 
are contrary, be together, like black and white, for 
example? " Thus Imäm al-Juwayni rejects the idea of any 
interpenetrability of substances. 
28A1-Juwayn3, Shämil, p. 143. 
29Ibid. 
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Imäm al-Juwayni defines the accident as 
being variable. 30 He mentions one verse from the Qurldn 
to confirm the definition of accident as being 
variable. As God says: 
"Ye look for the temporal goods of 
this world. "31 
In this verse "the temporal goods" are 
accidents. The Mutakallimün differ with each other on 
the definition of the accident, but Imäm al-Juwayn3 
holds that the meaning is the same. 32 Some of the 
Mutakallimün offer this definition: "accident is that 
which is not stable. "33This definition has the same 
meaning as mentioned in the Qur'än. The Ashcarites also 
say that the accident is that which does not stay more 
than one instant of time. Other Mutakallimün define it 
as being that which subsists in other than itself. 34 
However, Imam al-Juwayni prefers the one he 
gives, which is: "The accident is a happening which has 
no position and is to be found in the space of a 
substance. "35 This definition affirms clearly the 
difference between substance and accident. 
30Ibid. p. 179. 
3lThe Qur'än, 8: 67. 
32A1-Juwayni, Shämil, p. 167. 
332bid. 
342bid. 
35Ibid. 
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The first principle of Imam al-Juwayni's 
doctrine of the origin of the universe is the existence 
of the accident. He attempts to prove the existence of 
the accident in three ways: the first based on 
intellectual principles, the second on the power of the 
senses, and the third on internal feelings. In each 
way, he tries to point out what is changeable in 
existents. 
As to the first one, he asserts that 
substance can be conceived as being in other directions 
(jihät) than it is. So he asserts the possibility of 
the substance to be anywhere. He then asks: "What is 
the reason for such a change? " He calls the reason a 
determinant (al-mugtadi) which produces such change to 
the substance. 36 Is it the substance itself, by which 
he means its essence, which produces that, or some 
abstract property (macnä) over and above the essence?. 
He rejects the first supposition, because it 
is impossible for substance itself to produce such 
change, according to its qualities. Thus the 
determinant (mugtad3) should be other than the 
substance. It is the accident. 
36A1-Juwayn3, Irshäd, p. 40. 
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The second way he asserts is that many 
accidents are perceived by the senses. This knowledge 
is necessary. It does not need any argument. He has 
already stated that knowledge supplied by sense 
perception is necessary or immediate knowledge, which 
comes without any need for reflection. 37 
This knowledge includes colours, tastes and 
other feelings of the senses. 38 These sense perceptions 
are not stable. Therefore they are different from 
substance which is stable. Thus accidents exist. 
Imäm al-Juwayni also proves the existence of 
accidents by internal feelings as a sort of personal 
experience. He speaks of the internal feelings of 
pleasure, followed by a feeling of pain. The succession 
of such feelings proves the existence of something 
other than the "I" which is substance. Thus accidents 
exist. 
By the study of substance, then of accident, 
Imäm al-Juwayni introduces us to his principles, by 
which he proves the origin of the universe. It has 
already been pointed out that he first divides real 
existents into substances and accidents, defines 
, 
37A1-Juwayni, Shämil, p. 67. 
38Ibid. 
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substance, and studies it. Then he defines the accident 
and proves its existence. 
The second principle is the origin of the 
accident, and to confirm this Imam al-Juwayn3 depends 
on three points: 
(a) The impossibility of the non-existence of 
the eternal (al-gadim); because if it did not exist, it 
would not have been eternal . 
(b) The impossibility of the existence of the 
accident by itself. 
(c) The impossibility of the existence of an 
accident through another accident. 39 
Imäm al-Juwayni gives an example. He holds 
that if it is possible to conceive a substance at rest, 
then to conceive it in movement, this movement is new 
(täri'ah) and the rest has disappeared. Thus rest is 
not eternal. Before going further, he answers those who 
explain the succession from movement to rest by 
affirming the idea of latency (kumfln). They assert that 
accidents are not new (täri'ah). They are latent. The 
movement, for example, was latent in the substance. 
Then it appears, and the rest becomes latent. 
According to him this is impossible, because 
the rest, and the movement are two contrary accidents. 
39A1-Juwayn3, Irshäd, p. 41. 
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They cannot be at the same time in one substance. If 
rest and movement were in the substance and then 
appeared, this means that movement has an accident, 
which is appearance, and this is contrary to the 
qualities of accidents. 40 
On the first point Imäm al-Juwayni says that 
the eternal never disappears, and that this too is 
immediate knowledge. Supposing that the eternal was 
nothingness, who can bring it into existence? 
Nothingness is absolute non-existence. It is also 
immediately known that the eternal can take away 
nothingness. 41 
If the eternal disappears, this means that 
one of the conditions of its existence has disappeared, 
and this leads . to nothingness, which 
is absolute non- 
existence, and for which there can be no creator. Thus 
it is impossible for the eternal to be in nothingness. 
As to the second point, which is the 
impossibility of the existence of the accident by 
itself, Imäm al-Juwayni says that the accident needs a 
place, because it does not exist by itself, but exists 
in another existent. It produces in this existent the 
change noticed in it. It never stays more than one 
, 40Ibid. 
41A1-Juwayn3, Shämil, p. 189. 
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instant in the substance. It is not transferred from 
one substance to another. It is the movement itself, 
because if it is said that it is transferred, it will 
need another accident to move it, and it becomes a 
place for the new accident, which is not acceptable, 
each place being substance. Thus the accident is never 
a place. It can never exist by itself. 
As to the third point, it is the 
impossibility of the existence of an accident through 
another accident. Imam al-Juwayni already mentioned 
that if an accident exists in another accident, the 
latter becomes a substance, because the acceptance of 
accidents is an essential quality of the substance 
(sifah nafsiyyah). 
If these three points are affirmed, this 
helps to determine how that which is not eternal is 
originated. 
The third basis or principle of Imäm al- 
Juwayni's doctrine of the origin of the universe is the 
impossibility of separating substance and accident from 
one another. 
This principle is to be deduced from the 
essential quality given by Imäm al-Juwayni to 
substance, which is its acceptance of the accidents. As 
has been previously stated, this quality gives a real 
137 
and concrete existence to substance. It is impossible 
for substance, without this quality, to be found in the 
external world, or in other words, to be perceived. The 
third principle affirms this quality. Accidents are in 
substance. Each of them does not exist more than one 
moment and never exists with its contrary. 
The fourth principle is the impossibility of 
a chain of events without a beginning, because the 
existents have a beginning. Imam al-Juwayni holds that 
if anyone believes that there are events without a 
beginning, as being in continuous creation, since 
eternity, such as the movements in the firmament, each 
of these movements has a completion. So each has an 
end. If each has an end, the next must have a 
beginning. Thus there are no events without a 
beginning. 
He also divides the real existent into 
substance and accident, and gives the four principles 
or bases to his doctrine on the origin of the universe. 
He also presents to us two parts of the real existent; 
one is stable; the other does not last more than one 
moment. But as the separation of these two parts is 
impossible, if one part is originated, the other should 
also be so, and existents or things are not eternal. 
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They are originated. 42 In this way he proves the origin 
of the universe. 
3.3.1.1 The origin of the world according to Imäm al- 
GhazälI 
If we examine the way used by Imäm al-Ghazäli 
to prove the origin of the universe, we would find that 
he follows exactly his master's way step by step. 
Like Imäm al-Juwayni, he builds up his 
argument on the origin of the universe which consists 
of both substance and accident, and on the movement and 
immobility resulting from the transference of a 
substance from one place to another and its 
stabilization therein. Step by step he comes to prove 
the need for a maker of the existents and in so doing 
he argues for the proposition that "what has no 
beginning can have no end" in much the same way as did 
by Imäm al-Juwayni. 43 
Imam al-Ghazäli tries to proves the origin of 
the universe in a syllogistic way by shifting the 
argument to say that by the world he means nothing but 
all bodies and substance. He said: 
All that is not free from originated- 
changes (hawädi th) is originated. 
42Ibid. 
43A1-Ghazäli, Igtisäd, p. 19. 
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All bodies are not free from originated 
changes. 
Therefore all bodies are originated. 44 
Imam al-Ghazäl3 said: 
"Of everything there is a cause, 
and the world is an originated 
thing, so it necessarily has a 
cause. And we mean by the world 
every existent thing other than 
God, and by every existent thing 
other than God we mean all bodies 
and their accidents. Its detailed 
explanation is that we have no 
doubt in the origin of the 
existence, since we know that every 
existent either occupies space or 
not (mu tahayyiz wa ghayr 
mutahayyiz). And if every existent 
which occupies space is not united 
with its body we call it an 
indivisible substance (al-jawhar 
al-fard) , and if it is united with 
another we call it a body; and that 
which does not occupy a place will 
either necessitate for its 
existence a body in which it 
subsists, and we call it an 
accident; that which does not 
require anything for its existence, 
that is God. As for the bodies and 
their accidents, they are known by 
observation and no attention should 
be paid to the opponent who 
disputes about the accidents, as 
they are self-evident. If his 
arguments and disputations were not 
existent how could we busy ourself 
in answering and listening to his 
arguments? If they were existent, 
it is inevitable that they are 
something other than his (the 
arguer's) body, since his body was 
existent before and his arguments 
were not. Thus, you have known that 
bodies and accidents are perceived 
by observation. But the existent 
which is neither a body, nor a 
located substance, and which has no 
accident in it, cannot be so 
44Ibid., p. 20. 
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perceived (known by sensations), 
and we claim that that existent is 
prior to everything, and that the 
world exists because of His power 
(that is God). And we understand 
this by proof and not by 
sensation. 45 
Im-Em al-Ghazäll goes on to verify the 
argument of his claim. He says that the opponent may 
dispute that everything originated has a cause and may 
pose the question: how did he know that? The answer 
will be that this question can be asked concerning that 
existence which is originated, and not concerning that 
existence which never ceases to exist. He who does not 
understand what is meant by the term 'originated-thing' 
and 'cause' is either ignorant, and there is no need to 
answer his questions, or if he understands them, then 
his reason would necessarily accept that there is a 
cause for everything originated. By "originated-thing, " 
we mean, "what was non-existent and came into 
existence. "46 
With the origin of the world as a premise, 
Imam al-Ghazali proceeds to prove that the world being 
originated must necessarily have a cause, by recourse 
451bid; Al-Juwayni, Irshäd, pp. 39-42; and also al- 
Bagillani, Tamhid, p. 45. Here Imam al-Ghazäli followed 
the same line as undertaken by Imam al-Juwayni to prove 
the origin of the world. 
46A1-Ghazäl3, Igtisäd, p. 20. 
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to the so-called 'principle of determination'. In its 
barest form, this principle meant that since prior to 
the existence of the world it was equally possible for 
it to be or not to be, a 'determinant', whereby the 
possibility of existence could prevail over the 
possibility of non-existence, was required; and this 
'determinant', he argued, was God. 
He also proves that the substance is not free 
from originated changes, as he said: "Substance is not 
free from movement and rest, and both are originated. 
Movement and rest are from accident. "47 
He holds that no rational man can ever doubt 
the existence of accidents in himself such as pain, 
hunger, thirst, and other conditions, nor in their 
origination, as these characteristics are perceptible. 
Similarly, if one observes the bodies of the world, one 
cannot doubt the change of their conditions, and that 
these changes are originated. 
This was the method Imäm al-Ghazäli used to 
prove the origin of the universe with only a slight 
elaboration or addition to the details of his master, 
but we can see that he still follows his master's way 
by mentioning that substance is not free from accident. 
He then proved the existent and the origin of the 
47lbid. 
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accident and rejected the idea of latency (kumün) and 
appearance (zuhür). He further proved the impossibility 
of the existence of an accident through another 
accident and the impossibility of a chain of events 
without a beginning. All these are the same methods 
used by Imäm al-Juwayni to prove the origin of the 
world. 
3.3.2 The second doctrine 
In the second doctrine of Imäm al-Juwayn3 on 
the origin of the universe, he does not divide the 
existent of the universe into substances and accidents. 
According to his views in this second. doctrine, the 
universe is composed of finite bodies, with various 
forms having accidents which are distinguishing 
characteristics, such as colours, shape and other 
qualities. 48 
The word accident used by him in this second 
doctrine does not have a special technical sense, as in 
the first one. He uses it here in its ordinary meaning 
of what is perceived by the senses. Knowledge acquired 
by the senses is necessary, as has been previously 
explained. 
48A1-Juwayn3, ' cAqidah, p. 14. 
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Imam al-Juwayni then tries to ascertain the 
variability of accidents, and from this deduces the 
meaning of the possibility of things. He finds that 
things have unstable characteristics, these 
characteristics being perceptible by the senses or 
conceivable by the mind. One can perceive the sequence 
of the accident and can assert that things might always 
be of another shape than they are. 
Thus, all existents are unstable. This leads 
to the conclusion that they are possible. Imam al- 
Juwayni says: "It can be conceived by the reason that 
what is at rest (sukün) might be at rest. What by 
chance is located in the highest position of the 
atmosphere can possibly be in the lowest, and what 
turns in a certain orbit can turn out of it. "49 
He concludes by such reasoning that things 
are possible. If things are possible, they are not 
necessary, and if they are not necessary, they are not 
eternal. For him the universe, with the existents it 
contains, is possible, and can assume another shape and 
order than it has. Thus if the universe is necessarily 
possible, it is impossible for it to be eternal. 50 
49Ibid., p. 11. 
50Ibid. 
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Imäm al-Juwayni holds that if existents are 
possible, so they need a maker, for variability and 
instability of things cannot occur by themselves. They 
are originated. 
This view had an influence on Imäm al-Ghazäli 
in his opposition to philosophers who claimed that the 
universe is eternal. He used the same views as his 
master to reject one of the philosopher's arguments on 
the eternity of the world. He states that it is not 
logical to hold that the existent is impossible; for 
that which is impossible in itself, never exists at 
all. Again, it is not necessary in itself, for that 
which is necessary in itself is never deprived of 
existence. It follows that it must have been possible 
in itself. 
To prove his argument, like his master, he 
points out that the world is composed of bodies, with 
various forms, having accidents which have 
distinguishing characteristics as colour, shape, and 
other qualities. He then tries to ascertain their 
variability, and from this deduces the meaning of the 
possibility of_ things. One finds that things have an 
unstable nature (this is perceptible by the senses as 
well as by the mind). 
One can perceive the sequence of accidents 
and can assert that things might always be of another 
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shape than they are. Thus, all existents are unstable. 
This leads to the conclusion that they are possible. 
And their possible existence originates against their 
continued non-existence, which is equally possible. 
Then the mind posits intuitively and without recourse 
to rational proof that there must be a cause to bring 
an existent into existence from non-existence. Imäm al- 
Ghazal! said: 
The existence of the world is 
possible and we mean by this 
statement that it may exist or not. 
It was not in existence before, 
because its existence was not 
necessary; but, rather, its 
existence needs a 'determinant' so 
that its non-existence may be 
changed into existence. And by 
cause, we mean nothing but the 
'determinant'. 51 
Imam al-Juwayni had preceded Imam al-Ghazäli 
in rejecting the philosophers' views on the eternity of 
the universe. But he did not specify any particular 
group who rejected the idea of the origin of the world; 
he directed it to all groups who rejected this idea. 
This was slightly different to what was done by Imam 
al-Ghazäli; he specified only the theoretical 
philosophers. If we examine the evidences brought 
forward by Imam al-Ghazäli in his book "a1-Igtis5d fi 
al-I`tigäd" to reject the philosophers' views on the 
eternity of the universe, we will find that he followed 
his master's way step by step. 
51A1-Ghazäli, Igtisäd, p. 20. 
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3.4 The existence and one-ness of God according to Imäm 
al-Juwayni and his influence on Imam al-Ghazdll. 
According to Imäm al-Juwayni, God, as the 
creator of the world, has known of the existence of the 
world since eternity. This knowledge is eternal like 
God's other attributes. Imäm al-Juwayni shows that the 
Maker is eternal, because if He was originated, He 
would need a Maker; so He would not be necessary and 
this is contrary to what He is. He is necessary and is 
the Maker and Creator of all the originated existents. 
God brings about the world by His will and 
His choice, because according to Imdm al-Juwayni God is 
Mund (all-willing) and Mukhtär (a free agent). If God 
could not exercise His will and His power of choice, he 
would not have been able to create the universe in this 
particular place in the void of space, and in that 
time. 
For him the universe, with the existents it 
contains, - is possible and can assume another shape and 
order than it has. Thus if the universe is necessarily 
possible, it is impossible for it to be eternal. 52 He 
says that if existents are possible, they need a maker, 
52A1-Juwayn3, cAgidah, p. 11. 
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for variability and instability of things cannot occur 
by themselves. They are originated. 
This doctrine contains a philosophical 
thought which is the distinction between necessity and 
possibility in relation to existence. This 
philosophical idea is to be found in al-Faräbi's book. 
He held that there are two kinds of existents. One of 
them, if its essence is considered, is not necessary, 
and is called the possible. The second, if its essence 
is considered, is necessary and is called the necessary 
existent. 
If the possible is supposed non-existent, 
this is not logically absurd. But it needs a cause. If 
it happens, it happens as a result of something. 
Possibilities should never have an infinite chain of 
causes. They should never happen regularly. They should 
always need a necessary existent, which is the first 
existent. 
As to the necessary existent, it is 
absolutely absurd to suppose that it is non-existent. 
It has no cause. It never happens as a result of 
something other than itself. It is the first cause of 
all things. Its existence should be previous to all 
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other existents. It is the most perfect of all 
existents, and above causes. 53 
Ibn Sind also defines the necessary and the 
possible. He held that the necessary does not need a 
cause; the possible needs a cause. 54 
This idea of necessary and possible existents 
is in both doctrines of Imam al-Juwayni, as has been 
mentioned. Imam al-Ghazäli has used the same method to 
prove the existence of God. He sets out the more 
popular proof for divine origin which is known as dalil 
al-jawäz. 55 He held that if the world is possible, it 
must need a cause to bring it into existence. Hence the 
next is that the cause of all possible existents or the 
bodies of the world is eternal, that there is no 
beginning to its existence. It should be the originator 
of everything, and that it has existed before 
everything, and He is God. 
Here is the proof: were He Himself originated 
and not eternal, His own coming into existence would 
have required an originator, and his originator another 
and so on ad infinitum, without ultimately leading to 
53A1-Fär7abi, cuyün al-masä'il, Leiden, 1895, p. 57. 
541bn S3nä, kitäb-al-najät, Cairo, 1331 A. H. p. 383. 
55A1-Juwayni, irshäd, p. 35, where Imäm al-Juwayn3 
develops the similar argument from temporality. 
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one pre-existent, first originator who is the object 
and whom we call the originator of the world. So Imäm 
al-Ghazäli says that we should stop at the eternal 
cause; this is what we are aiming at and call it the 
originator of the world. It is evidently necessary to 
declare it eternal, and by 'eternal' he means nothing 
but that which is not preceded by non-existence, that 
is the statement of existence and denial of preceding 
non-existence. 56 
Imäm al-Ghazäli held that the existence and 
non-ex-istence of this originated world are possible. If 
its possible existence comes into existence, there must 
be a cause to bring it into existence. By the cause, he 
means, the 'determinant'. The question is, if the 
'determinant' was and the world was not, who was the 
originator of the 'determinant' itself? Why does the 
world originate now, and not before? In analyzing the 
'determinant', Imäm al-Ghazäli considers two 
alternatives: (a) either it is a natural determinant or 
agent; or (b) it is a free agent (fä`il mukhtär). 
This is similar to Imäm al-Juwayni's view in 
his analysis of the 'determinant' where he considers 
two alternatives: (a) that it is a natural agent 
(tabicah) (b) that it is a free agent (fäcil mukhtar). 
He disproves that it is a natural agent, and concludes 
56A1-Ghazäl3, Igtisäd, p. 24. 
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therefore established, " he writes, "that the 
determinant of originated things creates them freely, 
choosing for them particular forms and times. This free 
agent is the creator of the universe, or God. "57 
Like Imäm al-Juwayni, Imäm al-Ghazäli 
disproves that determinant is a natural agent, and 
concludes that it is all-powerful (gädir) and all- 
willing (murld), or in other words He is a free agent. 
Imam al-Ghazäli said: 
The originator of the world is all- 
powerful and all-willing as regards 
His actions (muridun 1i afcälihi). 
He brings about the world according 
to His power and will. If the 
determinant or God could not 
exercise his power and will, he 
would not have been able to create 
the world in this particular place, 
and at a particular time. As to the 
world, all spaces and all instants 
of time are similar. The originator 
originated it in a space and time 
that best suited His power and 
will. He chooses the time and space 
as He wills. 58 
Thus, according to Imäm al-Ghazäli, the 
determinant is a free one who creates and originates 
through His will and power. Affirming the attribute of 
power, he says that it is the attribute by which action 
becomes possible. Among its special characteristics is 
that it is related to all things possible, and as these 
are infinite, there is no limit to the power of God. 
Like Imäm al-Juwayni, Imäm al-Ghazäli goes on 
further to prove the creation of the world with the 
one-ness of God as a premise. Like his master, he 
ascribes to it two meanings: 
(a) That God is indivisible, for He has no 
quantity and what has no quantity 
cannot be divided. 
(b) That God has no equal in degree and no 
opposite, i. e. He can have no 
associate. 
That God has no opposite is evident since the 
opposite of a thing is that which alternates with it in 
the occupation of a place, and never shares it; whereas 
God is not limited by space, He therefore, can have no 
opposite. What is meant by the peerlessness (lä nidda 
Jahu fi rutbatihi)59 of God is that no being created by 
God can equal Him. 
In proving this proposition Imäm al-Ghazäli 
also makes use of (burhän al-tamänu`). Imäm al-Juwayni 
illustrated it with the conflict of wills, which he 
thus cast into the form of enumeration and division 
(al-sabr wa al-tagsim) " If we assume the existence of 
59lbid., p. 35. 
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two gods and of one body, whichever of the gods wills 
to move and the other wills to keep still, then all the 
possible results will be rationally unacceptable: 
(a) if the wills of both are carried out, 
there will be motion and quiescence in 
the same body at the same time, and 
this is impossible. 
(b) if the will of neither is carried out, 
there will be: 
(i) a body deprived of both 
motion and quiescence, and 
this is absurd; 
(ii) two gods incapable of 
exercising their will, and 
this also is absurd. 
(c) if the will of one is carried out to 
the detriment of the other's the second 
would be proved to be impotent. 60 
Now if an eternal being is impotent, his 
impotence must also be eternal and inherent, and this 
is absurd because impotence manifests itself in 
preventing an occurrence which is possible in itself, 
so that the creation of the possible universe is 
inconsistent with impotence. 61 
60A1-Juwayn3, Srshsd, p. 70. 
61lbid., pp. 69-71. 
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Imam al-Ghazali also makes use of burhän al- 
tamänu`. But he draws his argument from the degrees of 
existence and excellence, instead of conflicts of 
wills. 62 If God has an associate, then this associate 
must be one of these: 
(a) either equal to God in degree; 
(b) of higher degree than He; 
(c) of lower degree. 
Each of these alternatives can be shown to be 
absurd. In the first case, duality implies variation; 
this variation may be in the nature (movement and 
colour, for example, are two different natures, 
although they may exist in the same place and at the 
same time), or it may be a variation in place or time, 
the nature being the same (an illustration of this 
would be two blacknesses which cannot reside in one 
substance at one time). 
Now if God's associate is His equal in 
every way, his existence becomes impossible, for they 
cannot differ in nature since they are both pre- 
supposed to be eternal, and they cannot differ in time 
or place since they are not bounded by time or place. 
Therefore, there can be no variation and no duality 
either, and the unity of God is established. 
62A1-Ghazäli, Igtisäd, pp. 35-36, 
-Al-Juwayni, Irshäd, pp. 69-71. 
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The second and third alternatives are equally 
absurd, for God is ex hypothesi the highest Being in 
existence; in either of the two cases therefore the 
higher form is God and the other is not God. 63 
Like Imäm al-Juwayni, and with only slight 
elaboration of details, Imäm al-Ghazäli then attacks 
the theory that there might be two gods, dividing 
between them the creation of the world, the dividing 
line being between the heavens and the earth, or 
animate and inanimate, or good and evil. He reduces 
this theory to two alternatives, either: 
(a) the dividing line cuts through both 
substances and accidents, each of the 
gods creating some of the substances 
and some of the accidents, or 
(b) one of them creates all the substances 
and the other all the accidents. 
He then disproves both the alternatives in a 
manner that scarcely differs from the burhän a1-tamänuc 
and from Imäm al-Juwayni's argumentation, 64 except that 
his analysis and refutation of the hypothesis that one 
god may create solely good and the other solely evil 
63Ibid., p. 36. 
64A1-Ghazäli, Igtisäd, pp. 36-37, 
-Al-Juwayni, Irshäd, pp. 69-70. 
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takes an unexpected form. "This amounts to folly, " he 
writes of the hypothesis, "for evil is not evil in its 
essence; indeed in its essence it is equal and similar 
to good, and he who has the power to create one thing 
has the power to create its similitude. "65 
Imäm al-Ghazdl3 concludes his argument with 
the same assertion his master made that the 
multiplicity of gods in any form would result in 
confusion, and he quotes the same verse from the 
Qurldn: 
"If there were in them other gods 
than Allah, their order would have 
been disrupted", 66 
It will be observed that Imam al-Ghazall 
expanded the meaning of the One-ness of God to include 
the denial of an opposite to God. This idea is implicit 
in Imam al-Juwayni's explanation of the true nature of 
the One-ness of God, especially in that he argued 
against the possibility of there being an associate of 
God; but Imam al-Ghazäli brought it out and expounded 
it in such detail that he had to devote a special 
proof to it. 
65Ibid. 
66The Qur'än, 21 : 22. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A Discussion of the Attributes of God According 
to Imäm al-Juwayni and Imäm al-Ghazäl3 
Before discussing the attributes of God as 
explained by Imam al-Juwayni and Imäm al-Ghazäli it is 
necessary to define precisely what points of difference 
were raised among Muslim theologians with regard to 
this debate. 
4.1 The views of the Muctazilah 
The Muctazilah based their views on the 
attributes of God on one of their five usü1, namely 
that God is one. They tended to describe God by 
negatives and regarded statements about Him made in 
term of human qualities as being not applicable. They 
assert that God is not substance or accident but He is 
the creator of these things. 
They reject utterly the ascribing of specific 
characteristics as being eternal qualities of God, 
holding rather that He is knowing, powerful, and living 
as part of His essence; not that knowledge, power and 
life are eternal attributes or personal subsistences 
(macänl) inherent in Him. For if these qualities should 
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partake of His eternity which is the exclusive 
description of His essence, they would partake of 
divinity. And this would be absurd for them. 1 
This was the method used by the Muctazilah in 
their proposition that God is one. They drew 
comparisons between the Creator and created creatures. 
The creaters are not God, nor are there other creaters 
besides Him. They hold that if God has life which is 
additional to His essence it would make Him accept the 
other eternal qualities as part of His being. This they 
disagreed with. 
They reject the idea of the additional 
attributes of God to His essence because this would 
make God subsist in that something and destroy the 
unity of God. They believe that God is living, knowing, 
and powerful and that these are prior in His essence. 2 
4.2 The views of the Mushabbihah 
The Mushabbiha (anthropomorphists)3 assert 
1Al-Shahrastäni, Milal, vol. 1, p. 44. 
2Ibid., 
-Al-Shahrastän3, Nihäyat, p. 180. 
3A group of extreme Shiites and a group of extremist 
traditionalists. See Shahrastän3, Milal, vol. 1, p. 
148. 
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that God has attributes such as humans possess, except 
for His face. Among them some of the Shiites even 
claim that their Lord has a body which can move from 
one place to another. 4 
However, they (these Shiites) have different 
view concerning the body of God. Some of them claim 
that God has a body like a human being, His power is 
similar to that of His creatures and His speech has 
sounds and words; others assert that God is like a 
strong young man. They followed the thinking of some of 
the Jewish anthropomorphists who claim that God is like 
a picture of their leader. 5 
Some of them even believe that God can be 
seen in this world because He has a body, blood, head, 
tongue, eyes, ears, hands and legs though these are not 
as in an ordinary human body. 6 
4.3 The views of the Ashcariyyah 
The Ashcariyyah struck a middle path and 
vehemently denied that God has a body like His 
creations and they reject the views of the Muctazilah 
who denied that God has any attribute in addition to 
4A1-Baghdädi, Farq, p. 214. 
5lbid., p. 215. 
6A1-Shahrastäni, Mi1a1, vol. 1, p. 105. 
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His essence. The Ashcariyyah hold that God's qualities 
are additional to His essence but the Attributes cannot 
be said to be either the essence itself or other than 
the essence. 
Interesting though it would be to discuss 
these conflicting opinions, our concern here is only 
with the views of Imäm al-Juwayni and Imäm al-Ghazäli 
on the subject. 
4.4 The Attributes of God according to Imäm al-Juwayni 
In discussing the attributes of God Imam al- 
Juwayni divides them into three categories: 
4.4.1 First: The "Impossible Attributes" of God 
Imam al-Juwayni asserts that all the 
attributes of creatures show that they were fashioned 
by one originator who created them in this world. It is 
impossible for God to have been created because if God 
were an originated being, then He would need an 
originator, and His originator, another originator and 
so on ad infinitum . So we would come necessarily to a 
circular argument or an infinite sequence and both of 
these are absurd.? 
7A1-Juwayni, cAg3dah, p. 21. 
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Imäm al-Juwayi bases his argument on this 
issue by differentiating the attributes of God from 
those of His creatures, because the creatures' 
attributes indicate that they are created and governed 
by someone. If this happens to God, He would need 
someone who governs Him and this matter will continue 
without end. 
He mentions that the attributes of creatures 
are possible and they need an originator, while God's 
attributes are eternal and everlasting. He places God 
in a higher and more truly perfect degree than if 
extraneous attributes were ascribed to Him. 
Imäm al-Juwayni denies that God occupies 
space by using a rational argument; all that occupies 
space is originated and those who occupy space have 
bodies, and those who have bodies are tangible and all 
things that can be touched are originated. 8 
He rejects the idea presented by the 
Karrämiyyah9 who claim that God is similar to His 
creatures in body, movement, direction and so on. The 
Karrämiyyah use Qur'anic verses to support their views, 
such as the verse: 
8A1-Juwayni, " Irshäd, p. 58. 
9They are the followers of Abi cAbdullah Muhammad b. 
Karräm. See Shahrastäni, Milal, vol. 1, p. 159. 
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All Merciful settled on the Throne. l0 
The Karrämiyyah also claim that when people 
raise their hands and head towards the sky during 
prayer, this shows that God is in the sky. They used a 
hadith which was narrated by al-Järiyah to show that 
God is in the sky. When she asked the prophet, " Where 
is God? " the prophet directed her towards the sky-11 
Imam al-Juwayni vehemently rejects the 
interpretation given by the Karrämiyyah of the Qurldnic 
verse which seems to treat God's attributes as being 
similar to those of His creatures. He interprets "God's 
settling on the Throne" as meaning one of two things: 
1. God's possession and control of the throne. 
2. His direction of a purpose (gasd) towards 
it. 
He bases his interpretation on the verse 
which says " nothing is similar to Him"12 which proves 
that God is unlike any of His creatures and the 
impossibility of God's occupation of space, because to 
affirm it would be inconsistent with His eternity. 
10The Qur'än, 20 : 5. 
11A1-Juwayn3, Irshäd, pp. 58-59. 
12The Qur'än, 42: 11. 
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4.4.1.1 The "Impossible Attributes" of God according to 
Imam al-Ghazäli 
In dealing with the same topic Imäm al- 
Ghazäli asserts that by denying the similarity of 
God's attributes to His creatures, it would be possible 
to deny that God occupies space in any direction even 
in the sky, because if one claims that God has 
direction it would mean that He occupies space and has 
a body. 
All that occupies space has direction such as 
left, right, down and up. All these are created; if God 
occupied space He would also be one of the created 
things which would need a creator, which is impossible 
according to rational argument. 13 
This was the same argument given by Imäm al- 
Juwayni in denying that God occupies space. He rejected 
the evidence given by the Karrämiyyah to show that God 
is in the sky by explaining that all these references 
in the Qur'än and hadith are symbolic and only supplied 
to strengthen one's faith in God. 14 
Here Imäm al-Ghazäl3 gives a more detailed 
explanation than his master concerning these 
13A1-Ghazäl3, Ihyä', vol. 1, p. 105. 
14A1-Juwayni, Shämil, p. 563. 
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statements, and holds that when someone raises their 
hands and heads toward the sky during prayer, it does 
not mean that God is in the sky, but it is some kind of 
symbolic direction for prayer as in the case when one 
turns toward the Kacba when praying. It also serves to 
show that God is so lofty as not to be describable by 
His creatures. 15 
Imam al-Juwayn3 then argues the impossibility 
of God being substance, because being substance He 
would accept the substances' qualities and occupy space 
and possess the features of accidents. These cannot be 
predicated of God because His quality cannot be thought 
of as being that of the created thing and for Him to 
have these features or characteristics would mean that 
He also is a created being. l6 
If then we compare these views of Imam al- 
Juwayni with those of Imam al-Ghazäli on this matter we 
find that Imam al-Ghazäli uses the same argumentation 
when he holds that all substance is not free from 
movement and rest; and all that is not free from 
15A1-Ghazali, Igtisäd, p. 31., Here imam al-Ghazali 
uses exactly same argument with his teacher in dealing 
with the same problem. See al-Juwayni, Shämil, p. 565. 
16A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 64. 
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movement and rest is created; therefore substance is 
created. 17 
Concerning the claim of the Karrämiyyah that 
God has a body and location, Imam al-Ghazäli uses a 
sj. milar rejection to that of his teacher when he holds 
that all bodies are substance; if it is impossible for 
God to be substance it would also be impossible for Him 
to have a body. 18 
To prove the impossibility of God having a 
body, Imäm al-Juwayni argues that if God has a body, 
His body, as any specific located body, would have a 
limited ability. It would therefore appear logical that 
limited things are at best perceived as being equal to 
other limited beings. Therefore, they need a creator to 
process their attributes. 19 This argument becomes 
clearer with Imam al-Ghazali, as can be seen in the 
next paragraph. 
Imam al-Ghazall also uses the same view to 
prove the impossibility of God's having a body since he 
holds that if God has a body then it could be easily 
identified. By reasoning one can say that there must be 
17A1-Ghazäli, Ihyä', vol. 1., p. 106., 
-Al-Juwayni, Irshäd, pp. 39-40. 
18A1-Ghazäli, Igtisäd p. 28. 
19A1-Juwayni, Shämil, p. 412. 
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in this case smaller and bigger objects, one object 
should not be felt superior to the others unless there 
is a creator who has the power to layout its particular 
dimensions. In other words, the body or its attributes 
require a creator to carefully manage them i. e. to 
limit their boundaries. Therefore, the object is 
creature not creator. 20 
4.4.2 Second: The "Necessary Attributes" of God. 
Imam al-Juwayn3 divides the necessary 
attributes of God into: 
a. Personal attributes (sifät a1-nafsiyy5t) 
b. Qualitative attributes (sifat a1-maläni) 
He describes the personal attributes as 
affirmative attributes which indicate the essence 
itself and have no cause. 21 These are existence 
(wujüd), eternity (gidäm), self-dependence (giyämuhu 
binafsihi), dissimilarity to the accidents 
(mukhälafatuhu 1i1 hawedith), and His unity 
(wahdeniyyatihi). 
20A1-Ghazäl3, Igtisäd, p. 29. 
21A1-Juwayn3, Irshäd, p. 51. 
The qualitative attribute on the other hand 
is an additional meaning over and above the essence and 
created by a cause. 22 These are living (hayy), knowing 
(1511m), powerful (gädir), willing (murid), speaking 
(mutakallim), seeing (bas. i r) , and hearing 
(sami c) . He 
then gives a brief indication of the rational proofs 
that God is knowing, living and powerful, and this is 
clear from the fact that He is the producer of well- 
wrought works (a1-af`51 a1-muhkam5t, or al-hakamiyya). 
Since He is living, He must also be hearing 
seeing and speaking; otherwise He would have to be 
qualified, and eternally qualified, by the contrary 
defects of dumbness, blindness and deafness. 
If we look at Imäm al-Juwayni's work in a1- 
Irshäd and a1-Sh5mil we find that he discusses the 
ahwäl (states) and explains them in the same way as Abü 
Häshim al-Jabä'3.23 The h51 (state) is a quality which 
something which exists has: it is neither characterised 
by existence nor by non-existence. 24 
He then divides these states into two: 
22Ibid. 
23cAbd al-Jabbär, Khamsah, p. 158. 
24A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 92. 
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1. What is both ascribable to the essence and 
caused by it. This is any characteristic ascribed to 
the essence as a result of a quality inherent in it; 
thus the fact that a being is living or powerful 
confers upon it the attribute of life or power. 
2. What is ascribable to the essence, but not 
caused by it. This is any feature of an existent being 
which is neither existent by itself nor is caused by 
another existent being; an example of this is the 
occupation of space by a substance. 
To prove the ahwäl (states) Imam al-Juwayni 
argues that if a person knew of the existence of a 
substance but not of its occupation of space, and then 
came to know that the substance occupied space, he 
would then have acquired new knowledge about a thing 
already known, and he would then be in possession of 
two distinct items of knowledge - knowledge of 
existence, and knowledge of occupation of space. Now 
the object of the second item of knowledge is either 
identical with the object of the first, or else it is 
distinct from and additional to it; it cannot be 
identical with the object of the first item of 
knowledge, for it is self-evident to any rational being 
who has acquired this second item of knowledge that he 
knows something he did not know before. It is therefore 
established that the occupation of space is distinct 
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from the existence of a substance, and that power is 
additional to the essence of the potent being. 25 
Imam al-Juwayni then discusses the problem of 
God's speech (kaläm Allah) and rejects the views of the 
Mpctazilah who claim that the Qur'an is a created 
manifestation. He held that the Qur'an is the word of 
God and is not created in the sense of a text conceived 
and written in a specific time. He maintains that the 
utterance of God, the almighty, is the eternal word 
which does not have a beginning. 26 
Imam al-Juwayni reviews and discusses all the 
different attempts to define this attribute, for 
instance those of the Muctazilah who claim that speech 
is created and those of the Karrämiyyah who claim that 
it is eternal. The Muctazilah defined speech as ordered 
letters and intermittent sounds denoting definite aims 
and being conceived and uttered at specific moments. 
Im9m al-Juwayni defined speech as notions residing in 
the soul and made recognizable by expression and by 
conventionally agreed signs. 27 
The Mu`tazilah denied the inward speech 
(kaläm al-nafs) as posited by Imäm al-Juwayn3. In 
251bid., p. 93. 
26Ibid., p. 105. 
271bid., p. 106. 
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asserting the notion of inward speech Imäm al-Juwayni 
based his argument on linguistic usage. The Arabs used 
the word kaläm to include notions in the minds, as in 
the expressions käna fi nafsi kalämun (there was a 
thought in my mind) and zawwartu fi nafsi qawlan (I 
entertain ideas in my mind) indeed a verse by al-Akhtal 
runs as follows: 
inna 1-kal5ma la-f3 1-fu'ädi wa innamä 
jucila I-Iisänu ca1ä I-fu'ädi dali15.28 
Speech is in the heart, and the tongue 
was made solely to be the interpreter 
of the heart. 
This shows that the word kaläm had a wider 
significance then the spoken word, and in fact included 
inward speech (kalhm al-leafs) . 
Imam al-Juwayni also rejects the views of the 
Karrämiyyah who claim that the Qur'an is eternal and 
the expressed words and sounds are eternal. They also 
believe that the voice of the reciter of the Qur'än is 
God's speech itself. 29 
, 
28lbid., p. 111. 
29Ibid., p. 125. 
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The Karrämiyyah believe that God's speech is 
eternal, an integral part of His being and is not 
separate from the essence of God. They held that this 
notion of God implies that God is of a human form, and 
therefore God's speech is as human speech is. Imam al- 
Jp. wayni, however, explains his view that God's words 
are an attribute rather than the essence of God. This 
eternal attribute finds expression in the specific 
context composed of letters which is called the Qur'an. 
This is similar to any one of us who whenever 
he commands, prohibits, or narrates finds within 
himself an idea and then indicates it by an expression 
or by writing or by a gesture. 
Here Imam al-Juwayni proceeds to explain that 
the writing indicates the expression, the expression 
indicates what is in the mind, and this in turn 
indicates what is in the substance. So whenever the 
Qur'an is described as one of the things inseparably 
connected with the eternal, as when we say that the 
Qur'an is eternal and uncreated, the meaning is that it 
is true eternal essence manifest in an external 
reality. 
He then holds that the Glorious Expressions 
are created and written on the Preserved Tablet (al- 
lawh al-mahfüz); Jibril revealed them to the prophet 
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after they had been brought down in the night of 
Decree. 30 
Imam al-Juwayni maintains that what was 
brought down to the prophet was expression and meaning. 
Some claim that only the meaning was brought down to 
him. There is a conflict of opinion on this; some say 
that the prophet clothed the meaning with expressions 
of his own, and others, that it was Jibril who clothed 
the meaning. However, Islamic scholars accept that it 
was sent down both in fixed expression and meaning. 31 
Whatever the debate between the theologians 
regarding the doctrine of the Qur'än on the question of 
wheather or not it was created, it has been accepted by 
Muslims that the Qur'än, at any rate, is a speech of 
God, and it appeared in time. 32 
4.4.2.1 The qualitative attributes according to Imäm 
al-Ghazäli 
If we look at the way of Imäm al-Ghaz513 in 
affirming the necessary attributes of God, we would 
301bid., p. 130. 
31Macdonald, Muslim Theology and Jurisprudence; London, 
1903. p. 336. 
32Watt, "Early discussions about the Qur'an" Muslim 
world, vol. 40, (1950), pp. 27-40. 
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certainly find that it is in substance the same as that 
of Imäm al-Juwayni and as will be seen, differs from it 
only in better organization and greater clarity and 
detail. 
In discussing the qualitative attributes, 
like his master Imäm al-Ghazäli divides them into 
seven; these are power (qudrah), knowledge (`ilm), life 
(hayäh), will (irädah), speech (kalam), sight (basar), 
and hearing (samc). 
Imam al-Ghazäll begins his discussion in this 
field with the attribute of power, where he held that 
God has a power which has no limit and can do anything 
according to His will. To prove the power of God, Imam 
al-Ghazali bases his view on the creation of this 
world; the order and the most fitting and proper plan 
are proof that its maker is powerful and exercises 
choice. The order and pattern in the universe, the 
systematic functioning of the human body and the 
manifest yet regulated diversity in the world point to 
the power of the creator. 
He also uses the human body to prove that God 
is powerful; he maintains that if one were to look to 
his body he would certainly notice that there must be 
someone who created it because it is very remarkable 
and works in a complex order. All these show that the 
creator must be powerful. Here Imam al-Ghazal3 presents 
173 
his case in a systematic way so that the reader can 
understand it easily. 
In discussing the attribute of knowledge, 
Imam al-Ghazäl3, like Imam al-Juwayni, held that God is 
knowing of His attribute and of other things by virtue 
of His essence and His knowledge is an eternal 
attribute which is connected with all the three type of 
beings: the essential, the possible and the absurd or 
impossible in a comprehensive way, as they are, without 
any ignorance preceding it. 33 
In dealing with the attribute of life, Imäm 
al-Ghazäli held that it is intellectually and 
religiously essential for God to possess the attribute 
of life. To prove this, Imam al-Ghazäli held that God 
is attributed with power, intention and knowledge. All 
those who possess these must necessarily have life. 34 
In this point Imam al-Ghazäli keeps his discussion 
almost as brief as that of Imam al-juwayni. 
In discussing the attribute of God's will, 
Imam al-Ghazall holds that it is God's will that 
determines whether a possible thing shall exist or not. 
This will of God cannot be dispensed with even where 
there is knowledge, because knowledge is dependent upon 
33A1-Ghazäl3, Igtissd, p. 64. 
34Ibid., p. 65. 
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the thing known, related to it in its actual form, and 
it is no part of the function of knowledge to alter or 
influence it. 
The will of God is involved in every act of 
origination because every originated thing is created 
by the power of God, and everything created by the 
power presupposes a will to direct power to the object 
of power. 35 Thus every object of power is willed, and 
every originated thing is an object of power; therefore 
every originated thing is willed. 
Now among originated things are disbelievers, 
sins, and acts of disobedience. In this connection, 
Imam al-Ghazall investigates several awkward questions: 
How can God command what He does not will?; how can He 
will a thing which He prohibits?; and how can He will 
abominations, acts of disobedience, injustices, and 
evils; can we consider Him who wills such things as 
being debased?. 
Like others among Ahl al-Sunnah, Im5m al- 
Ghazäl3 settled these questions by differentiating 
between command and will and by defining duty, good and 
evil. He also reviewed and criticized, along the same 
lines as his predecessors, other opinions on the 
35Ibid. 
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subject. 36 It is interesting to note that the 
discussion introduced by Imäm al-Ghazäl3 also presents 
completely new material on this subject which is not 
to be found in the same discussion by Imäm al-Juwayni. 
In dealing with the attribute of Hearing and 
Seeing, Imäm al-Ghazali based his argument on the 
Qur'än and rational argument. To prove that God is 
Hearing and Seeing, he uses the verse: "He is a Hearer 
and Seer, 1137 and also the words of Abraham . 
"0 my 
father! why worship that which heareth not and seeth 
not and can profit thee nothing". 38 
For the rational argument, he holds that the 
creator possesses greater perfection than the created. 
it is known that the one who sees is more perfect than 
the one who does not see, and the hearer is more 
perfect than the one who does not hear, and it is 
therefore, absurd to attribute perfection to the 
created and not to the creator. 39 
Imäm al-Ghazäl3 enumerates all the objections 
that may be raised to the premises on which he has 
built his argument, and he refutes these objections to 
36Ibid., p. 70. 
37The Qur'än, 42: 11. 
38The Qur'an, 19: 42. 
39A1-Ghazäl3, Igtisäd, P" 72. 
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his own satisfaction. He also considers the other 
senses such as tasting and smelling and concludes, like 
his master Imäm al-Juwayni, that it is impossible to 
ascribe them to God. 40 
In discussing the attribute of Speech, Imäm 
al-Ghazäll like his master, held that the God's Speech 
is a primordial attribute of God which stands in the 
essence of God and which does not have any letter nor 
any sound and which is pure from being precedent or 
subsequent (i. e. no part of it is precedent or 
subsequent to the other parts, as our speech is). 41 
Imäm al-Ghazäli follows his master's analysis 
in dividing speech into two sections. First: sounds and 
letters which are originated and second: the inward 
speech which does not consist of letters and sounds; it 
is an eternal quality, subsisting in God's essence. The 
sounds and letters show that the inward speech is 
eternal like the created universe shows that the 
creator is eternal. 
As his master did, Imäm al-Ghazäl3 argues 
that God's Speech is inward Speech and denies the views 
of the Karrämites who claim that the Speech of God 
consists of letters and sounds which are consecutive 
40Ibid., p. 73. 
41Al-Ghazäli, Ihyä', vol. 1, p. 91. 
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and ordered. And they thought that the letters and 
sounds are eternal. 
Some of them went to the extent of thinking 
that the letters which we read out of the Qur'än and 
t. he writing, too, are eternal. The intellectual 
narrowness of some of them led them beyond this to 
consider even the covers of the copies of the Qur'än as 
being eternal. 
As for the Muctazilites, they were of the 
opinion that the Speech of God was made up of 
accidental letters and sounds which do not reside in 
the essence of God. Therefore, according to them "God's 
being a Speaker" means that He creates the speech in 
some bodies, because, they think that there can be no 
speech without letters and sounds. 
In order to deny these claims, Imam al- 
Ghazal!, like his master, uses linguistic arguments to 
support his view. He uses exactly the same words as did 
by his master before him, by saying: 
inna 1-kal5ma la-f3 1-fu'ädi wa innamä 
julila 1-lis2inu 'a15 1-fu'5di dali15. 
speech is in the heart, and the tongue 
was made solely to be the interpreter of 
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the heart. 42 
Imäm al-Ghazäll holds that the term Speech of 
God is applied to indicate the eternal inward speech, 
meaning that it is an attribute which stands in the 
essence of God, and is applied to indicate verbal 
speech, meaning that He created it and there is no 
possibility of alteration for anyone in the make-up of 
its origin. 
Despite the fact that the words or utterances 
which we read are only accidents, it is not permissible 
to say that the Qur'än is an accident, because the term 
Qur'an is applied to indicate the attribute which 
stands in the essence of God. 
In order to make the discussion more vivid, 
Imam al-Ghazall sometimes presents his points 
differently from Imam al-Juwayni, in a question and 
answer style. An example of this is his treatment of 
the question of how Moses heard the Speech of God. The 
question arises of how can Moses be said to have heard 
God's Speech if God's Speech does not consist of 
sounds and letters, because the normal speech we hear 
consists of sounds and letters. 
42Ibid., p. 109., 
-Al-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 111. 
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To answer this question Imäm al-Ghazäli 
argues that "how? " can be asked only of things which 
have a mode of entity, and not of what has no such 
mode. When one asks, "how is it ? ", what one means is, 
"which of the things we know is it like ? ". And if the 
object of the question has no analogy, there can be no 
answer to the question. It is therefore, impossible to 
answer this question except by making the questioner 
hear God's Speech. 43 
The impossibility of answering this question 
does not prove that God's Speech does not exist. 
Rather, writes Imam al-Ghazäll, It is necessary to 
believe that G:, d's Speech is an eternal attribute with 
which there is nothing that can be compared, even as 
His essence is eternal and has no comparision; and even 
as His essence can be seen in a way which differs from 
the visibility of bodies and accidents and has no 
similarity with it, so is His Speech is heard in a way 
which differs from letters and sounds and has no 
similarity with them. "44 Here Imam al-Ghazäll re- 
elaborates in greater detail the points which are 
discussed by Imdm al-Juwayni. 
Imäm al-Ghazäli also uses the claim of his 
master that God's Speech is written in copies of the 
431bid., p. 78. 
441bid. 
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Qur'än, retained in memories, recited by tongues, while 
the reciting, the memories and the writing are all 
originated. 45 
Like Imam al-Juwayni, Imam al-Ghazäli then 
h. olds that these seven qualitative attributes are 
additional to the essence of God. Thus God is Knowing 
by virtue of knowledge, Living by virtue of life, 
Potent by virtue of power, Willing by virtue of will, 
Hearing by virtue of hearing, Seeing by virtue of sight 
and Speaking by virtue of speech. All these attributes 
are primordial and eternal to God. 
4.4.3 Third: The "Possible Attributes" of God 
In dealing with the possible attributes of 
God Imam al-Juwayni began his discussion with the 
possible vision of God. He held that it is possible to 
see God in the abode of the next world. He demonstrated 
the possibility of the vision in two ways, one based on 
rational argument and the other based on traditional 
argument. 
In establishing the rational argument, he 
divides this into two: 
45Ibid., p. 79. 
-A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 128. 
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First: he maintains that God is existent; all 
that is existent is capable of being seen; therefore, 
God is capable of being seen in the next world. 46 But 
that is without quality (i. e. without the seen taking 
any of the qualities of the accidents such as "being 
possible to the seer", being in any direction to the 
seer, occupying any location and so on. ) 
Second: he bases his argument on the power of God 
who can create anything He likes. Imäm al-Juwayni 
intends to answer the doubt expressed by the 
Mu`tazilites on the basis of the intellectual evidences 
when they said that the vision of God is an absurdity. 
For them this was as follows: if God could be seen He 
ought to be in front of the seer by necessity. In that 
case He would be in a direction and in a location; and 
this is absurd. 
This argument of the Muctazilah was refuted 
by Imäm al-Juwayni when he held that the claim made by 
the Muctazilah that God ought to be in front of the 
seer by necessity is false. Therefore, the necessity of 
direction and location, too, is false, because "the 
vision" is a power God endows in His creatures and 
neither the seen being in front of the seer nor His 
being in any direction nor His occupying any location 
46A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 171. 
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and so on has been made a necessary condition here. For 
these are merely customary necessities and not 
intellectual necessities in the discussion in which a 
great many intellectuals took part. 47 
In establishing the traditional argument Imam 
al-Juwayni using the following verse: 
"On that day will some faces beam 
looking towards their lord"48 
Here Imam al-Juwayn3 interprets the word 
"looking" as indicating the "beauty and brightness" of 
God. However he endeavours to refute the Mu`tazilites' 
argument that the word "looking" in the verse suggests 
that the faces look with "expectation" or "hope"; they 
took the preposition "toward" to indicate a searching 
for "bounty" or "favour". 
Therefore, according to them this verse 
means: "On that day will some faces beam (in brightness 
and beauty), expecting or hoping the 'bounty' or 
'favour' of their Lord. "49 
47Ibid., pp. 164-167. 
48The Qur'än, 75: 22. 
49A1-Zamakhshari, hashshäf, vol. 2, p. 509. 
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Imäm al-Juwayni refuted the claim of the 
Muttazilah who said that the verse meant seeking 
expectation for reward by saying that God could not 
mean a sense of expectation in the context of the verse 
since there is an explicit connection with "face". 
The verse, therefore, must mean the vision of 
the eyes. And it is not correct to say "towards" with 
reference to a regard of expectation, since the regard 
of expectation does not become transitive by the 
preposition "towards". 50 
Imam al-Juwayn. i then proceeds to refute the 
Muctazilah who used the verse to deny the vision of 
God, to which they clung in saying that this vision is 
an absurdity. They quoted the saying of God: 
"vision comprehendeth Him not, but He 
comprehendeth (all) vision. He is the 
subtle, the aware". 51 
The Mu`tazilah hold that the vision of God is 
impossible since the reality of God cannot be attained 
by "vision". On the other hand, "vision" cannot be used 
to comprehend Him. The heart of the difficulty, 
50A1-Juwayni, Irshed, p. 169. 
51The Qur'än, 6: 103. 
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perhaps, is in the meaning of "vision" itself, of which 
the Multazilah had their own interpretation. 
They define vision as a subtle substance 
which is conveyed by God only to the sense of sight by 
which all the seen things can be comprehended. Hence 
their definition seems to be restricted only to 
temporal matters. Since God is neither accident nor 
body, they argue that vision could not be used to 
comprehend Him. 52 
Imäm al-Juwayni intended to answer this doubt 
expressed by the Muttazilah and held that he could not 
accept that "the perception through the eye" is the 
general vision. For him this is a particular aspect of 
vision. It is that which happens in a manner in which 
the seen becomes bracketed by limitations and 
boundaries. 
Therefore, the perception which is denied in 
this verse is more particular than "the vision". And 
the denial of the particular does not necessitate the 
denial of the universal. Consequently, God can be seen 
without His taking any qualities which are taken into 
account in the visibility of the physical things and 
without being limited with limitations of physical 
things. 
52A1-Zamakhsharä, Kashshäf, vol. 1, p. 307. 
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To illustrate his point Imäm al-Juwayn3 
provides this understanding. The servant will be 
perplexed in respect of His Greatness and Mightiness so 
that he will not know his name and will not sense those 
creatures around him, because the intellect will become 
unable here to understand and all things will become 
nothing by the side of the Greatness of God. 53 
Imam al-Juwayni proceeds to prove the vision 
of God by mentioning the request of Moses for a vision: 
"O my Lord, make me see, let me look unto Thee". 54He 
argues that the vision of God is an intellectually 
possible thing, because if it were impossible, Moses' 
request would be ignorant and worthless. Moreover the 
prophets are far removed from any such defect 
especially about their knowledge of God. And Moses 
would know better than most what is impossible and 
possible in relation to Him. So Moses cannot have asked 
his God that which was impossible; hence the vision is 
possible. 55 
4.4.3.1 Vision of God according to Imäm al-Ghazäli 
In discussing the vision of God Imäm al- 
Ghazäli follows exactly his master's way to prove the 
53A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 169. 
54The Qur'än, 7: 143. 
55A1-Juwayni, cAg3dah, p. 49. 
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vision of God in two ways, the first based on rational 
argument and the second based on traditional argument. 
Following on Imam al-Juwayni, Imam al-Ghazäll 
refutes the Mu`tazilah's claim that it is impossible to 
s, ee God, because their argument runs if He can be seen, 
He would need a location and all that needs a location 
must be either accident or substance, and this is 
absurd in the case of God. 
To answer this claim, Imäm al-Ghazäli held 
that the eye is only an organ, and has no other purpose 
than to be the location for the forms of the visible 
things. If it were the essence of vision, then whenever 
a form occupied the eye completely the whole of vision 
would be fulfilled. 
Again, if we know something with our heart or 
head, we can say, "we know with our heart and head, " 
and if we know anything through our heart or head or 
eye we can also say, "we see with our heart or head or 
eye. " Thus the eye is not identical with vision. 
Vision, therefore, is an abstraction independent of 
either organ or object of vision. 56 
In the second point, Imäm al-Ghazäll defines 
vision as part of perception (idräk) which impresses 
56A1-Ghazäl3, Igtisäd, p. 44. 
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upon the mind the form of visible things more clearly 
than does imagination (at-takhayyul). 57 
In other words, the forms which we derive 
from the vision are clearer and more perfect than those 
Which we derive from imagination. Vision is therefore, 
a degree of perception and it follows that there are 
things which we can perceive but cannot imagine; such 
are the essence and the attributes of God. 
Concerning the statement of proof from the 
second standpoint, that is from traditional, to show 
that God can be seen in the next world, Imam al-Ghazali 
exactly quotes the same verse and gives the same 
explanation as did his master when he held that Moses 
requested a vision, saying, "0 my Lord, make me see, 
let me look unto Thee". 58 This verse is strong evidence 
that it is possible for God to be seen. 
If it were not possible to see God, this 
request of Moses would seem like ignorance on his part 
as to what is permissible and not permissible in regard 
to the essence of God, or it would have been some sort 
of foolishness, or trifling, or a request for the 
impossible; and these defects cannot be acceptable for 
the prophet. 
57Ibid., p. 45. 
58The Qur'än, 7: 143. 
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Imam al-Ghazäli examined and refuted the 
arguments by which the Muctazilah sought to nullify the 
implication of Moses' pleas. Thus he makes out that 
God's answer to Moses, "You shall not see Me, "59 and 
again the verse, "Sight cannot see Him, "60 refer only 
to natural vision as known in this life. It is quite 
clear from a close scrutiny of both views that Imam al- 
Ghazäli has leaned heavily on his predecessor on this 
subject. 
However, Imäm al-Ghazäli still felt the 
insufficiency of his definition of vision, and he 
finally revealed his süf3 inclination when he said of 
the vision of God that this experience may be described 
by any convenient term such as meeting or seeing God, 
the actual word used being immaterial. 61 
Imam al-Ghazäli, seems to have waded deeper 
than Imam al-Juwayni into an investigation of vision 
and finding the rational possibilities not entirely 
satisfactory, introduced a s5f3 bias into his 
explanation. 
59Ibid. 
6OIbid. 
61A1-Ghazäll, Ihyä', vol. 1, p. 90. 
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As already suggested at various points in 
this section, generally speaking, Imam al-Ghazäli's 
method is more organized and systematic than that of 
Imam al-Juwayni. He presents the subject in a way in 
which the reader can understand what sifät Allah (the 
attributes of God) are. The material is dealt with 
systematically and not in the scattered, disordered way 
in which it is treated in Imam al-Juwayni's writings. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Question of Human Actions and Free Will 
Theologians have differences of opinion 
concerning human acts; some of them assert that a human 
being is the creator of his own actions and this is due 
to the reward or punishment which God promised. Some of 
them hold that a human being is under a compulsion in 
all his actions whether they are intentional or not, 
and he is like a feather hung up in the air being 
twisted and turned by the winds as they like. 
Some of them maintain that a human being has 
a responsibility in the initiation of his voluntary 
actions in the aspect of acquisition (kasb), by virtue 
of the fact that he has been addressed with the 
shari'ah. All of the theologians were unified in the 
opinion that the necessary acts of a human being are 
created by God. However, they differed in their 
opinions in respect of human free action. The question 
arises whether these actions are created by God or the 
individual person himself. 
Before we discuss the views of Imäm al- 
Juwayn3 and Imäm al-Ghazäl3 on this issue, it is 
necessary to present the views of theologians such as 
191 
the Jabriyyah, the Muctazilah, and the Ahl al-Sunnah 
regarding the analysis of human action. 
5.1 The analysis of human action according to the 
Jabriyyah 
According to the Jabriyyahl God created 
everything and a human being does not have power over 
anything, nor can he be said to have a capacity to act. 
A person is absolutely determined in his deeds. He has 
neither power, nor will, nor choice. God creates deeds 
in humans just as He produces actions in all inanimate 
objects, and the possibility of action is only 
metaphorical in human beings, as it is with inanimate 
objects. 
There is no distinction between human beings 
and inanimate objects except in outward appearance 
only. A person seems outwardly to have choices in his 
action, but in fact, he is compelled by God in the same 
manner as are the inanimate objects. 
1This group was founded by Jahm b. Safwän (d. 128/745) 
in the days of the Umayyad Caliphate. They were called 
after "Jabr" (compulsion) because of their doctrine 
which denies that a deed is in reality to be attributed 
to a human agent, and ascribes it to God. See 
Shahrastäni, Milal, vol. 1, p. 112. 
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The Jabriyyah deny human free action and 
attribute it only to God. All human actions are 
necessary acts over which people do not have power or 
choice. They claim that human action is merely a 
disguise or cover for divine action. They believe that 
a. ction resides only in the eternal power which cannot 
be associated with a created power, which is what human 
beings are. 
Therefore, it is God's will whether He wants 
to blame and punish His creatures, whether to retain 
them in Hell or reward them with Heaven without looking 
at their previous actions, because all actions belong 
in God's power. 2 
Al-Baghdädi explained the Jabriyyah's view 
concerning human action and held that they believed 
that a human being has no acts in reality except as 
ascribed by God alone, and a person has the acts 
ascribed to him only by way of metaphor. This is 
similar to saying that the sun sets, that the wind 
circulates. 3 
2A1-Taftäzän3, Sharh a1-`A gä'id al-Nasafiyyah, Cairo, 
1939, p. 353. 
-`Abd al-Jabbär, hhaMsah, p. 324. 
3A1-Baghdädi, Farq, p. 113. 
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The Jabriyyah believed that a human being has 
no volition whatsoever in his action. Therefore, he is 
under compulsion esoterically and exoterically because 
the occurrence of the action has been inevitably in the 
knowledge of God. 
5.2 The analysis of human action according to the 
Muctazilah 
According to the Muctazilah a human being 
creats his own voluntary actions, which means that a 
person is endowed by God with the power to act freely. 
This, with the agreement of punishment, reward, 
promise and threat by God, shows that a human being is 
responsible for his own actions. 
Here the Muttazilah reject the views of the 
Jabriyyah who claim that all human actions are created 
by God and not by human volition. Thus the Muctazilah 
hold that whoever says that God is responsible for 
human action makes a big mistake, 4 because this action 
is related to human beings only and it is not right to 
attribute it to the essence of God. It is impossible or 
4`Abd al-Jabbär, Mughni, vol. 8, p. 3. 
-Ibn Hazm, a1-Fisi f3 al-Milal wa al-Ahwä' wa a3-Niha3, 
Cairo, n. d. vol. 3, p. 41. 
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illogical that one thing should be the object of power 
of two possessors of that power. 
They believe that human actions are created 
by a human being himself and are the product of his own 
free will. That power with which a person is endowed by 
God cannot be takenaway from him even by God; the 
implication being that for God to deprive a human being 
of the power to act with which He Himself has endowed 
him is an impossibility, because God does not act 
unjustly or deceitfully. 
It would be unjust on the part of God if He 
were to decide in advance the fate of every human in 
the hereafter and to ordain that one will be saved and 
other damned, without either having merited this by his 
own actions. 
The Muctazilah hold that a human being is 
free to chose his own future, whether to believe or not 
to believe, or to follow the law or disavow it. God 
does not determine faith or disbelief in human beings, 
because if He were to do this He would be unjust to His 
creatures. 
The voluntary human act to them is produced 
by human desire and power and a person has control over 
his acts. This can be seen through one who has the 
power to do a thing, and who can equally do it well or 
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not do it. 5 In other words, every power is equally the 
power of an act and of its opposite. 
Then they give these examples when someone is 
asked to stand up, he could respond by obeying or not 
obliging. Similarly, even when hungry, someone could 
decide to eat or not eat when offered food. All these 
show that the notion of power is linked to that of 
human free choice or human volition. 6 
They hold that the act which is produced by a 
human being is a reality and not metaphorical. They 
reject the views of the Jabriyyah who claim that all 
human actions are created by God. The Muctazilah 
clearly deny this view with their statement: "if we are 
asked, 'do you ascribe to a human being production of 
his act as a reality?, ' we would say to them 'yes'. "7 
The Muctazilah maintain that physical actions 
and sensations such as movement, work, pain and voice 
are all within human ability and a person controls them 
completely as he does his mental ability such as 
thinking, willing, and hearing confidence. 8 
5lbid., vol. 7, p. 48., and vol. 8, p. 16. 
6cAbd al-Jabbär, Khamsah, pp. 336-337. 
7`Abd al-Jabbär, Mughni, vol. 10, p. 189. 
8Ibid., vol. 9, p. 13. 
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A1-Baghdädi has explained the views of the 
Muctazilah concerning human action where he ascribes to 
them the view that God is not the creator of the 
acquisitions (aksäb) of humans, or the action of 
animals. It is a human being who determines his own 
acquisitions (aks5b). 9 
Al-Shahrastäni has also explained the view of 
the Muctazilah when he said: "the Muctazilah believe 
that a human being creates his action, his goodness and 
wickedness; his nobleness and baseness belong to a 
human being's acquisitions (aksäb) and he is deserving 
of what he has done in terms of reward or punishment in 
the next world. God is exempt from any evil act and 
unjustice because if He created these He would be 
unjust. "10 
The Muctazilah used the following verses of 
the Qur'an to support their claim that a person has the 
attributes of creating his deeds. 
"And you invent falsehood"11 
"Is there a creator, other than God"12 
9A1-Baghdädi, Farq, pp. 114-115. 
10A1-Shahrast5n3, Milal, vol. 1, p. 67. 
11The Qur'än, 29: 17. 
12Ibid., 35: 3. 
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"Is then He who creates like one that 
creates not"13 
"And God the best of creators is blessed"14 
They claim that these verses show that the 
human creates his own destiny. The text cannot be 
interpreted with another meaning (nibärah) but should 
be interpreted correctly. This explains that a human 
being has the power to create according to his ability. 
Then they explain the secret of using the 
word "Creator" (khäliq) as a reference to God and not 
to humans. It is just for the recognition of the might 
of God that the word "rabb" is used to name to God. 
But this does not mean that this word cannot be used 
for other than God. The reason of using this word for 
God is to show His greatness and power. According to 
them the meaning of the word "creation" (khalq) is an 
action of production by one who has power and a human 
being has power to do an action such as the act of 
movement and of acquisition (kasb). Though God created 
the initial necessary conditions, human beings are 
responsible for their own actions. 15 
13Ibid., 16: 17. 
141bid., 23: 14. 
15cAbd al-Jabbär, Mughn3, vol. 8, p. 283. 
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Therefore, the Muctazilah believe that every 
action produced by a human being is created by himself, 
but the degree of creation is not at the same level of 
God's creation. 
Yahyä b. Husayn had explained the attribute 
of creation by human beings by comparing it with the 
attribute of creation by God. He gives the example of 
God creating human bodily instruments such as legs to 
work, but it is the human being who uses them for work; 
ears to hear, and the human being who uses them for 
hearing; He creates a nose to smell and eyes to see. 
Everything that a human being gains from these 
instruments come from human action not from divine 
intervention. God created all these instruments in the 
human body and it is human responsibility to use them 
according to humans' own desires. 16 
5.3 The analysis of human action according to Ahl al- 
Sunnah 
It is clear from the previous discussion that 
the Jabriyyah believe that God created all human 
actions and a person does not have any power or choice 
16yahyä b. Husayn, R. isälat al-`Adl wa al-Tawhid, 
Beirut, n. d. vol. 2, p. 100. 
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over his own action. The Muctazilah, however, maintain 
that a human being creates his own free action with the 
power which God endowed upon him and God does not 
direct human free action. 
The Ashcariyyah and Mäturidiyyah are the 
followers of Ahl al-Sunnah, their views are between 
those of the Jabriyyah and the Muctazilah. They oppose 
the views of the Jabriyyah who do not differentiate 
between the necessary actions and free actions. They 
also reject the views of the Muctazilah who link human 
action with the attribute of creation and who do not 
know the reality of_the creation of action. They argue 
that if we ask a human being about the movement and 
power he produces when he moves his hand, he could not 
give an adequate answer. 
The Ahl al-Sunnah argue that to move the 
hands needs a perfect action, this kind of action can 
only be done by one who has the attribute of perfection 
who can control all kinds of actions, and who knows 
everything about the movements. A human being does not 
know all about the movement of his hands. Therefore, he 
is not the ultimate creator of his own movement. 
They maintain that all human actions done 
with intention (i. e. free actions) are initiated by 
both God and humans in the sense that God initiates the 
actions in the aspect of creation (fihalq) an da human 
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being initiates the actions in the aspect of 
acquisition (kasb). 
They then divide action into three forms: the 
first creation of the action, second: the power to 
iqnplement the action, and third: the intention. 
God perfected human action and endowed a 
person with the secondary power and with this, God 
completed His actions on humans. However, a human being 
has only the possibility of intention of action, not 
the initial forming of the possibility. They called 
God's action here that of a creator and initiator while 
human action is acquisition (kasb). 
What the Ahl al-Sunnah mean here is that God 
created human action and accidental power and it is 
human responsibility to use this action whether to do 
good or evil and it is upon one's own, initiative to 
gain reward or punishment. Here they called the human 
role in his own action the acquisition (kasb)17 in 
accordance to the Qur'änic verse: 
"Yet is each individual in pledge 
for his deeds". 18 
17A1-Shahrastäni, Nihäyat, pp. 74-75. 
18The Qur'än, 52: 21. 
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They base this view on the clear distinction 
between human free action and action in inanimate 
objects, because if one looks at an inanimate object 
one will notice that it does not have choice and 
acquisition over its action. 
They also base this view on the differences 
between the movement in the act of seizing a thing and 
the movement in the act of the trembling of agedness. 
They believe that God is the creator of the actions but 
a human being has an acquisition in the intentional 
ones, and that any one thing can come under two 
distinct powers in two different aspects. 
Therefore, the intentional human action will 
come under the power of God in its aspect of being 
created and under human power in the aspect of being 
wrought. 
Al-Ashtarl, one of the Ahl al-Sunnah, 
maintains that the necessary movements and free actions 
are created by God but they are distinguished in the 
aspect of acquisition. 19 He illustrates the necessary 
movements as the trembling from palsy and the shivering 
from fever, and the free actions by such movements as 
going, approaching and receding. 
19A1-Juwayni, Lumac, p. 77. 
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Here al-Ashcan claims that all human actions 
are created by God and acquisition is by human beings. 
So what is the definition of acquisition to al-Ashcari 
and his followers?. 
If al-Ashcari claims that all human actions 
are created by God, so what is the human role in these 
actions?. in answer to this question, he explains that 
the human being has acquisition and choice, but the 
acquisition is dependent on the power and intention of 
action by the human being. This action is created by 
God, because human beings do not have power to create 
thir own action. God created in a person the accidental 
power to enable him to fulfill his intention and 
acquisition. 20 
Here it seem to us that the views of al- 
Ashcar3 are that a human being has no effect or control 
whatsoever in his action. Therefore, he is under 
compulsion esoterically and has choice exoterically. If 
it is claimed that there is no meaning in the human 
possessing exoteric choice if he is esoterically under 
compulsion, the occurrence of the action has been 
inevitably in the knowledge of God because He has 
created in the human the power to do that action. 
20A1-Shahrastän3, Milal, vol. 1, p. 124. 
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There is only a slight different between the 
views of the al-Ashcar3 and the Jabriyyah on the human 
action. This can be seen in al-Ashcar3's views when he 
holds that a human being has the agency of initiation 
in voluntary actions in the aspect of acquisition but 
a. human being is neither under perfect compulsion nor 
does he have perfect freedom of choice. 
This is a clear refutation of the stand taken 
by the Jabriyyah that a person is under compulsion and 
has no choice at all in the initiation of all his 
actions, irrespective of whether voluntary or 
involuntary. 
Here what is meant by choice is the mastery 
over action and abstinence. This mastery is certainly 
different from acquisition except that it clings to it. 
Therefore, whoever establishes "acquisition" 
establishes the exoteric choice and whoever denies 
"acquisition" denies the exoteric choice, as do the 
Jabriyyah. They hold that the human is like a feather 
hung in the air, being turned about by the winds, left 
and right. 
In fact, the view of al-Ashcari on God who 
simultaneously creates in humans the power to acquire 
as well as the act of acquiring is not very much 
different from the view of the Jabriyyah. Al-Ashcari 
believes that a human being has no control over work 
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and action that has an influence upon existent things, 
and by this he means that both the act of acquiring and 
the object acquired are created by God. 21 
Here al-Ashcari seem to create a question 
&ntended to puzzle by using the word "acquisition" 
which still does not have clear definition. The 
theologians therefore, claim that al-Ashcarl still 
could not solve the problem and deny the Jabriyyah. Due 
to this they called al-Ashcari the medial Jabriyyah. 22 
Ibn Taymiyyah also claims that al-Ash`ari is 
completely the same as the Jabriyyah. 23 This is because 
al-Ashcari claims that the acquisition goes with the 
action which is created by God and the human choice 
does not have any influence on the acquisition. 
Therefore, the acquisition is like the action which is 
created by God and the human does not deserve any 
reward or any punishment. Due to this Ibn al-Nadim 
21Ibn Rushd, Manähij al-Adillah fl cAgäi'd al-Millah, 
Cairo, n. d. pp. 225-226. 
22cAbbäs Mahmüd, al-Falsafah al-Qur'äniyyah, Cairo, 
n. d. p. 150. 
-Ahmad Amin, Duhä a1-Is15m, Cairo, 1946, vol. 3, p. 57. 
23Ibn Taymiyyah, Minhäj al-Sunnah f3 Magd Kaläm al- 
Shicah wa al-Qadariyyah, Cairo, 1321 A. H. vol. 1, p. 
326. 
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claims that a1-Ashcarl carries the Jabriyyah's 
opinions. 24 
Since God alone is the creator of the actions 
of humans irrespective of whether they are voluntary or 
involuntary and since they have no part, even in their 
intentional (voluntary) actions, except that of the 
aspect of acquisition, there arises the question: Then 
why should the humans be subjected to reward or 
punishment, as has been clearly stated in the Qur'än, 
for they do not deserve any reward or any punishment?. 
This question was answered by the Ashcariyyah 
who hold that if God rewards a human being it is purely 
by His Grace and if He punishes him it is purely by His 
Justice. Here what is meant by the term "Grace of God" 
is His grant on the basis of perfect choice that is not 
on the basis of anyone or anything imposing it as a 
duty on Him. Therefore, God's actions are independent 
from human action. 
The school of the Ash`ariyyah therefore, 
holds that God rewards human purely by His Grace 
without it being tainted with anybody or anything 
making it a duty on Him or it becoming an essentiality. 
241bn al-Naditn, Fihrist , Cairo, 1929, p. 257. 
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After having discussed the views of the 
theologians on human action, we shall assess how Imam 
al-Juwayni offered a solution to the difficulty in the 
Ash`ariyyah's views of this problem and how far Imam 
al-Ghazali has been influenced by his master on this 
subject. 
5.4 The analysis of human action according to Imäm al- 
Juwayn3 
In discussing human actions, Im5m al-Juwayni 
bases his method on intellectual premises and abstract 
reasoning. He opens his discussion with the broad yet 
complex statement: "All created things are created by 
the power , qudrah) of God, without any distinction 
between those with which human power is connected and 
those over which the Lord is alone in His power. "25 
Imam al-Juwayni then explains that God 
created all events whether of good or evil by His will 
and according to His desire. 26 To explain that God is 
the only one who brings things into existence, Imam al- 
Juwayni goes on to analyze and compare these two types 
of actions. He attempts to show how God's creations 
show that He is knowledgable about every thing He 
25A1-Juwayn3, Irshed, p. 173. 
26A1-Juwayn3, Lumac, p. 97. 
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created, while a human being does not have knowledge 
about his own action. This shows that human beings do 
not have the power to create their own actions. 27 
He then provides a further explanation that 
such purposeful and well-directed actions denote the 
knowledge of their creator. But as the human being in 
that state would not be aware of the exact nature of 
the actions which he produces, it must be deduced that 
such actions as he then produces must be animated or 
created by the one who is aware of their nature, 
namely, God the Almighty. 28 
Imam al-Juwayni believes that all created 
thing must be governed and controlled by someone; if a 
human being created his own action, that would mean he 
governs and controls himself. This argument or line of 
reasoning equates God and human beings in their power. 
Imam al-Juwayni does not agree with this association, 
because in his view the created power (i. e. the power 
of a human being) could not be equivalent to God's 
power. 29 
This does not meant that a human being is 
under a compulsion in his action, but rather that he 
27Ibid., pp. 106-107. 
28A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 175. 
29lbid., p. 189. 
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has power over his acquisition. This can be seen in the 
human knowledge of the distinction between the 
trembling of the hands and the intentional movement of 
the hands; that is to say, a human being knows this 
intuitively. 
If in Imam al-Juwayni's view, as has been 
seen, it is impossible that human beings should possess 
the exclusive power to produce actions which lie within 
the power of God, what, it may be asked, does Imäm al- 
Juwayni seek to establish by this argument? Does he 
intend to prove that the power of God operates by 
itself to produce the action, so that the power of 
human being would have no influence upon that action, 
or does he intend to prove that human beings are not 
solely responsible for the production of the action, 
but that the action is produced by the simultaneous 
operation of the two powers (i. e. the power of human 
beings and the power of God)? The first presumption is 
made likely by his definition of the meaning of 
"acquisition" (kasb). 
Here Imäm al-Juwayn3 embarks on a discussion 
of the reality of "acquisition" (kasb). This concept 
was resorted to by the Jabriyyah who deny the power of 
the human being to create his actions, as a means of 
explaining the relationship between the universal and 
comprehensive pre-eternal power and the created power. 
The Muctazilah on the other hand sought to make a 
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subject capable of being commanded to do certain things 
and not to do other things and capable of being 
rewarded and punished in such a way that the human 
being was made accountable for all behavior and actions 
produced by him. If the actions of the human being were 
dependent on the power of God and not by the power of 
the human being concerned, then why should the 
individual be held responsible for his conduct? And how 
would the recompense and chastisement be just?. 
To this the upright reply, according to Imam 
al-Juwayni, that there is some kind of connection 
between the power of the human being and his actions, 
not in the sense that the actions are created or 
produced by the human being, for that is dependent only 
on the power of God, but in the sense that there is 
some kind of influence upon the action known as "the 
acquisition". 
Imam al-Juwayni proceeds to explain this 
acquisition and holds that it is impossible to 
attribute the difference between necessary human motion 
and human motion by choice simply to the one who 
apparently performs the motion, without the addition of 
some other thing, which he goes on to explain, is a 
"power" created within the apparent performer of the 
motion as something distinct from him. 30 
30Ibid., p. 188. 
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Here Imam al-Juwayni justifies the use of the 
term "power" by arguing as follow: "It is not a 
necessary condition for the connection which an 
attribute has with an object that the attribute should 
influence the object connected with it, for, in the 
case of knowledge, its connection with an object of 
knowledge is indisputable, even though it has no 
influence upon the object of knowledge, and by the same 
token, the human will, though connected with the act of 
man, has no influence upon the act". 31 
What Imäm al-Juwayni means by the term 
"power" here is not in the sense of a power to acquire 
but in the sense of a power to will to acquire, and to 
will in relation to its object is analogous to 
knowledge in relation to its object. 
Im5m al-Juwayni goes further to explain his 
teleological views. He holds that a human being knows 
within himself that he has power, but that, that power 
does not enable him to create independently, all by 
himself, the existence of something; a human being's 
action depends for its existence upon his power, which 
acts as its immediate cause; this power of a human 
being depends for its existence upon another cause, 
3lIbid., p. 189. 
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which is one in a series of causes; this series of 
causes culminates in God, the uncaused cause. 32 
God, the uncaused cause, is the creator of 
the causes and the caused ones, by which is meant that 
God is the remote cause or creator of each caused cause 
in the series of which the immediate cause is its 
immediately preceding caused cause in the series; every 
caused cause in the series is to be considered as 
independent with respect to its being the cause of that 
which follows it, but it is to be considered as 
dependent with respect to its being caused by that 
which precedes it, whereas the creator is the Absolute 
Independent one (al-ghani al-mutlaq). 33 
Shahrastdni commented on this view of Imäm 
al-Juwayn3 and holds that what Im5m a]-Juwayni did was 
to take a principle from the metaphysical philosophers 
and dress it up in the garb of the ka. läm in order to 
avoid the utter folly of compulsion. 34 
Shahrastani argues that the philosophic 
principle of causality drawn upon by Imam al-Juwayni as 
an explanation of human action is not restricted by its 
original exponents to human action. It is applied by 
32A1-Shahrastäni. Milal, vol. 1, p. 134. 
33Ibid. 
34lbid. 
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them to every process of coming into being. The 
underlying meaning of this principle, he says, is the 
conception of an order of nature throughout which there 
is a concatenation of cause and effect. But such a 
conception of causality, he concludes, is not what is 
believed by Muslims. 35 
However, the views and interpretation of Imäm 
al-Juwayni are supported by many scholars such as 
Muhammad cAbduh who argues that those who dismiss or 
deny the validity of Imäm al-Juwayni's views fail to 
understand him. 36 
Imäm al-Juwayni expounds the reality of 
acquisition that it is only one manner of correlation 
and affinity between the power of the human being and 
his action, and that it does not create or originate 
the action. 
From the above, we see that Imäm al-Juwayni 
was not in fact able to present us with a sufficiently 
clear or satisfactory exposition of the nature of 
acquisition, and that he was not able to explain its 
true purpose, which is the determination of a subject 
capable of religious responsibility. 
35Ibid., p. 135. 
36Muhammad cAbdüh, Risälat al-Tawhid, Cairo, n. d. 
70. 
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5.5 The analysis of human action according to Imam al- 
Ghazäli 
In discussing human action, Imäm al-Ghazäli 
does not produces any new theory. What he does is to 
reproduce the view of his teacher Imäm al-Juwayni. 
Like Imam al-Juwayni, Imam al-Ghazali rejects 
the Muctzilah's views and disproves their claim that a 
human being is endowed by God with the power to act 
freely and of that power he cannot be deprived even by 
God Himself. To counter this, Imam al-Ghazäli 
reproduces Imam al-Juwayn3's questioning of how could 
the human being's movement be the creation of the human 
being, when he does not encompass the knowledge of the 
different constituent parts of the acquired movements 
and their numbers. 37 
Imäm al-Ghazäl3 uses exactly the same 
argumentation as his master to prove that God is the 
creator of the human actions, as supported by the 
verse: "God is the creator of all things, and He is the 
guardian and disposer of all affairs". 38 The 
37A1-Ghazäl3, Ihyä', vol. 1, p. 111., see also al- 
Juwayni, Irshäd, pp. 175-176. 
38The Qur'än, 39: 62. 
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explanation follows that God's power is perfect and 
unrestricted and human action is dependent upon the 
power of God and God alone is responsible for the 
creation of the human movements, though this does not 
exclude these from being objects of human power by way 
of acquisition (iktisäb). 39 
Imam al-Ghazall thereby defines the meaning 
of what he calls "acquisition". In his view, God 
created at once the power (qudrah) and the object of 
power (magdür) and He created at once the choice 
(ikhtiyär) and the object of choice (mukht5r). 40 
From Imäm al-Ghazäli's subsequent statements 
it becomes clear that God creates movement in the hand 
of the human being without that movement itself 'being 
under the personal control of the individual. Thus God 
creates the power of the individual and likewise 
creates the object to be governed by the power of the 
individual; and God in this manner reserves unto 
Himself the exclusive power of creating the power of 
the human being and the object which is governed by 
that power of the human being. 
Imam al-Ghazäli rejects the views of the 
Muctazilah that it was impossible to prove that one 
39A1-Ghazäli, Ihya?, vol. 1, p. 111. 
401bid. 
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object of power could belong to two powers (i. e. that 
one thing can at one and the same time be the product 
of two different powers). He then gives his view on 
this and holds that the right view is to correlate the 
two powers to the same action and to hold the view in 
f. avour of an originated thing being related to two 
powers of origination, 41 the original creation and the 
subsequent creation-in-use. 
What remains then of the opposition view 
would be the improbability of the joint operation of 
the two powers upon the same action; but this becomes 
improbable only if the correlation of the two powers is 
in the same mode or deemed as equivalent. But if the 
two powers differ and the mode of their correlation 
also differs, then the operation of the two powers upon 
the same thing would not be impossible. 42 
To prove the above Imäm al-Ghazäli holds that 
the movement of voluntary shaking is different from the 
movement of the shaking with fright, in that the human 
being has to undertake the former but not the latter, 
and that the power of God attaches to every possible 
thing; that every originated thing is a possible thing; 
that the action of a human being is an originated 
thing; and that therefore, it is impossible that the 
41A1-Ghaz7ali, Igtisäd, p. 59. 
42Ibid. 
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power of God should not attach to that thing. 43 It may 
be noted that the same argument had been used by Imäm 
al-Ghazäli's teacher, Imäm al-Juwayn3 in his refutation 
of the Muctazilah. 44 
Imam al-Ghazäli anticipates the following 
objection; how could acquisition justify the 
description of a human act as an object of human power, 
when human acquisition itself is said to be created by 
God and as such quite evidently has no influence upon a 
human's actions? It will be recalled that the same 
objection-to the theory of acquisition is mentioned by 
his master Imäm al-Juwayni. 45 
His answer to this objection is similar to 
that provided by Imam al-Juwayni, except for the change 
of Imam al-Juwayni's analogy of human knowledge for the 
analogy of God's eternal power. Imam al-Juwayni tried 
to show that just as human knowledge of something 
existent does not influence that existent, human power 
to will to acquire something does not have to influence 
that something acquired. 46 
431bid., p. 60. 
44A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, pp. 174-175. 
45A1-Ghazäl3, Igtisäd, p. 57. 
-Al-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 188. 
46A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 189. 
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Imäm al-Ghazäli similarly tries to show that 
just as God had from eternity the power to create the 
world, without the world having been created from 
eternity, that is to say, without there having been 
from eternity an object influenced by that power, so 
a. lso human power to will to acquire something does not 
have to influence that something acquired. So much of 
Imäm al-Ghazdli's treatment of the problem of 
acquisition here is to be reproduce Imäm al-Juwayni's 
views. 
However, Imäm al-Ghazäl3 sometimes differs 
slightly from his master by displaying his süfi view; 
this can be seen in his conception of human actions 
when he refers to all the human actions as remaining 
dependent upon God's power. Everything is due to. the 
creation of God, for the choice itself is also due to 
the creation of God and a human being is forced into 
the choice which he makes. 47 
His explanation of this point is exemplified 
by a detailed analysis of the process of eating. This 
process is shown by him to involve a number of things 
created by God, of which he mentions the following: 
hands by which human being can handle food; the food; a 
feeling of hunger; a knowledge that food will appease 
the hunger; a sense of precautionary inquiry as to 
47A1-Ghazäli, Ihya , vol. 4, p. 5. 
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whether the food is fit for eating; a knowledge that 
the food in question is fit for eating; the decision 
(injizäm) of the will (irädah) to take the food; the 
movement of the hand in the direction of the food. It 
is the "decision of the will, " he says, that is called 
", choice" (ikhtiyär) and this like all the other steps 
in the process of eating is created by God. 48 
From this conception of continuous creation 
Imam al-Ghazäli clearly shows that human choice is not 
created by a human being himself but it is created by 
God through His custom (cädah) who creates things 
continuously in the same order of succession. The human 
is only the abode or substratum for this procedure. 
Then, after stating that this manner of the 
succession of continuously created things is according 
to the fixed and immutable order predetermined by God's 
generosity and His eternal power, he goes on to show 
that human actions are subject to the same procedure of 
divine ordainment and divine decree that govern all the 
so-called natural events in the world. 49 He supports 
this view with the verse of the Qur'än: 
"Verily, all things have We created 
in proportion and measure". 50 
48lbid., p. 6. 
49Ibid. 
50The Qur'än, 54: 49. 
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Imäm al-Ghazäli then illustrates this by 
showing how the human act of writing is created by God, 
by His creating in the human being who has a desire to 
write "four things", namely, 1) by His creating in the 
spul of the human being a knowledge (cilm) of that 
toward which he has a desire, a knowledge called 
comprehension (idräk) and cognition (ma`rifah); 2) by 
His creating, again in the soul of the human being a 
will (irädah), that is, a strong and decisive 
inclination (mayl gawi jäzim) called intention (gasad); 
3) by His creating in the hand of the human being an 
appropriate attribute called power (qudrah), that is to 
say, a power to write; and 4) by His creating, again, 
in the hand of the human being a movement (harakah), 
that is to say, the act of writing. 51 
With the implication that, as he has said 
before, these "four things" are not each successively 
produced as an effect by that which precedes it as its 
cause but rather that, in the human being as the abode, 
each of these "four things" follows the one preceding 
it as something conditioned follows that which precedes 
it as a condition. Such an explanation by Imam al- 
Ghazal! is not to be found in the relevant section of 
Imam al-Juwayni. 
51A1-Ghazäl3, Ihyä', vol. 4, p. 6. 
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However, it is quite clear from a close 
scrutiny of both works that Imäm al-Ghazäli was 
influenced heavily by his predecessor in this section. 
This can be seen in Imäm al-Ghazäli's answer to the 
question of how a human being could be described as 
simultaneously acting both under compulsion and with 
choice. 52 
In answer to this question, Imäm al-Ghazäli 
divides human action in three types: 1) action of 
choice, 2) volitional action; 3) natural action. 53 
This threefold division of human actions, 
despite the difference of terminology in the 
description of the second and third types, is the same 
as the threefold division used by Imam al-Ghazali's own 
teacher Imam al-Juwayni. The first type, which Imäm al- 
Ghazal! describes as "action of choice" and illustrates 
by the act of writing, is exactly like the first type 
in Imäm al-Juwayni, who illustrates it by the act of 
going and coming and by that of intentional movement. 54 
The second type, which he describes as 
"volitional", a term which, he uses in the sense of 
"instinctive", corresponds to what which is described 
52Ibid., p. 254. 
531bid. 
54A1-Juwaynl, Irshäd, p. 195. 
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by Imam al-Juwayn3 as "necessary" and is illustrated by 
the movements of trembling and shivering. 55 
The third type, which he describes as 
"natural", a term which quite evidently he uses here 
loosely in the sense of "customary", corresponds to 
what Imam al-Juwayn3 refer to as generated effects, 
that is an action produced by a human being in 
something outside his own body. 56 
The doctrine of Imam al-Ghazall on the 
subject of human action can on the whole be regarded as 
a true reflection or echo of the doctrine of Imam al- 
Juwayni on this subject, from the point of view of the 
elements, proofs, manner of treatment and even of the 
examples employed for the purpose of expounding the 
doctrine. 
551bid., p. 196. 
56lbid. p. 178. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Views of Imäm al-Juwayni and Imäm al-Ghazäli 
on Prophethood and Messengership 
Before we discuss the views of Imam al- 
Juwayn3 and Imam al-Ghazali on this subject it is 
necessary to define the Islamic meanings of prophet and 
messenger. 
6.1 The meanings of prophet and messenger 
The Arabic for 'prophet' is the word nabiy 
and the root of the word nabiy with a hamza is naba', 
meaning information or announcement. Without a ham2a 
the word is nabiy, meaning a prophet.! 
A messenger (z'asül) means one who is sent a 
divine revelation (wahy) from God. All the messengers 
are prophets, though not all the prophets are 
messengers. 2 This is also the view of early 
llbn Manzlzr, Lisän a1-`Arab, Cairo, 1300 A. H. vol. 2, 
p. 156 
2A1-Baghdädä, Usül, pp. 153-154, 
-A1-I ji, MaGVägif, p. 545. 
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Christianity. 3 
The difference between a messenger and a 
prophet is that the former was sent with a revealed law 
(sharc) and a book special to him, whereas the latter 
was only to preach and utter warnings even though he 
may receive some revelations. 4 
According to CAbd al-Jabbär, there is no 
difference between the terms prophet and messenger. -9 
Similarly al-Iji deals with these two words as 
synonymous because for him both of them are categories 
of the highest position given by God to his servant. 6 
In the Qur'Ttn the term prophet (nably) is 
only applied to menu connected with the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, for the prophet Muhammad was regarded as 
continuing and reforming that tradition.? 
Theologians agree that prophecy is God's 
bringing into existence in a man a directed 
determination (hu ni inshä'i) pertaining to himself. An 
3Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, Cambridge, 1932, p. 204. 
4lbid. 
5CAbd a1-Jabb5r, Khamsah, p. 568. 
61ji, Mawägif, p. 545. 
7Watt, Introduction to the Qur35n, Edinburgh, 1970, 
p. 29. 
224 
instance would be the Qurlänic verse, " Recite in the 
name of your Lord". 6 This was an enchargement (taklif) 
pertaining to himself (i. e. prophet Muhammad) at that 
time, and was therefore, a prophecy. 
However, when the verse declares "Rise and 
warn", 9 this is an instance of messengership (risäla), 
since this charge is related to others. Thus a prophet 
is charged with what pertains to himself, whereas a 
messenger is charged with that and with communicating 
to others. Therefore, a messenger is more particular 
that a prophet. 
6.2 The Sending of Messengers 
It is intellectually possible or rationally 
believable of God to have sent all the messengers, from 
Adam to Muhammad. 10 This doctrinal point is opposed to 
that of those who hold that it was intellectually 
essential and to that of those who hold that it was 
intellectually absurd. 
Among those who hold that it was 
intellectually essential were the Muctazilites and a 
8The Qur'än, 9: 61. 
glbid., 74 : 2. 
10A1-Mäturldl, al-Tawhid, Beirut, n. d. p. 435, 
-Al-Bägi l länä , . Tamh1 d, p. 107. 
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certain group of philosophers. 11 These two groups 
agreed on the intellectual essentiality, but the 
philosophers added that it was a duty on God to send 
the messengers. The basis of the opinion shared by the 
Muctazilah was their belief of the obligation of God to 
care for the good of His servants. 
They claim that the order which leads to 
general goodness in human life in this world and in the 
hereafter will not be perfect except by the sending of 
the messengers. And thus it is God's duty to care for 
people. 
Those who hold that it was intellectually 
absurd for God to send messengers were the Barähimll2 
(from the Bar: 5him of Somnat, a historical temple city 
of the BarT-himah in the Kachch peninsula of India). 
They thought that the sending of messengers is a vain 
act on the part of God and it is not an act fit for a 
wise God because the presence of intellect in man 
renders it unnecessary. A man can do an action if it is 
good in the eyes of his intellect without a messenger 
bringing him a command and he can abstain from an 
action if it is bad in the eyes of his intellect though 
a messenger does not bring any prohibition. If it is 
neither good nor bad in the eyes of his intellect he 
11A1-Shahrastän3, Nihäyat, p. 417. 
12A1-Shahrastäni, Mi1a1, vol. 3, p. 342. 
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will do it if he needs it and he will not do it if he 
does not need it. This logic, according to the 
Sumanites, renders messengers unnecessary and not 
`likely to be God's function. 
6.3 The views of Imam al-Juwayn3 on the notion of 
Messenger 
IniRm a! -Juwayni begins his discussion on the 
c_ea of a messenger by pointing out the specious 
argument of the Sar; ahinl Who c. a! m that it is impossible 
for God to send t`-le rie outlined the poi: it 
at 1_ßi r id the `brae ar` rlliiients 'I proffers against 
as 
First: "; ýý 5arr,. _ n c? -. _m th. t i the sending 
ý+ - 
Cý! 
,. 
f' to di_= egnrd ý: ýN intellec ;, then 
senc? __ r' E' _iß s, e2 `e i0p,. 2'70SGS and is useless. .:.. 
Moreover if t-: e wenc__, g of the messengers is contrary 
to 1oic, it shou. lc be rejected because a thing can 
cKy be accepted after the intellect proves It. 13 
Imam a]-Juwayni denies this view and holds 
that the sending of messengers is possible for God. He 
maintains that the sending of the messenger does not 
provide any contradiction to the intellectual evidences 
especially when the proof is derived only from 
13A1-Juwayn7-, Irshäd, p. 257. 
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intellectual evidence. We cannot claim that other than 
this kind of evidence is useless; this would be a 
circular argument and hence invalid. Furthermore before 
God sends the messengers, He knows that there will be a 
fine combination between the messengers and the 
intellectual reasoning and think--ng people would be 
pleased by the sending of the messengers. Therefore, 
the claim made by the Barähim is invalid. 14 
Imäm al-Juwayni then gives an analogy of 
men's need for messengers. This is likened to a 
patient's need of a doctor. When he ashes the doctor 
what kind of medicine he needs to cure his disease, the 
patient knows that medication in general can cure his 
; lines but `ie does riot knows w , at specific medication 
he needs. In . use ikk. e needs a doctor to show him 
the suitable medication to cure him. The same applies 
to human beings. Before God's sending of the 
messengers, human beings do not know the purpose of 
their creation and their task in this world. They need 
guidance from messengers of God to explain these to 
them. 15 
Reason alone would been an insufficient guide 
and this can be shown by a comparison. Reason may not 
always discern unhealthy or poisoned food. However, if 
14Ibid., p. 258. 
15Ibid. 
228 
reason was told that certain foods are unhealthy it 
will avoid them and choose the wholesome ones. 16 
Second: The Bardhim claim that reason would 
have difficulty in accepting that the prophet has 
attributes against the customary mode of the occurrence 
of things (i. e. against the law of nature), such as the 
ability to turn silver to gold. They could not believe 
that the prophet could know hidden and secret 
matters. i7 
Imäm al-Juwayni answers this claim by holding 
that this group seems to deny the messenger from the 
beginning because they seem to view all things not 
usually natural as 'tieing false. He then goes to explain 
that v. ie naturally that it is not in the power of 
human beings to return, life to bones after they are 
destroyed, to cure 1-. j-, e leper or to cause a stick to 
become alive, and this 
ýJ in order to show the 
falsehood of the magician. These special attributes 
were only given to the messenger to prove that he is 
truly God's messenger. 18 The point Imam al-Juwayni is 
making is that messengers are able to transcend what is 
usually considered natural or possible, they break the 
limitations of nature. 
16Ibid. 
171bid., p. 263. 
16Ibid., p. 264. 
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Third: The Barähim claim that if the 
messenger can distinguish between miracle, magic and 
treachery, one needs to ask what would be the source of 
this discerning ability. For the Barähim it seems that 
God wants to lead us astray and entrap us into 
believing in the prophet because all his words promise 
benefit. God seems want to bring us to destruction and 
trap us with His prophet's words, because it is not 
impossible for God to do that. 19 
To oppose this view Imam al-Juwayni holds 
that the miracles which appear coming from the one who 
claims to be a messenger are intended as an affirmation 
of truthfulness. 20 
To illustrate his point, he provides this 
comparison. The king sits on his throne and there is a 
big assembly of people present who are not allowed to 
speak to the king even though they have important 
matters to ask. Then the claimant, who is a commoner, 
stands before the assembly and says: "0, people, you 
know that the king will not speak and meet all of you 
face to face. I as his messenger will bear with you in 
your problem and this action I take with the pleasure 
of the king. For the sign of the truth of my claim the 
19A1-GhazAli, Iqtisäd, p. 122. 
20A1-Juwayn3, Irshdd, p. 262. 
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king will make a movement if I ask him for it. "21 
Then he says: "0, king, if I am truthful in 
my claim to your messengership, please make a movement 
against your custom by standing up and sitting down", 
and the king performs that movement immediately. Then 
it will be known, certainly by means of the context of 
the condition, that the king through his action of 
moving intended to verify the truthfulness of the 
claimant, and he substituted the verbal verification 
with a movement which is against his normal custom. And 
none from the assembly doubts that the matter is in 
accordance with the claim of the claimant. 22 
This is similar to the instance when the 
prophet said: "0, people, you know that to return life 
to a dead person or cause a stick to become alive is 
God's attribute. 0, Lord, If I am truly your prophet, 
cause this stick to be alive, so I can turn it when I 
need it. " This was to show and confirm that the prophet 
is truly the messenger of God and so accepted by 
reason. 23 
21A1-Juwayn3, cAg3dah, pp. 68-69. 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid. 
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6.4 The views of Imäm al-Ghazäll on the notion of 
messenger 
Like his master, Imam al-Ghazäli holds that 
the sending of messengers is possible for God though 
Trot compulsory, as claimed by the Muctazilah, nor 
impossible as claimed by the Barähim. 
Imäm al-Ghazäli began his discussion on the 
messengers in his book al-Igtised f. i al-I` tigad in 
exactly the same way as did his teacher Imam al-Juwayni 
by pointing out the arguments of the Barahim and 
opposing them systematically by using the same argument 
of his master, not only in the meaning but also in his 
method and words. 
The first argument of the Bardhim is their 
claim that if the sending of the messenger by God is to 
perform what is already within human reason, that 
sending of the messenger is useless and thus impossible 
for God. Moreover if the sending is found to be 
contrary to reason, it is impossible to accept or 
believe. 24 
In rejecting this claim Imäm al-Ghazäli uses 
exactly the same argument as his master when he argues 
that the prophet Muhammad rejects the limited use of 
24A1-Ghaza13, Igtisäd, p. 122. 
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reason because reason alone does not guide one to be 
useful or prevent harm by wrongful action, speech or 
behaviour; reason alone cannot lead one to faith. Nor 
does reason enable one to differentiate between 
hardship and happiness. However, and this is the main 
axgument, reason can be educated to lead to greater 
understanding, as illustrated by the patient benefiting 
from the doctor's information about illness and 
medicine. The point is that messengers, far from being 
useless, provide this essential extra guidance. 25 
The second-argument is it is impossible for 
God to send a messenger because it would be impossible 
for people to know the truth of the sending. If a 
servant of God respects and believes in God, God will 
speack to him directly without the need of a messenger. 
If the servant does not revere God, the way to show his 
"truth" would be by practising against the law of 
nature. There is no distinction between what he does 
with magic and wondrous things; all of them would be 
against the law of nature to those who do not know 
them. 26 
If we look at Imam al-Ghazäl3's rejection of 
this claim we would find- that it is not different to 
25Ibid., p. 123. 
26Ibid., p. 122. 
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his master's view in rejecting this claim. Imäm al- 
Ghazäli holds that this claim does not differentiate 
between miracle, magic and fantasy. No one of 
intelligence would agree that the magician can return 
life to a dead person; turn a stick into a snake; split 
the moon; or cleave the sea and cure the leper. 
If they claim that magic can do whatever God 
does, this claim is impossible because if we look at 
human attributes and abilities we would notice that the 
messenger is not a magician; and his miracles cannot be 
gained by magic. These miracles are given by God to His 
messenger. 27 
The third argument is that the Barähim claim 
that one cannot know how the messenger differentiates 
between miracles and magic; what would be the source of 
his claim of truth. They claim that God intended to 
destroy them with belief in the prophet's words and 
this word only bring them to disaster and lead them 
astray. 28 
To oppose this claim Imam al-Ghazali does not 
produce any new arguments, he reemphasizes his master's 
views when he presented this illustration of a king 
imposing on his subjects to obey his messenger, a 
271bid., p. 123. 
28lbid., p. 122. 
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soldier, in dividing their wealth. The doubting people 
demanded that the soldier prove that he was the king's 
messenger. The king meanwhile remained silent though he 
was present. The messenger then said: "0, king, if I am 
truly your messenger, please confirm this by standing 
up from your throne three times, which is not your 
usual custom. " Then the king immediately stood up 
thrice. With this evidence none of the people could 
deny the truth of the messenger's claim. 29 
In order to reject the views of those who 
denied the sending of the messengers it seem to us that 
both of the Imams had to differentiate between 
miracles, marvels and magic. In order to have clear 
understanding of them it is necessary to discuss more 
widely what distinguishes miracles, marvels and magic. 
6.5 Miracles (mucj2zat) 
The word for miracle (muljiza) has been 
derived from the word cajz (disability). 30 It literally 
means: a thing which renders someone unable. According 
to the theological terminology it is an event happening 
against the customary mode of occurrence (i. e. law of 
nature), in the hands of the claimant to prophethood or 
messengership, in the face of a challenge by his 
29Ibid., p. 124. 
30A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 260. 
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disapprovers, in a way rendering the disapprovers 
unable to do likewise. 
Al-Ij3 gives a complete definition of the 
term miracle (mucjiza): it is a means to prove the 
s. i ncerity of him who claims to be the messenger of 
God. 31 
The reality of a miracle (mucjiza) is an act 
of God which is not something from eternity. God is the 
only one who has power over a miracle (mucjiza) and a 
human being does not have power over it. However, some 
of the Ashcariyyah32 and most of the Muctazilah divide 
the miracle (mudjiza) into two forms. 
In the first form God alone has power over 
the miracle (mu`jiza) and a human being does not have 
the same power, such as the creation of bodies. The 
second form includes the power of a human being, but 
this power could not be at the same level of that of 
God, such as the example of the eloquence of the 
Qur'än. People can create eloquence but not in the 
same category as that of the Qur'än. A miracle 
31A1-Ij1, Mawägif, p. 547. 
32A1-Bägi11än3, a1-Bayän can a1-Farq bayn a1-Mucjiza wa 
a1-Karäm5t, Beirut, 1377 A. H. 
-A1-Baghdädi, Usül, p. 170, 
-Al-Iji, Mawägif, p. 547. 
pp - 8-14, 
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(mucjiza) can only exist in this world because 
everything that is against the nature of law in the 
hereafter will not be considered as miraculous 
(mucjiza). 
Imam al-Juwayni posited six conditions for an 
event to be classed as a miracle (mucjiza). These are: 
First: it must be an act of God and it cannot 
be considered as an eternal attribute because if the 
miracle (mudjiza) is an eternal attribute, the existent 
of God will be considered a miracle (mudjiza). 33 
Second: it should be against the customary 
mode of the occurrence of things (i. e. against the law 
of nature). 34 Therefore, if a claimant to prophethood 
says the sign of his truthfulness in his claim is to 
raise the sun from where it rises and to set it where 
it sets, this cannot be accepted, because, it is not 
against the customary mode of the occurrence of things. 
Third: the event should happen in the hands 
of a claimant to prophethood or messengership. 35 
Therefore, that which takes place though the hands of a 
person known for his piety and which is known as "the 
33A1-Juwayn3, Irshäd, p. 261. 
34Ibid., p. 262. 
35Ibid., p. 264. 
237 
marvel of a saint" (karäma) should be excluded. And 
that which occurs through the hands of an ordinary man 
in order to save him from his difficulties and which is 
known as "macüna " (succour) should also be excluded. 
Fourth: it should accompany the claim to 
prophethood or messengership in reality, (i. e. together 
with his claim) or while he still maintains his 
claim. 36 Therefore, that which occurred to such a 
claimant before he was made a prophet or messenger by 
way of preparation for it, and which is known as a1- 
irh5s (laying of foundation), such as the shading of 
the cloud for the prophet before he was even 
commissioned with prophethood, should also be excluded. 
Fifth: it should be in agreement with his 
claim. 37 Therefore, that which is in disagreement with 
his claim should be excluded. 
Sixth: it should not falsify his claim. 38 
Therefore, that which falsifies his claim should be 
excluded. For example, if he says : "The sign of the 
truthfulness of my claim is the speech of my fingers" 
and then the fingers spoke that he is liar, this cannot 
be taken as a miracle (mucjiza). 
36Ibid. 
37Ibid., p. 265. 
38lbid. 
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6.6 Marvels (karemä t) 
A marvel (karäma) means a thing or event 
occurring against the customary law (i. e. the law of 
nature) through the hands of a pious servant of God 
known as a saint (wall) who is aware of God and his 
attributes, is dedicated to obedience, turns away from 
disobedience, and avoids being absorbed by material 
pleasures and. cravings. 
A marvel (karama) differs from a miracle 
(mu`jiza) although each involves a" breaking of the 
natural order of things". However, the miracle 
(mu`jiza) occurs in the hands of prophet preceeded by a 
"proclamation" (dacwa) and a challenge to others to 
perform likewise, 39 thereby rendering them unable to 
produce the like. All of this is in order to prove the 
veracity of the claim to prophethood and the veracity 
of the attribution of the message brought from God. 
Marvels (karämät) occur in the hands of a 
saint (wall) as a personal favour. It should be kept 
secret, and is in no way the sign of a prophetic 
mission. 40 It is as a mark of respect for him so that 
he is held as a model for other people to follow in his 
39E. I, 6, P. 615. 
40Ibid. 
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deeds of piety and self purification through the 
cultivation of good manners, conducts and virtues. 
Therefore, it should not be taken to mean 
that such a person may be free from all sins, because 
he is not impeccable (ma`süm) like the prophets who are 
impeccable from infidelity and sins before and after 
the mission. 41 
Most Muslims agree that it is possible for 
marvels (karämät) to appear on the part of saints 
(awliyä'). 42 However, the Mu`tazilites denied the 
intellectual possibility of karämät to the a wliya'. 
They based their claim on the argument that if karämZit 
were to occur through the hands of the awliyä', that 
will create a confusion as to who is a prophet and who 
is a wall, and the number of such occurrences would 
become so great that they would not be considered 
miracles or supernatural happenings any more. According 
to Imäm al-Juwayni, al-Isfarä'ini is close to this 
position. 43 
The scholars have inferred the possibility of 
karämät to the awliyä' from the fact that if one 
supposes its occurrence it is not an absurdity, and all 
41Ibn Khaldün, Mugaddimah, p. 87. 
42A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 266. 
43Ibid. 
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such events are intellectually possible. Evidences of 
karämät having occured from the hands of pious people 
who were non-prophets can be cited from the Qur'än and 
the traditions. Some of such karämet are: 
" a) The story of Mary, mother of Jesus, as 
stated in the Qur'än, God says: 
He vouchsafed her a goodly growth and made 
Zakariyyah her guardian. Whenever Zakariyyah 
went into the sanctuary where she was, he 
found that she had food. He said: "0, Mary, 
whence cometh unto thee this? She answered: 
"It is from God". God giveth without stint to 
whom He wills. 44 
Her growth was unlike that of an ordinary 
childbearing. In a single day her growth was 
phenomenal. There was no one going to her place except 
Zakariyyah and every time he entered he found her with 
food, the summer fruits in the winter and winter fruits 
in summer. 45 
b) The story of the companions of the cave as 
narrated in the Qur'än is another evidence. 46 The 
companions of the cave were non-prophets. They were 
seven chieftains from the Roman Empire who were in fear 
of loosing their faith because of the persecution by 
their king. Therefore, they left their country and 
44The Qur'an, 3 37. 
45A1-Juwayn3, Irshäd, p. 269. 
46Ibid. 
241 
entered a cave. They spent 309 years without food and 
water, sleeping and without any danger. 
c) The story of Asaf as reported: He was the 
chief minister of prophet Solomon. He knew the great 
name of God. He said to prophet Solomon, "Look at the 
sky". And Asaf supplicated to God with the great name 
of God to bring to Solomon the throne of Balgis with 
her on it, and it was brought. Then prophet Solomon 
turned his look and found the throne before him. 47 
These extraordinary acts are not presages, 
because their aim was not the verification of a claim 
to prophecy, they are marvels. 
6.7 Magic (sihr) 
By magic is meant not mere trickey but_ 
sorcery. This magic (sihr) is something extraordinary 
appearing from a mere appearance (k-hay51) and uses the 
properties of substances such as the life of an animals 
to perform a ritual. This form of magic usually i_ 
meant to undermine people. There is an example of this 
magic stated in the Qur'än which show that it happens 
and it is harmful to those at whom it is directed by 
the magician. 48 
47A1-Baghd5d3, Usül, pp. 174-175. 
48A1-B5gi11än3, op., cit. pp. 57-58. 
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The Qur'an and the traditions show that magic 
occurs although its premises are false or its intention 
often evil. The story of the two angels at Babel, Harüt 
and Marüt, who taught mankind magic, and the story of 
Moses and his contests with the magicians of Pharaoh 
are two references which occur in Qur'anic verses. 
The prophet Muhammad, too, had spells cast 
upon him. A chapter of the Qur'än speaks of It the evil 
of those who blow upon knots"49, and CA'ishah tells how 
those magic knots unloosed themselves, when this 
chapter was recited over them. 50 The commentators agree 
that the reason of this chapter revealed by God was to 
cure the prophet Muhammad from the magic of Labid b. 
A`sam. 51 
According to Imam al-Juwayn3 and Imam al- 
Ghazal! the basic difference between miracles, marvels 
and magic are: miracles come from the hands of those 
who are proclaimed as prophets, marvels come from the 
49The Qur'än, 113 : 1-4. 
50Macdonald, The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam, 
Chicago, 1909. p. 113. 
51A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 271. 
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hands of saints, while magic comes from those who are 
godless. 52 
According to the theologians the distinction 
between the miracle and magic is that a miracle is what 
ip worked by a good man, for good objects and for 
purified souls, and by way of proof of the prophetic 
office. Magic is worked only by an evil man, for evil 
purposes and with evil results. 53 
6.8 The proof of the messengership of the prophet 
Muhammad according to Imäm al-Juwayni 
Imäm al-Juwayni began his discussion on the 
proof of the messengership of the prophet Muhammad by 
refuting the arguments of the two groups who denied his 
messengership. 
The first group were those scholars of the 
Jewish faith who denied abrogation (naskh) and claimed 
that there is no messenger after Moses. 54 They produced 
these two arguments: 
Firstly: they claim that abrogation (naskh) 
52Ibid., p. 271, 
-A1-Juwayni, cAgidah, p. 69, 
-A1-Ghaz7ali, Igtisäd, p. 124. 
53Macdonald, op., cit., p. 118. 
54A1-Juwayni, Irsh5d, p. 283. 
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is impossible because it shows changes and 
uncertainty, which is impossible for God. 
Secondly: they assert that Moses said: 
"As long as the earth and the sky exist you 
are in my revelation, " and said again: "I am 
the seal of the messengers. "55 
The second group is the cIsawiyyah, 56 another 
group of Jewish scholars. This group confirmed the 
messengership of the prophet Muhammad but restricted it 
to only Arab people. 
6.8.1 Imam al-Juwayni's rejection of the Jewish 
reservations 
Im5m al-Juwayni rejects the first argument 
(i. e. the impossibility of abrogation) of the first 
group by explaining the reality of abrogation. He holds 
that abrogation means that the expression of the new 
ruling shows the withdrawal or repeal of the earlier 
ruling by another ruling. 57 
55Ibid., p. 285, 
-A1-Ghazäl3, Igtisäd, p. 127. 
56This group are named after Abü `Isd Ishäq b. Ya`qüb 
al-Isbahdni; a1-Shahrastäni, Milal, vol. 2, p. 23. 
57A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 283. 
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He then argues that if the meaning of 
abrogation is the withdrawal of a Divine law and 
replacing it with another Divine law in order to give 
more explanation and benefit, it does not imply that 
God is uncertain, because God knows everything that He 
creates for His creatures. 58 
In rejecting the second argument (i. e. the 
claim attributed to Moses) Imam al-Juwayni argues that 
the Jewish claim is false in two aspects: the first 
aspect is: if their claim is true there would be no 
miracles at the hands of Jesus or Muhammad. But when 
miracles happened to them it proved that the Jewish 
claim is false. Their claim that Moses said; "I am the 
seal of the prophets", 59is therefore not accurate. 
Imam al-Juwayn3 holds that with reference to 
the second aspect of who is the seal of the prophets, 
Muhammad would be more entitled to this claim than 
Moses. It was believed that there was an attempt to 
deny the prophethood of Muhammad and the reference to 
him in the Torah was altered. According to Imäm al- 
Juwayni if there was a wording in the Torah which could 
deny any abrogation against making permanent the 
revelation of Moses, there should have been a strong 
objection at the time of Jesus as there was at the time 
58Ibid., p. 285. 
59lbid., p. 287. 
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of the prophet Muhammad. That is because if there was 
an objection at that time, it would have shown their 
claim to be false. 60 
6.8.2 Imäm al-Ghazäll's rejection of the Jewish 
reservations 
If we look at Imäm al-Ghazäli's view on the 
same subject, we find that he follows exactly the same 
method as his master. This can be seen in his book 
Igtisäd fi al-Ictigäd when he discusses the proof of 
the messengership of the prophet Muhammad. He begins 
his discussion by pointing out the same groups 
identified by Imäm al-Juwayni. 61 
However, Imam al-Ghazdll adds another group 
which is not included in Imam al-3uwayni's discussion. 
This group is those who accept abrogation yet deny the 
messengership of the prophet Muhammad and the miracle 
of the Qur'an. 62 
To reject the first of the Jewish 
arguments, 63 like his master, Imam al-Ghazali begins by 
60Ibid. 
61A1-Ghazäl3, Igtisäd, p. 127, 
-Al-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 283. 
62Ibid., p. 129. 
63Ibid. 
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defining the reality of abrogation. He quotes the same 
definition as his master, that abrogation is the 
expression showing the repeal of a ruling with the 
condition of the continuance of that ruling until the 
new one is confirmed. 64 
Imäm al-Ghazäli then provides an illustration 
of this point: the master asks his servant to stand up 
without informing him of the length of time he is 
required to do this or its advantage. The master knows 
that the standing is only for a specific time. The 
servant understands that he is being asked to stand up 
for an unrestricted time and it is obligatory for him 
to stand up continually unless his master orders him to 
sit down. Whenever his master asks him to sit down he 
will sit down and he does not have an erroneous 
impression that his master has wasted his time. In time 
the advantage and reason of his standing will appear to 
him . That is the way 
how the disagreement of the 
Divine law should be understood. 65 
He further argues that if the sending of the 
prophet is just for deputation and not for the 
abrogation of the Divine revelation before him, or just 
for the repeal of some aspect of the Divine Law rather 
64Ibid., p. 128, 
-A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 283. 
65lbid. 
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than the whole law, such as the changing of the 
direction of the qiblah, or making permissible some 
things earlier forbidden, there is no contradiction in 
these changes and replacement of the Divine law. These 
kinds of affairs are different according to the time 
and situation. The Jewish scholars however claimed that 
there was no Divine revelation from Adam till Noses, 
and thus denied the existence of the revelation of Noah 
and Abraham. The notion of the continuity of reports 
(tawýitur) or a knowledge of it seems to be missing from 
their understanding. 66 
In dealing with the second argument of the 
Jewish scholars, Imam al-Ghazäli follows his master's 
refutation by dividing his argument into two aspects: 
In the first aspect, if the Jewish claim about Moses is 
true there would be no miracles in the hands of Jesus. 
Imam al-Ghazali argues how could God have granted 
miracles to one who is denied by the claim of Moses 
when these miracles are themselves proof of 
prophethood. It seems that they denied the existence of 
Jesus's miracles and especially denied such miracles of 
his as the instance when he returned life to a dead 
body as testament against those who challenged him. It 
seems that everything they rejected, they ascribed to 
66Ibid. 
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Moses's revelation and claimed them as Moses's own 
word. 67 
The second aspect is that this argument was 
only claimed after prophet Muhammad's mission and 
death. If their claim was true they would take this as 
an argument to fight the prophet Muhammad's followers. 
The Prophet Muhammad believed Moses to be a messenger 
of God with his revelation (i. e. the Torah). However, 
according to Imam al-Juwayni the Jewish scholars did 
not use the argument of Moses being the seal of 
prophethood to support their claim because they knew 
that if they used it there would be no support for its 
authenticity and explanation for the continuity of 
reports. If they accepted Jesus, it would also confirm 
the messengership of the prophet Muhammad., -'-S 
In refuting the second group e. the 
ýIsawiyyah), who claim that the prophet Muhammad is 
only for Arab people, Imäm al-Juwayni does not provide 
any discussion of this group because, to him, their 
claim is clearly untrue and there is no need for him to 
argue this. 69 
67Ibid. 
68Ibid., p. 129. 
69A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 283. 
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However, Imäm al-Ghazäll holds a different 
view to his master. He rejects this group and holds 
that they are clearly false, but he goes on to discuss 
this. They confirm the messengership of the prophet 
Muhammad and should have been aware that the prophet 
did not lie in his life. The prophet always asserted 
that he is the messenger to all human beings and he 
sent his messengers to all nations as proof that his 
mission was not only for the Arabs but for all. This is 
confirmed by authentic evidence. Therefore, the claim 
of the `Isawiyyah is impossible and contradictory. 7° 
6.9 Discussion of the proof of the miraculousness of 
the Qur'an according to Imäm al-Juwayn! 
For Muslims the Qur'än is the best of all the 
miracles of the prophet Muhammad, for it has rendered 
all creatures unable to imitate the prophet Muhammad in 
such a way. This is clearly spelt out through the 
challenge: 
"Say: if the entire mankind and the 
Jinns were to gather together in order 
to bring a like of the Qur'än they would 
never bring its like even if some of 
them lend assistance to the others. "71 
Here mankind and Jinns are specifically 
mentioned because they are the only two kinds of 
70A1-Ghazäli, Igtisäd, p. 127. 
71The Qur'än, 17 : 88. 
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creatures for whom the effort of imitation can be 
envisaged. All other creatures are considered unable to 
produce the like of the Qur'an. 
A1-Bägill5ni said that we should give full 
attention to understand the aspect of the 
miraculousness of the Qurldn because the messengership 
of the prophet Muhammad was proved by this as well as 
by other miracles. 72 
Islamic scholars have argued various aspects 
of the miraculousness of the Qu'än as follows: 
First: from the aspect of its writing and 
unusual style which is a deterrent from imitation even 
by an excellent poet. None could write anything like it 
in his own words. Thus the QuIdn's eloquence (fas5ha) 
is a miracle. 73 
Second: from its highest standard of 
rhetorical excellence. If an expert in rhetoric were to 
study the Qur'an he would find that it contains many 
arts of eloquence which no one could repeat or imitate, 
72A1-B5gilläni, I`jäz a1-Qur'än, n. p. 1954. p. 10. 
73Muhammad Rashid Ridä, Tafsir a1-Manär, Beirut, n. d. 
vol. 1, p. 198, 
-Säl ih Sharaf, Muhädarät fi Mädda t a1-Tawhid, Cairo, 
1980, p. 22. 
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even though he may spend all his life attempting 
that. 74 
Third: another aspect of the miraculousness 
of the Qurldn is the prophesies it contains which are 
only possible. with a knowledge of the unseen world. The 
best-known such prophecy concerns the historical 
I. 
victory of the Byzantine Romans over the Persians. 
Shortly after the Romans had been defeated by the 
Persians this prophecy was fulfilled during the 
prophet's lifetime, when the enemies of Islam could 
themselves be witnesses to it: 
"The Roman Empire has been defeated in a 
land close by; but they (even) after 
(this) defeat of theirs will soon be 
victorious within a few years. "75 
Fourth: from the aspect of its content. The 
Qur'än contains details of the science of the divinity, 
rules of devotion, and the foundation of a political 
structure and social civilization which are suitable 
for every period of time and place.? 6 
74lbid. 
75The Qur'än, 30 : 1-2, 
-Bägillän3, op, cit., p. 48. 
76Rashid Ridha, op, cit., vol. 1, p. 206. 
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6.10 The aspect of the miraculousness of the Qur'än 
according to Imam al-JuwaynI 
According to Imäm al-Juwayni the 
miraculousness of the Qur'än is the combination of the 
eloquence and unusual word-patterns. They cannot be 
separated from one another. If one claims the virtue of 
the miracle of the Qur'än is only its eloquence, other 
eloquent Arab poets could claim likewise. Similarly if 
the claim were to be based only on the unusual word- 
patterns, the poet Musaylima with his unusual word- 
patterns could claim likewise. Therefore, the eloquence 
and the word-patterns should be combined together; they 
cannot be separated because masters of eloquence could 
imitate either one separately. 77 
Imäm al-Juwayni then mentions two aspects of 
the miraculousness which are not eloquence or unusual 
word-patterns: 
First: the information about the earlier 
prophets, earlier scriptures and earlier events. We are 
aware that the prophet Muhammad could not even read or 
write, yet he proclaimed the Qur'än and recited its 
many chapters and verses in which he informed about 
earlier events, all in spite of his belonging to an 
77A1-Juwayni, Irshäd, p. 292. 
254 
uneducated people. In this range of knowledge is one of 
the aspects of the miraculousness of the Qur'än. 78 
Second: the Qur'än describes an unseen world 
such as in chapter 30: 2-3. In this case there is a 
forecast of the Byzantine Roman Empire's defeat by the 
Persians. 
Y 
These are the aspects of the miraculousness 
of the Qur'an mentioned by Imam al-Juwayn3 in his book 
al-Irshäd. However, there is another aspect which he 
mentions in his book al-'Agldah a1-Niz5miyyah, that is 
a deterrence (sarfa). The Arabs were certainly able to 
imitate words and short phrases as used by the Qur'an, 
but God deterred them by removing their ability to 
compose likewise. 79 
Imäm al-Juwayni then holds that the prophet 
Muhammad challenges masters of Arabic eloquence to 
produce some work like the Qur'än. This is mentioned in 
the Qur'än : 
"Say: "If the whole of mankind and 
Jinns were to gather together to produce 
the like of the Qur'än, they could not 
produce the like thereof. 1180 
This challenge was posed by the prophet 
Muhammad to the Arabs and has never been met. The 
781bid., p. 295. 
79A1-Juwayn3, `Aq. idah, p. 73. 
BOThe Qur'än, 17 : 88. 
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Qur'än is their language and its eloquence and word- 
patterns are not too different for them, yet they still 
could not produce work like it, even though there have 
been many masters of poetic eloquence and prose writers 
in the Arabic language. However, God removed their 
ability to imitated the Qur'än. 81 
This view of Imam al-Juwayn! is similar to 
that of the Muctazilah who suggested that the 
miraculousness of the Qur'an is a deterrence (sarfa), 
that is, the Arabs could have resisted and imitated the 
Qur'än, but God prevented this by removing either their 
power or their motive, or the necessary knowledge. 82 
Some scholars have disagreed with this, 
saying that this contradicts the view of holding the 
Qur'an itself to be a miracle. 63 Ahmad Hijazi comments 
on this view of Imam al-Juwayn3 by saying that Imam al- 
Juwayni is not right in his view that the 
miraculousness of the Qur'an is God's deterrence of 
imitation. The correct view is that the miraculousness 
of the 'Qur'an is its word-patterns and meaning, not 
81A1-Juwayni, cAg3dah, pp. 73-74. 
82cAbd al-Jabbär, Khamsah, p. 586. 
83`Abd. Saläm 'Abduh, al-cAg3dah Islämiyah bayn al-cAgl 
wa al-Nagl, Cairo, n. d. p. 168. 
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only for the Arabs but for all nations and all periods 
of time. 84 
However, in our view there is no objection to 
a deterrence (sarfa) as an aspect of the miraculousness 
of the Qur'an, beside other aspects of miraculousness 
as mentioned before. What is important here is whether 
Imam al-Juwayni's view on the aspect of the 
miraculousness of the Qur'an influenced his student 
Imam al-Ghazäll. 
6.10.1 The aspect of the miraculousness of the Qur'än 
according to Imam al-Ghazäll 
There is no doubt about this last point. If 
we look at imam al-Ghazali's view on this subject, we 
find that he follows exactly his master's view when he 
holds that the aspect of the miraculousness of the 
Qur'an is its eloquence and unusual word-patterns. 85 
Imäm a1-Ghazäli then claims that the 
combination of both of them is a miracle which cannot 
be imitated by human beings. Perhaps some Arabic poems 
and speeches have eloquence and some of them wanted to 
imitate the word-patterns of the Qurldn after studying 
84Ahmad Hijäz3, Tac1iq fi a1-'Aqidah a1-Niz5miyah 1i1 
al-Juwayni, cairo, p. 114. 
85A1-Ghazäli, Igtisäd, pp. 129-130. 
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it, as has been done by Musaylima. Yet it still is not 
the same. As for the eloquence of the Qur'än, all the 
Arabs writers admired and took notice of the excellent 
word-patterns and eloquence of the Qur'än. All of this 
proves that the combination of both of them is the 
miracle of the Qur'än. 86 
Imam al-Ghazäll also claimed, like his 
master, that the deterrence (sarfa) is regarded as one 
aspect of the miraculousness of the Qur'än. God 
prevented the Arabs from imitating the Qur'än and His 
deterrence is itself a great miracle. 87 
Here, Imäm al-Ghazäl3 follows his master's 
view that the miraculousness of the Qur'än is its 
joining together of the eloquence and unusual word- 
patterns and his claim of a deterrent (sarfa). Imäm al- 
Juwayni's explanations of the miraculousness of the 
Qur'an from the aspect of eloquence and unusual word- 
patterns can be found in his book a1-Irsh5d i15 QawSti` 
al-Adillah f3 Usl11 al-It tigäd, whereas his view on the 
deterrent (sarfa) is in his book al-`AgIdah al- 
Nizämiyyah. However, Imäm al-Ghazäli summarizes all 
86Ibid. 
87Ibid. 
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these views in his book a1-Igtis5d fi a1-Ictig5d. There 
is strong evidence to show that Imam al-Ghazali's view 
on this subject was influenced by his master Imam al- 
Juwayni. 
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6.11 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence presented in the foregoing 
chapters makes it clear that there was a great 
influence of Imam al-Juwayni on Imam al-Ghazali's ideas 
on theological discussion. Imam al-Juwayni uses dIlm 
al-kaläm to solve theological problems by using logical 
argument in defence of the articles of faith and in 
refuting innovators who deviate from the principles of 
the dogma. Later, before the end of his life, he turned 
to the süfi's way. This route of first using rational 
debate and then seeking the mystical way was followed 
by Imam al-Ghazali. He also uses logical proofs in his 
discussion of theological problems and later when he 
feels that it does not satisfy him, he turns to the 
ways of the süfi. 
Imäm al-Juwayni was the first Ashcarite 
scholar to introduce philosophy to the dIlm a1-kal5m 
and he was also the first of the Ashdarites who used 
this new theological approach to reject the 
philosophers. This method was adopted by Imäm al- 
Ghazäli. The claim made by Ibn Khaldün in his 
Mugaddimah88 that Imäm al-Ghazäll was the first 
Ashcarite scholar to introduce philosophy to `Ilm al- 
kaläm is therefore untrue. Evidence for this has been 
88lbn Khaldün, Muqaddimah, p. 352. 
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given in Chapter Three, which illustrates that Imäm al- 
Juwayni's influence upon Imäm al-Ghazäli on this 
subject was profound. 
To prove the existence of God, Imam al- 
Juwayni made use of the syllogism (giyäs) in his 
discussion. Imäm al-Ghazäli also uses the same method 
of his master. However, sometime Imäm al-Ghazäli 
displayed his . Ufi inclination in his discussion in 
order to achieve the perfect belief in the existence of 
God. It should be noted that Imäm al-Ghazäli's position 
is that of a thinker who, taking over the doctrines of 
his predecessors, systematized them and gave them 
clearness and precision. 
The influence of Imam al-Juwayni on Imam al- 
Ghazali can be traced not only in the latter's ideas 
and discussion of identical problems, but the words and 
phrases he employs are similar to those of his teacher. 
Because of the popularity of Imam al-Ghazali and the 
comparative obscurity of Imam al-Juwayni, many of the 
views of the latter have been credited to the former 
and the teacher's writings have been overlooked. This 
study, in part, addresses this oversight in Islamic 
scholarship. 
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APPENDIX 
In 1953, M. A. R. Bisar carried out a study of 
Imäm al-Juwayn3 and Imäm al-Ghazäli as theologians. His 
unpublished Ph. D thesis al-Juwayni and al-Ghazäli as 
theologians with special reference to al-Irshad and al- 
Igtisäd makes a comparison between Imäm al-Juwayn3's 
and Imäm al-Ghazäl3's theological views. ' However, his 
thesis refers only to al-Juwayn3's al-Irshad and al- 
Ghazäli's Igtisäd. Bisar commences his discussion by 
comparing the theological methods of Imäm al-Juwayn3 
and Imäm al-Ghazäli. In this section Bisar argues that 
there are many differences between Imäm al-Juwayn3 and 
Imäm al-Ghazäli in this respect. 
In the second chapter of his thesis, Bisar 
discusses the nature of God and the difficulty of . 
its 
definition. He then goes on to discuss the attributes 
of God and their special characteristics. In chapter 
four Bisar discusses Imäm al-Juwayni's and Imäm al- 
Ghazäli's treatment of God's sitting on the throne and 
the vision of God. It seem that Bisar tries to show 
that Imäm al-Ghazäli is more advanced compared to Imäm 
al-Juwayni. 
1M. A. R. Bisar, al-Juwayni and al-Ghazäli as theologians 
with special reference to al-Irshäd and a1-Igtig5d, 
unpublished Ph. D thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1953. 
Finally in chapter five of his thesis, he 
discusses their views on free-will and predestination. 
Bisar again argues that Imam al-Ghazali's views on this 
subject differed from those of Imam al-Juwayni. 
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